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ABSTRACT 
 
The present research project concerns the topic of cross-border collective re-
dress in the employment context under European Union (EU) law, examined us-
ing a comprehensive approach. Indeed, among the remedies for the effective pro-
tection and enforcement of workers’ rights, collective actions, which include 
forms of industrial action and collective redress procedure, may be resorted to by 
workers or their representative organisations.  
The analysis initially focuses on the protection of the fundamental right to 
collective action vis-à-vis the economic freedoms on the basis of the Court of Jus-
tice case law and its interpretation of the principles of effectiveness and propor-
tionality, and in light of Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The 
precedence of the economic integration pillars appears to have prejudiced the pro-
tection of social rights within the EU, although their fundamental nature is recog-
nised and they are included in European and international human rights’ charters. 
Social rights have been undermined even in times of financial-economic crisis, 
raising questions about the legitimacy of the austerity measures that have affected 
the national social systems. In this case, the competence of the Court to safeguard 
fundamental rights has been challenged.  
The legal framework for the protection of workers in Europe provides for the 
implementation of the main principles enshrined in EU primary law regarding the 
free movement of workers by establishing public enforcement procedures and 
recognising the right to act collectively, even in judicial proceedings. In view of 
increasing labour mobility, difficulties in regulating peculiar situations have 
emerged with regard to posted workers, who only temporarily engage in employ-
ment activities abroad in the framework of the cross-border provision of services. 
The legislation on transnational posting, consisting of two directives, provides for 
substantive elements, i.e. minimum standards of work terms and conditions, as 
well as procedural rules aimed at protecting posted workers from abuse and com-
batting social dumping. Alongside the mechanisms of control involving national 
authorities, the right to act individually or through trade unions or similar entities 
is envisaged.  
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Member States are called upon to ensure in order to guarantee the protection 
of rights, collective redress is considered, in general, to be a viable means for rea-
sons of procedural economy and efficiency of enforcement. Relevant studies and 
legislative developments are still in progress, including the European Commis-
sion’s initiatives on common principles for collective redress procedures, although 
they are non-binding. The adopted horizontal approach, which principally refers 
to consumer protection, but also to antitrust and environmental law, is aimed at 
raising awareness of this procedural remedy, which may even be resorted to in the 
employment context by virtue of the right to collective action as guaranteed in EU 
law. 
Whenever disputes are characterised by transnational implications, private in-
ternational law instruments are to be applied. Considering the relevant EU regula-
tions addressing, among other issues, employment matters, remarks on the con-
necting criteria and the applicability of existing rules to collective redress proce-
dures are put forward with particular regard to the employment context. As to the 
jurisdictional and conflict of laws provisions, the collective dimension does not 
appear to have found room in light of the jurisprudential tendencies and the ob-
servations of the European institutions submitted within the law making process-
es, thus necessitating specific rules, whether generally or pursuant to a sector-
specific approach. 
Against this background, the concluding considerations and recommendations 
address the opportunity to include in the relevant EU legislation specific provi-
sions related to the right to collective action and to cross-border collective redress. 
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SOMMARIO 
 
Il progetto di ricerca riguarda il tema del ricorso collettivo di carattere tran-
sfrontaliero in materia di lavoro nel diritto dell’Unione europea (UE) e viene af-
frontato secondo un approccio che racchiude diverse prospettive. Infatti, 
nell’ambito dei rimedi volti ad assicurare la protezione dei diritti dei lavoratori, gli 
stessi lavoratori o le organizzazioni rappresentative possono promuovere azioni 
collettive, che comprendono forme di sciopero e procedure di ricorso collettivo.  
L’analisi si concentra inizialmente sulla tutela del diritto fondamentale 
all’azione collettiva, soggetto al bilanciamento con le libertà economiche, in base 
alla giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia e della sua interpretazione dei principi 
di effettività e proporzionalità, e alla luce della disposizione di cui all’articolo 28 
della Carta dei diritti fondamentali. È stata riconosciuta la prevalenza delle libertà 
volte a realizzare l’integrazione economica, pregiudicando in tal modo la prote-
zione dei diritti sociali all’interno dell’UE, sebbene sia stata affermata la loro na-
tura fondamentale e siano contenuti in strumenti europei e internazionali dedicati 
alla tutela dei diritti umani. L’affievolimento dei diritti sociali si è verificato anche 
nel contesto della crisi economico-finanziaria, dove sono state sollevate questioni 
circa la legittimità delle misure di austerità che hanno inciso sui sistemi sociali 
nazionali. In questo contesto, la competenza e il ruolo della Corte nella salvaguar-
dia dei diritti fondamentali sono stati criticati. 
Il quadro giuridico relativo alla protezione dei lavoratori in Europa è finaliz-
zato a dare attuazione ai principi fondamentali sanciti dal diritto primario dell’UE 
in materia di libera circolazione dei lavoratori, stabilendo procedure di esecuzione 
pubblica e riconoscendo il diritto di agire anche in procedimenti giudiziari. In 
considerazione dell’aumento della mobilità del lavoro si sono registrate difficoltà 
di regolamentazione delle situazioni peculiari che interessano i lavoratori distacca-
ti, i quali svolgono solo temporaneamente attività lavorative all’estero nell’ambito 
della libera circolazione dei servizi. La legislazione sul distacco transfrontaliero, 
contenuta in due direttive, prevede elementi sostanziali, vale a dire norme minime 
in materia di condizioni e termini di lavoro, nonché regole procedurali, volte a 
proteggere i lavoratori distaccati e a combattere il social dumping. Accanto ai 
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meccanismi di controllo che coinvolgono le autorità nazionali, è stabilito il diritto 
di agire individualmente oppure rappresentati da organizzazioni sindacali o simili. 
Tra i rimedi effettivi che gli Stati membri devono offrire ai fini di tutelare i di-
ritti dei lavoratori, il ricorso collettivo può essere ritenuto un efficace strumento 
anche per ragioni di economia e di efficienza processuale. Il tema è oggetto di 
studi e sviluppi legislativi, tra cui rilevano le iniziative della Commissione euro-
pea sui principi comuni applicabili ai meccanismi di ricorso collettivo, seppur non 
vincolanti. Principalmente riferito alla tutela dei consumatori, ma anche in materia 
di antitrust e di diritto ambientale, l’approccio orizzontale che è stato proposto ap-
pare utile per promuovere un’azione europea relativa al ricorso collettivo, che po-
trebbe ugualmente essere ricondotto nell’ambito del diritto di lavoro in virtù del 
riconoscimento del diritto all’azione collettiva nella legislazione europea rilevan-
te. 
Qualora le controversie siano caratterizzate da implicazioni transnazionali, gli 
strumenti di diritto internazionale privato devono trovare applicazione. Conside-
rando i rilevanti regolamenti dell’UE che disciplinano, tra le altre, questioni legate 
ai contratti di lavoro, vengono valutati i criteri di collegamento e la possibile ap-
plicazione delle disposizioni alle procedure di ricorso collettivo in materia di lavo-
ro. Per quanto riguarda le norme sui conflitti di giurisdizione e di leggi, alla luce 
della tendenza giurisprudenziale e delle osservazioni avanzate dalle istituzioni eu-
ropee nell’ambito dei processi legislativi, la dimensione collettiva sembra non 
trovare spazio, richiedendo quindi regole specifiche da applicare in generale o in 
settori specifici. 
Alla luce di quanto sopra, considerazioni conclusive e proposte di modifica 
affrontano l’opportunità di inserire nella legislazione rilevante disposizioni speci-
fiche relative al diritto all’azione collettiva e al ricorso collettivo transfrontaliero 
attraverso un’interpretazione sistematica del diritto dell’UE. 
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Executive Summary 
 
The introductory chapter aims at illustrating the reasons for the research project 
and its main features. Collective redress with transnational implications represents 
an actual and cross-cutting topic, but the employment context has not yet been ad-
dressed. On the basis of ongoing research, including research conducted abroad, 
the study has been developed and integrated with arguments and doctrine. The 
scope is to provide an examination that covers the relevant profiles concerning 
cross-border collective redress in EU law, with particular regard to the employ-
ment context, from the substantive, procedural and private international law per-
spectives, with the ultimate objective of submitting recommendations for consid-
eration in the development of EU-related policies. 
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1.1. Introduction: background. 
The main question in this research project is whether the relevant existing Eu-
ropean Union (EU) legislation, in which the right to collective action is recog-
nised, is sufficient to grant effective protection to workers’ rights in transnational 
disputes and whether collective redress could contribute to their enforcement. In 
view of the smooth functioning of the internal market, civil judicial cooperation is 
an essential policy of the European Union which is aimed at creating an area of 
freedom, security and justice where rights and freedoms are recognised to citizens. 
A particular situation involves workers who move abroad in the framework of the 
free movement of persons or the freedom to provide services. Within the legisla-
tion in force and in progress, the remedies to which workers may resort are not set 
forth in a clear (European) regime nor in specific provisions; such is the case for 
cross-border collective redress. In this context, issues arise from the substantive, 
procedural and private international law perspectives. 
Some clarifications about the use of the term “collective redress” must be 
provided preliminarily with regard to the concept of collective action. The latter is 
mentioned when dealing with the fundamental social rights, as referred to in in-
ternational and European instruments. It covers every type of activity that work-
ers, trade unions or other organisations may implement to claim the respect for 
rights in employment matters. Collective redress, in line with the definition pro-
vided by the Commission
1
, is addressed within the analysis under procedural law, 
as it is considered to be a means to initiate judicial proceedings. Commonly, col-
lective redress, as a generic term, may comprise class, group or representative liti-
                                                          
1
  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Eu-
ropean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a Euro-
pean Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress, COM(2013)401 final of 11 June 2013, 
where it defined collective redress as «a procedural mechanism that allows, for reasons of 
procedural economy and/or efficiency of enforcement, many similar legal claims to be bun-
dled into a single court action. Collective redress facilitates access to justice in particular in 
cases where the individual damage is so low that potential claimants would not think it worth 
pursuing an individual claim. It also strengthens the negotiating power of potential claimants 
and contributes to the efficient administration of justice, by avoiding numerous proceedings 
concerning claims resulting from the same infringement of law». All EU documents are 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu. 
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gation and alternative dispute resolution procedures that enable groups of individ-
uals with low-value losses to take on powerful corporate interests. The relevant 
terminology may also include class action, class context, and collective or multi-
party litigation
2
.  
At the substantive level, the right to collective action is envisaged in the inter-
national and European charters on social rights and in the relevant legislation, in 
which the role of trade unions, representative organisations or other similar enti-
ties is deemed essential to the collective defence of workers’ interests. This role 
should be performed in both extrajudicial and judicial situations. Collective ac-
tions mainly refer to extrajudicial activities undertaken to assert respect for work 
terms and conditions or to conclude a collective employment agreement. As a fur-
ther means of protection falling within the social right to collective action, collec-
tive redress, as a judicial remedy, should be provided for in legal proceedings, in 
which trade unions may represent workers’ interests at the national and European 
levels. In this regard, the representation of workers, i.e. local as well as posted 
workers, should be ensured in order to strengthen the opportunity to act collec-
tively, even in cross-border cases.  
As to representative organisations in the area of labour law, the right of trade 
unions to act has been questioned with respect to its impact on the smooth func-
tioning of the internal market. In the framework of the freedoms of movement, 
obstacles have been faced when collective actions have hampered the economic 
activities of the relevant undertaking. In particular, the protection of fundamental 
social rights has been challenged when it is in conflict with the EU general princi-
ples enshrined in the Treaties. The balancing with the economic freedoms has en-
                                                          
2
  On the terminology see D. FAIRGRIEVE, G. HOWELLS, Collective redress procedures: Euro-
pean debates, in D. FAIRGRIEVE, E. LEIN (edited by), Extraterritoriality and collective re-
dress, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 15-41, spec. pp. 17-18; M. DANOV, The 
Brussels I Regulation: cross-border collective redress proceedings and judgments, in Journal 
of Private International Law, 2010, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 359-393, spec. p. 359; see also C. 
HODGES, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal Systems, A new 
Framework for Collective Redress in Europe, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 
2008; R. MULHERON, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Per-
spective, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2004. 
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tailed a downgrading of the social rights, including the right to collective action. 
In this regard, the judgments of the Court of Justice in the Viking and Laval cases
3
 
demonstrate the priority given to the market freedoms, and thus the placement of 
social rights within the EU legal order. After the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which affirmed the legally binding effect of the EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights, whose Article 28 protects the right to collective action, conflicts have 
continued to arise with regard to aspects of social policy because the EU does not 
have exclusive competence. According to the Charter, restrictions on the funda-
mental rights are allowed provided that the prescribed conditions are met
4
, and 
when emergency situations occur, such as economic and financial crisis. Never-
theless, the European institutions’ commitment to concretely create the social di-
mension of the Union as envisaged in the Treaties has recently been manifested 
with the proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights
5
.  
As to the procedural remedies, collective redress is referred to in other specif-
ic sectors, such as antitrust law and consumer policy
6
. Collective mechanisms for 
private enforcement were recognised as an effective means in the 2013 Communi-
cation of the Commission
7
. It stated that «collective redress facilitates access to 
justice in particular in cases where the individual damage is so low that potential 
                                                          
3
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05, Interna-
tional Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and 
OÜ Viking Line Eesti, EU:C:2007:772; (Grand Chamber), judgment of 18 December 2007, 
Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Bygg-
nadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, 
EU:C:2007:809. See infra in Chapter 2, para. 2.2. All judgments of the Court of Justice are 
available at http://curia.europa.eu. 
4
  See Article 51; and infra in Chapter 2, paras. 2.1 and 2.2. 
5
  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Establishing a European 
Pillar of Social Rights, COM(2017)250 final of 26 April 2017; Proposal for a Interinstitution-
al Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights, COM(2017)251 final of 26 April 
2017; solemnly proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
17 November 2017. For comments see S. GIUBBONI, Appunti o disappunti sul pilastro euro-
peo dei diritti sociali, in Quaderni costituzionali, 2017, n. 4, pp. 953-962. 
6
  See infra in Chapter 4, para. 4.1. 
7
  Communication from the Commission, COM(2013)401 final of 11 June 2013, cit.  
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claimants would not think it worth pursuing an individual claim. It also strength-
ens the negotiating power of potential claimants and contributes to the efficient 
administration of justice, by avoiding numerous proceedings concerning claims 
resulting from the same infringement of law»
8
. This procedural mechanism is 
deemed to be a means of protection favouring weaker parties; even within the 
employment field, workers organised in trade unions may also more effectively 
claim respect for their rights and promote the defence of their economic and social 
interests.  
Jointly with the 2013 Communication, the Commission adopted a Recom-
mendation on common principles and guidelines for injunctive and compensatory 
collective mechanisms
9
. It invited the Member States to adapt their legislation on 
collective redress procedures by providing for an opt-in system, limiting the 
standing to representative actions brought by non-profit entities, establishing the 
loser-pays principle, limiting the funding of litigation by third parties and pro-
scribing punitive damages. However, it is a non-binding instrument, and it has 
been criticised as to its legal value in the Member States
10
. 
In any case, these EU initiatives show the legislative progress in relation to 
the development of means of private enforcement in different policy areas. Never-
theless, the employment context has not yet been addressed.  
European labour law covers many different aspects, from the general princi-
ples, the freedom to move and to establish, to the work terms and conditions ap-
plicable to posted workers in the framework of the free provision of services. In-
deed, with regard to the posting of workers regime
11
, it is possible to identify a 
                                                          
8
  Ibidem, spec. at para. 1.2. 
9
  Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of 
rights granted under Union Law (2013/396/EU), in OJ L 201 of 26 July 2013, pp. 60-65. 
10
  See infra in Chapter 4, para. 4.1. 
11
  Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, in OJ L 18 
of 21 January 1997, pp. 1-6; Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 
14 
 
procedure for public enforcement (based on cooperation among the national au-
thorities under Directive 2014/67) and specific provisions addressing private liti-
gation in transnational situations. Private judicial remedies are deemed effective 
in pursuing the aim of protecting rights at the EU level in accordance with Article 
47 of the Charter on the right to an effective remedy. Commonly, individual 
claims are initiated to seek the protection of rights, and the national rules apply. 
Collective mechanisms are indeed provided in the Member States’ legal orders 
solely for certain categories of weaker parties, such as consumers. As to employ-
ment matters, most of the national systems recognise trade unions, associations or 
organisations of workers as being entitled to act in support of employees or on be-
half of them. At the European Union level, such entities are granted a role within 
the social dialogue that is aimed at contributing to the development of legislation. 
In transnational disputes, difficulties may arise when workers employed in 
one country wish to introduce proceedings in another Member State. Due to the 
fact that individual claims are often too challenging in terms of costs, length of the 
proceedings, as well as uncertainty about the applicable domestic law, workers are 
discouraged from acting against their employers. Assuming that collective redress 
is a more effective and viable means, and given the national procedural differ-
ences, issues related to private international law, such as the jurisdiction (which 
authority shall be competent), the applicable law (which law should be applied to 
employment relationship issues involving a class of workers) and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments, are at stake. 
The existing EU regulations in civil and commercial matters play a fundamen-
tal role by providing for uniform rules of private international law. Such acts con-
tain specific rules on workers as weaker parties (namely, individual employment 
contracts), and in conjunction with the directives concerning posted workers, they 
offer a starting point from which to consider and examine the framework on col-
lective redress in the employment context. The relevant EU regulations are: the 
Brussels I Recast on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
                                                                                                                                                               
1024/2012 on administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System 
(‘the IMI Regulation’), in OJ L 159 of 28 May 2014, pp. 11-31; see infra in Chapter 3. 
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ments
12
 and Rome I or II on the applicable law
13
. In light of the entrance into 
force of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, European institutions, such as the Euro-
pean Parliament with its 2013 Resolution
14
, have observed that it does not cover 
certain aspects of the rules on jurisdiction applicable to employment law. Those 
initiatives have been spurred by the dismissal of the Proposal for a Regulation on 
the exercise of the right to take collective action, including the right to strike 
(Monti II Regulation), and the former proposal to add into the Brussels I Recast 
Regulation an article concerning the right to strike (Monti clause)
15
 with regard to 
the procedural aspects. Such acts clearly referred to the Laval quartet sentences, 
in which the Court of Justice, on the one hand, considered the social rights as fun-
damental, and on the other, recognised that their protection could be an obstacle to 
the economic freedoms. Accordingly, the right to collective action in the cross-
border employment context is deemed essential with a view to both guaranteeing 
the smooth functioning of the internal market and protecting workers’ rights 
across Europe. 
In fact, the questions arising from the applicability of the present international 
private law instruments are the following: (i) whether, with respect to jurisdiction, 
the competent court pursuant to the provisions on individual employment con-
tracts should have jurisdiction over collective redress; and whether, with regard to 
industrial actions, the forum for disputes, in line with the Rome II Regulation, 
should be the place where the industrial action is to be or has been taken; (ii) 
whether, as to the applicable law, with the aim of avoiding that the court applies 
                                                          
12
  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Decem-
ber 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and com-
mercial matters, in OJ L 351 of 20 December 2012, pp. 1-32. 
13
  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), in OJ L 177 of 4 July 2008, pp. 6-
16; Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), in OJ L 199 of 31 July 
2007, pp. 40-49. 
14
  European Parliament resolution of 8 October 2013 on improving private international law: 
jurisdiction rules applicable to employment (2013/2023(INI)), P7_TA(2013)0396. All Euro-
pean Parliament documents are available at www.europarl.europa.eu. 
15
  See infra in Chapter 2, para. 2.4. 
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the law of another Member State, which may not guarantee the most favourable 
solution, coherence between the jurisdictional rules and the rules governing the 
applicable law for employment disputes, as well as the need to prevent forum 
shopping, should be ensured; (iii) whether, relating to the recognition and en-
forcement of judgments, given that the Brussels I Recast Regulation provides for 
the abolition of exequatur, some problems might arise due to the differences in the 
national legislations related, for instance, to the procedural public policy of the re-
quested court.  
To conclude, the absence of a clear regime or specific provisions on collective 
redress gives rise to legal uncertainty, particularly because national laws provide 
different rules regarding collective mechanisms. Considering that the right to col-
lective action is included within the fundamental social rights enshrined in inter-
national and European instruments, in conjunction with the right to an effective 
remedy, it appears necessary that the collective redress procedure shall be gov-
erned by EU law, thus providing for common conflict of jurisdictions and laws 
rules when no substantive standards are established.  
Within this context, the protection of workers’ rights calls for EU sector-
specific action, particularly in light of the recent legislative developments con-
cerning posted workers. Questions based on political grounds may interfere with 
future proposals for a legislative act on cross-border collective redress. Neverthe-
less, many recent initiatives in Europe, such as the abovementioned European Pil-
lar on Social Rights, have addressed the need to protect social rights in order to 
strengthen the objective of an ever closer (social) Union. 
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1.2. Objectives.  
The final aim is to determine a European Union legal framework on cross-
border collective redress in the employment context. Collective redress may con-
stitute an effective means of enforcement for the protection of workers’ rights, 
falling within the fundamental social right to collective action with specific regard 
to judicial proceedings. Based on the analysis of legislation, doctrine and case 
law, it is possible to assert that the existing regime and rules are inconsistent and 
inappropriate to ensure means for workers’ protection in the transnational context.  
Therefore, the objectives of this work may be briefly summarised as follows: 
to provide an overview of the protection of the fundamental social rights vis-à-vis 
the economic freedoms and in times of economic and financial crisis, with partic-
ular regard to the right to collective action (in Chapter 2); to identify the existing 
legislation on the protection of rights of workers and posted workers, whether col-
lective actions are included among the remedies available for this purpose, which 
are aimed at ensuring the fundamental procedural rights to access to justice and to 
an effective remedy (in Chapter 3); to point out the role of procedural law in the 
enforcement of rights, and in particular of collective redress as a means of private 
enforcement. It is not the purpose of this work to decide which form of collective 
redress proceedings is more effective (in Chapter 4); to analyse the existing appli-
cable private international law rules to employment matters (of workers and post-
ed workers) and to identify possible solutions suitable for cross-border collective 
redress in the employment context (in Chapter 5). 
In conclusion (in Chapter 6), the final considerations stress the need for inter-
vention on the research topic, and accordingly some recommendations are sug-
gested to provide useful starting points for legislative development. 
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1.3. Approach.  
To address the main topic of the research project, an approach covering vari-
ous perspectives under EU law has been implemented. Cross-border collective re-
dress in the employment context is examined in relation to the protection of fun-
damental social rights, particularly the right to collective action, in the EU legal 
order; from the EU civil procedure perspective, by assessing the need to regulate 
collective redress as a means of private enforcement; and from the EU private in-
ternational law point of view, by assessing the existing rules applicable to em-
ployment matters and determining whether they are applicable to cross-border 
collective redress in the employment context. All EU law-related viewpoints are 
interconnected; thus, a comprehensive assessment of the topic is pursued to high-
light the relevant issues. 
The underlying reasoning of this approach is based on the assumption that, 
because collective action is recognised among the fundamental social rights, 
which are given priority in the realisation of the internal market and the area of 
freedom, security and justice, at the legislative level, there is a lack of appropri-
ateness and a need to intervene in relation to the judicial remedy of collective re-
dress. To protect and enforce the social rights, it is not sufficient to merely recog-
nise them in binding instruments; rather, legislation setting forth clear rules within 
the procedural and private international law provisions is also required to achieve 
the aim of legal certainty. 
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1.4. Outline of this work. 
The present work starts with a short preliminary and illustrative introduction 
in the present Chapter 1.  
The recognition of fundamental social rights in the EU, including the right to 
collective action, based on an analysis of the relevant instruments on fundamental 
rights protection, as well as the case law at the EU and national levels, is ad-
dressed in Chapter 2. In particular, an analysis is conducted regarding the protec-
tion of fundamental social rights vis-à-vis the economic freedoms and then in 
times of economic crisis. The legal framework on the right to collective action is 
then examined. 
In Chapter 3, the protection of workers under EU law is addressed by under-
lining the relevant provisions, which also refer to the right to collective action, 
and by examining the phenomenon of the posting of workers and the specific leg-
islation.  
Collective redress, as a judicial remedy, is assessed under Chapter 4 from an 
EU civil procedure perspective, considering the role of the EU action, its scope, 
legal basis and potential advantages.  
Ultimately, private international law issues are examined in Chapter 5 by fo-
cusing on the existing instruments concerning employment matters and then eval-
uating the rules applicable to collective redress involving workers, as well as 
posted workers.  
To conclude, in Chapter 6, considerations and possible suggestions are sub-
mitted.  
20 
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Executive Summary 
 
Chapter 2 addresses the question of how fundamental social rights are considered 
and protected within the European framework, especially in the Court of Justice 
case law. Although social rights find a place in EU primary law, their relevance is 
balanced with the principles of economic integration, competition law, free 
movement of goods, freedoms of establishment or of provision of services in view 
of the smooth functioning of the internal market. Another conflict occurs when 
the protection of social rights is invoked against restrictive measures in times of 
economic-financial crisis. In this context, the protection of workers’ rights across 
the EU is concerned, with particular regard to the right to collective action as a 
means of enforcement. 
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2.1. Introduction: fundamental social rights in the EU. 
Fundamental social rights have experienced an evolution in terms of their po-
sition in the European Union (EU) legal order: originally, selective employment 
rights were provided in a set of legislative initiatives, and then included in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights that become legally binding
16
. In this regard, the 
Court of Justice’s jurisprudence has intervened in their interpretation and interplay 
with EU principles.  
The preliminary questions address what the fundamental social rights are, 
why they need to be protected, whether the EU has competence over their exer-
cise, and thus the Court of Justice’s power to control respect for them and the le-
gitimacy of EU and national acts. 
The fundamental rights comprise social and employment rights, and they are 
mostly referenced in the international human rights documents and the national 
Constitutions. Social rights enable citizens to demand services and assistance (re-
garding the right to health, the right to education, social security rights, etc.) from 
the State and, in contrast, envisage obligations for the States, which shall con-
cretely provide means of national measures or direct actions. In the employment 
context, such rights include, for instance, the right to collective action and to col-
lective bargaining. In particular, the right to act collectively, including industrial 
actions, sympathy actions, blockades, strikes, lockouts as well as collective re-
dress as judicial procedures, is aimed at achieving the protection for weak parties. 
The exercise of all such rights is covered by domestic law, which may differ from 
one State to another. 
The objective of protecting the fundamental rights in EU law is to ensure that 
those rights are not infringed in areas of EU activity, whether through action at the 
EU level or through the implementation of EU law by the Member States. The 
reason for pursuing that objective is the need to avoid a situation in which the lev-
el of protection of the fundamental rights varies according to the national law in-
                                                          
16
  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, proclaimed in Nice on 7 December 
2000, adapted at Strasbourg on 12 December 2007 and became legally binding on the EU 
with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty on European Union – TEU and Trea-
ty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU) in December 2009. All EU legislation 
is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu. 
23 
 
volved in such a way as to undermine the unity, primacy and effectiveness of EU 
law
17
. 
From the outset of the European Communities, social rights did not fall with-
in their competences
18
, given that the Communities were aimed at regulating eco-
nomic freedoms as a means for the creation of the internal market. Social matters 
were not within the Communities’ competences in accordance with Articles 117 
and 118 of the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty, except for the 
principle of non-discrimination with regard to remuneration for men and women 
(Article 119 EEC Treaty, now Article 157 TFEU). 
By virtue of the Single European Act of 1986, the Community had the power 
to adopt directives as established by Article 118A of the EEC Treaty. It authorised 
the Council, acting by a qualified majority in the framework of the cooperation 
procedure, to establish the minimum requirements with a view to «encouraging 
improvements, especially in the working environment, as regards the health and 
safety of workers». This provision was maintained (see then Article 137 EC Trea-
ty and now Article 153 TFEU).  
In 1989, all of the Member States at that time, except for the United King-
dom, signed the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, 
which was a political declaration with non-binding legal force or effect containing 
a series of social and labour rights for workers. 
                                                          
17
  Court of Justice, judgment of 17 December 1970, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesell-
schaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, EU:C:1970:114, para. 
3; similarly, (Grand Chamber), judgment of 26 February 2013, Case C-399/11, Stefano Mel-
loni v Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107, para. 60; judgment of 6 March 2014, Case C-
206/13, Cruciano Siragusa v Regione Sicilia - Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di 
Palermo, EU:C:2014:126, paras. 31-32; judgment of 10 July 2014, Case C-198/13, Víctor 
Manuel Julian Hernández and Others v Reino de España (Subdelegación del Gobierno de 
España en Alicante) and Others, EU:C:2014:2055, para. 47. 
18
  On the EU competences on social matters, see A. FABRE, La «fondamentalisation» des droits 
sociaux en droit de l’Union européenne, in R. TINIERE, C. VIAL (sous la direction de), La pro-
tection des droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne. Entre évolution et permanence, 
Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2015, pp. 163-194, spec. p. 165 f.; on the origin see also E. TRIGGIANI, 
La complessa vicenda dei diritti sociali fondamentali nell’Unione europea, in Studi 
sull’integrazione europea, 2014, IX, pp. 9-33, spec. pp. 9-13. 
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The Agreement on Social Policy of 2 February 1992 was annexed to the Pro-
tocol on Social Policy of the Treaty of Maastricht, and it was signed by only elev-
en Member States, excluding the United Kingdom. The Agreement goes back to 
the Joint Agreement of the Social Partners of 31 October 1991, which was elabo-
rated by the social partners within the intergovernmental conference in Maastricht. 
The two texts are nearly identical. The Agreement on Social Policy proposed a 
constitutionally recognised role for the social partners in the Community legisla-
tive process, which had formerly engaged only with the Institutions. At the same 
time, a major extension of EC competences in employment and industrial rela-
tions was proposed, allowing for qualified majority voting with respect to some of 
the new competences. Nonetheless, the recognition of social rights was not aimed 
at giving relevance to such rights; rather, they were considered to be a corollary of 
the realisation of the common market and thus the economic integration
19
. The 
social rights were deemed to be instrumental
20
, but, at the same time, they could 
be an obstacle to economic progress
21
. 
In the 1993 Copenhagen criteria
22
, there was no space for either social policy 
aspects or for social rights; attention was given solely to the economic and politi-
cal dimensions of the States that asked to become Members of the Union
23
. 
                                                          
19
  M. BENOLO-CARABOT, Chapitre 2. Les droits sociaux dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union Eu-
ropéenne, in D. ROMAN (sous la direction de), Droits des pauvres, pauvres droits ? Re-
cherches sur la justiciabilité des droits sociaux, in La Revue des Droits de l’Homme, 2012, 
No. 1, pp. 84-102, spec. p. 87 ff., available at http://revdh.revues.org. 
20
  A. FABRE, La «fondamentalisation» des droits sociaux, cit., p. 165: «conception instrumen-
tale». 
21
  I. INGRAVALLO, La Corte di giustizia tra diritto di sciopero e libertà economiche fondamen-
tali. Quale bilanciamento?, in La Comunità internazionale, 2008, No. 4, pp. 641-662, spec. at 
p. 643. 
22
  Available at www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/conclusions.  
23
  I. INGRAVALLO, La Corte di giustizia tra diritto di sciopero e libertà economiche fondamen-
tali, cit., p. 654; I. INGRAVALLO, Il diritto di sciopero e quello di contrattazione collettiva 
nell’Unione europea dopo il Trattato di Lisbona, in P. GARGIULO (a cura di), Politica e diritti 
sociali nell’Unione europea. Quale modello sociale europeo?, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica, 
2011, pp. 217-242, spec. p. 218. 
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In 2000, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights was proclaimed. It includes 
civil and political rights as well as socio-economic rights (Chapter IV “Solidari-
ty”). Subsequently, the EU Charter was mentioned in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty un-
der Article 6 TEU, whose paragraph 1 states: «The Union recognises the rights, 
freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, 
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties». The following paragraph 3 
specifies that «Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute 
general principles of the Union’s law». It codifies the Court of Justice case law 
according to which the Charter has been used as a source of general principles of 
EU law, against which even the primary provisions of EU law in the Treaties may 
be measured and assessed. 
As to employment and social policies, according to the Treaties, they fall 
primarily under the national competence of the Member States: Social policy is an 
area of shared competence between the EU and the Member States pursuant to Ar-
ticle 4, paragraph 2, letter b TFEU. The harmonisation of national laws in the are-
as of social exclusion and modernisation of the welfare protection systems are 
matters for which the EU may coordinate national laws (Article 153, paragraph 1 
TFEU). Any EU legislation relating to employees’ protection against dismissal, 
information and consultation of workers, collective representation, defence of 
workers’ and employers’ interests, and conditions of employment for non-EU na-
tionals, requires unanimity in the Council (Article 153, paragraph 2 TFEU). Pay, 
the right of association, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs are 
beyond the EU competence (Article 153, paragraph 5 TFEU). Principles on non-
discrimination between men and women, mainly with regard to pay, are affirmed 
in Article 157 TFEU.  
26 
 
Among the European initiatives, the Institutions have focused on the need to 
give weight to social rights within the European integration process and to face 
new challenges and obstacles
24
.  
Remarks on the conception and placement of the social rights in the EU legal 
order may be pointed out, not only at the legislative (and non-legislative) level, 
but also at the interpretative level, on the basis of European and national case law. 
The Court of Justice has intervened to clarify the rights of migrant workers in 
relation to the freedoms of movement within the internal market. In this regard, it 
can be debated whether the Court of Justice is the most appropriate venue to bal-
                                                          
24
  In the 2006 Green Paper “Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century”, 
COM(2006)708 final of 22 November 2006, the Commission called for actions to enforce 
workers’ rights and their protection in the labour market facing globalisation challenges. In 
2010 it adopted the Communication “Reaffirming the free movement of workers: rights and 
major developments”. In the EU Citizenship Report “Dismantling the obstacles to EU citi-
zens’ rights” of 27 October 2010 (action 15) and then in the 2013 EU Citizenship Report “EU 
citizens: your rights, your future”, the Commission addressed the need to remove administra-
tive hurdles and to simplify procedures for Union citizens living, working and travelling in 
other Member States. In the Communication “Towards a job-rich recovery” of 18 April 2012 
(the Employment Package), the Commission announced its intention to present a legislative 
proposal (information and advice) in order to support mobile workers in the exercise of rights 
derived from the TFEU and Regulation (EU) No. 492/2011. The Commission presented the 
2013 Communication “Strengthening the social dimension of the economic and monetary un-
ion” (COM(2013)690 final of 2 October 2013), in which it «proposes a number of initiatives 
to strengthen the social dimension of EMU with a particular focus on three points: reinforced 
surveillance of employment and social challenges and policy coordination; enhanced solidari-
ty and action on employment and labour mobility; strengthened social dialogue». This action 
falls within the scope of the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth, which places social policy at the core of the EU’s economic plan. Following the 
Communication, the European Parliament, in its Resolution of 21 November 2013 
(P7_TA(2013)0515), «urges that social considerations be placed at the core of European inte-
gration and mainstreamed into all EU policies and initiatives; considers that the social dimen-
sion should be a reconciliation/trade-off factor in terms of ‘bench learning’; notes that the 
purpose of the social dimension of the EMU is to provide social security and a sufficient liv-
ing standard for current and future generations; considers it important, therefore, for EU citi-
zens to see that their Union is capable of promoting social progress». 
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ance market interests and the fundamental social rights
25
. This consideration gives 
rise to doubts concerning the role and powers of the European judges, whose ap-
proaches as to whether the fundamental rights prevail or not have been different 
depending on the circumstances of the case. Certainly, the European integration 
process was originally aimed at creating a European economic area based on eco-
nomic principles. The core of the European policies indeed focused on the internal 
market and later moved on to the people, i.e. the European citizens. Due to the 
recognition of the European citizenship, nationals can enjoy some specific rights, 
including social rights, when they move across the Member States. 
The fact that social policy is under national sovereignty has not precluded the 
Court of Justice from interfering
26
 and controlling the Member States’ legislation, 
even in matters not under EU competence
27
. 
In the case law of the Court of Justice, relevant judgments have addressed is-
sues related to fundamental rights in various areas of social policy. The recogni-
tion of the fundamental nature of social rights is linked to the adoption of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the Union did not pro-
vide for specific social rights, and European judges developed significant deci-
sions in light of the principles of direct effect and supremacy
28
. Because the fun-
damental rights did not have a written basis in EU law, the Court of Justice, in 
some cases, considered them as general principles and, in others, as principles of 
                                                          
25
  I. INGRAVALLO, La Corte di giustizia tra diritto di sciopero e libertà economiche fondamen-
tali, cit., p. 643. 
26
  Ibidem, p. 644. 
27
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05, Interna-
tional Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and 
OÜ Viking Line Eesti, EU:C:2007:772, paras. 40-41; (Grand Chamber), judgment of 18 De-
cember 2007, Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbun-
det, EU:C:2007:809, paras. 87-88. 
28
  M. BEIJER, The Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU. The Scope for the Devel-
opment of Positive Obligations, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, Intersentia, 2017, pp. 110-
112. 
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social rights
29
. This evaluation is relevant to understanding the status of the fun-
damental rights (including social rights) in the EU legal order. 
The Court of Justice first recognised the fundamental rights as part of the 
general principles for which it should ensure respect in the Stauder case of 1969
30
. 
The question was related to Article 4 of Decision No. 69/71 EEC of the Commis-
sion of the European Communities. It concerned whether a requirement that the 
sale of butter at reduced prices to beneficiaries under certain social welfare 
schemes shall be subject to the condition that the name of beneficiaries shall be 
divulged to retailers could be considered compatible with the general principles of 
Community law in force. In its judgment, the Court held that «the most liberal in-
terpretation must prevail, provided that it is sufficient to achieve the objectives 
pursued by the decision in question. It cannot, moreover, be accepted that the au-
thors of the decision intended to impose stricter obligations in some Member 
States than in others»
31
. It then specified that «interpreted in this way the provi-
sion at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human 
rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the 
Court»
32
. Thus, the Court affirmed the nature of the fundamental rights, consider-
ing them among the general principles of European law; accordingly, the funda-
mental rights were recognised as being at the same level as the good faith or legal-
ity principles
33
. 
This concept was further developed in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
case of 1970
34
. The fundamental rights were defined as an integral part of the gen-
eral principles of law protected by the Court of Justice and thus fell within the 
framework of the structure and objectives of the Community, whilst inspired by 
                                                          
29
  A. FABRE, La «fondamentalisation» des droits sociaux, cit., p. 167 ff. 
30
  Court of Justice, judgment of 12 November 1969, Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v City of Ulm – 
Sozialamt, EU:C:1969:57. 
31
  Ibidem, para. 4. 
32
  Ibidem, para. 7. 
33
  On the definition of general principles through the Court of Justice case law, see L. 
FUMAGALLI, Art. 19 TUE, in F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (a cura di), Commentario breve ai 
Trattati dell’Unione europea, Padova, CEDAM, 2ª ed., 2014, pp. 89-98, spec. pp. 95-96. 
34
  Court of Justice, judgment of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, cit. 
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the constitutional traditions common to the Member States
35
. As general princi-
ples, the definition of such rights are derived from principles that are generally 
recognised at the international and national levels, including the fundamental 
rights. 
Subsequently, in the Nold judgment of 1974
36
, the Court of Justice reiterated 
that human rights are an integral part of the general principles of (European Un-
ion) law, and that as such, the Court itself was bound to draw inspiration from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. Therefore, the Court can-
not uphold measures which are incompatible with the fundamental rights recog-
nised and protected in the Constitutions of the Member States. It also found that 
«international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member 
States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines 
which should be followed within the framework of Community law»
37
. In addi-
tion to the consideration of fundamental rights as general principles deriving from 
the national constitutions and thus commonly recognised, the Court has referred to 
international instruments on human rights which integrate the national laws. 
In the ERT judgment of 1991, the Court of Justice affirmed the nature of the 
fundamental rights as general principles and added a reference to the European 
Convention on Human Rights among the relevant international treaties
38
.  
With specific regard to social rights, they have been recognised as general 
principles of EU law, such as the trade union freedom, the elimination of discrim-
                                                          
35
  Ibidem, para. 4. 
36
  Court of Justice, judgment of 14 May 1974, Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen- und 
Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities, EU:C:1974:51. 
37
  Ibidem, para. 13. 
38
  Court of Justice, judgment of 18 June 1991, Case C-260/89, ERT v DEP, EU:C:1991:254, 
para. 41: «fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law, the ob-
servance of which it ensures. For that purpose the Court draws inspiration from the constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines supplied by interna-
tional treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member States have collabo-
rated or of which they are signatories. The European Convention on Human Rights has spe-
cial significance in that respect (...)». 
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ination based on sex or on age
39
, and the right to collective action and collective 
bargaining
40
.  
In the Rutili case of 1975
41
, the Court held that the restriction relating to pub-
lic policy may not be invoked on grounds arising from the exercise of trade un-
ions’ rights. Indeed, according to the more general principle enshrined in Articles 
8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and ratified by all the 
Member States, and in Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 of the same Convention, «no 
restrictions in the interests of national security or public safety shall be placed on 
the rights secured by the above-quoted articles other than such as are necessary for 
the protection of those interests ‘in a democratic society’». 
As to the non-discrimination principle, in the Defrenne III case
42
, after con-
firming that the respect for fundamental personal human rights is one of the gen-
eral principles of Community law, the Court continued by asserting that «there 
can be no doubt that the elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of 
those fundamental rights» on the basis of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty (now Ar-
ticle 157 TFEU), which requires the same remuneration for men and women, as 
well as on the basis of the European Social Charter
43
 and ILO Convention No. 
111 of 25 June 1958 concerning discrimination in respect of employment and oc-
cupation.  
                                                          
39
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 22 November 2005, Case C-144/04, Werner 
Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, EU:C:2005:709, spec. para. 75 ff.; see also Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber), judgment of 19 January 2010, Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH 
& Co. KG., EU:C:2010:21, para. 21. 
40
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 15 July 2010, Case C-271/08, European 
Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, EU:C:2010:426, paras. 37 and 41. 
41
  Court of Justice, judgment of 28 October 1975, Case 36/75, Roland Rutili v Ministre de 
l’intérieur, EU:C:1975:137, paras. 31-32. 
42
  Court of Justice, judgment of 15 June 1978, Case 149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société ano-
nyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena (Defrenne III), EU:C:1978:130, paras. 26-28. 
43
  The European Social Charter was adopted in 1961 within the Council of Europe, and revised 
in 1996. Article 136 EC Treaty, now Article 151 TFEU, specifically refers to it jointly with 
the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. 
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The judgments of 2007 in the Viking and Laval cases focused on the right to 
collective action, according to which it, «including the right to strike, must be rec-
ognised as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the general princi-
ples of Community law the observance of which the Court ensures»
44
.  
It should be noted that within its previous judgments, the Court expressly re-
ferred to international instruments, such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights
45
, the European Charter of Social Rights or the ILO Conventions
46
, where-
as in the most recent decisions, it has also referred to the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights for Workers and the Charter of Fundamental Rights
47
. 
Considering the abovementioned case law, the Court of Justice followed an 
extensive approach in order to recognise certain general principles of a social na-
ture, such as the principle of non-discrimination. In this regard, significant are the 
cited Defrenne III and Mangold cases, in which the Court relied on the general 
clause on the prohibition of discrimination under Article 13 EC Treaty (now Arti-
cle 19 TFEU) in order to qualify non-discrimination based on age as a general 
principle
48
. Authors have deemed that such an approach is aimed at considering 
certain general principles applicable in various areas, including the social field
49
. 
                                                          
44
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 11 December 2007, Viking, cit., para. 44; 
(Grand Chamber), judgment of 18 December 2007, Laval, cit., para. 91. See G. BARRETT, 
Lawyers, the Question of Whether the European Union is Good for Workers, and How to 
Help Doom a Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty Without Really Trying, 2009, pp. 31-52, spec. 
p. 40, available at www.um.edu.mt/europeanstudies, who commented that «the case has actu-
ally created at least one benefit for trade unions: the recognition of the right to strike as gen-
eral principle». On these cases see further in this Chapter, para. 2.2. 
45
  Court of Justice, judgment of 28 October 1975, Rutili, cit., para. 32. 
46
  Court of Justice, judgment of 15 June 1978, Defrenne III, cit., para. 28. 
47
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 11 December 2007, Viking, cit., para. 43; 
(Grand Chamber), judgment of 18 December 2007, Laval, cit., para. 90; (Grand Chamber), 
judgment of 19 January 2010, Kücükdeveci, cit., para. 22; (Grand Chamber), judgment of 15 
July 2010, Commission v Germany, cit., para, 37. 
48
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 22 November 2005, Mangold, cit., para. 75: 
«The principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age must thus be regarded as a general 
principle of Community law». 
49
  A. FABRE, La «fondamentalisation» des droits sociaux, cit., p. 169. 
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Alongside the category of general principles, the Court in some cases has 
identified principles of social law of particular importance
50
, such as the equality 
of part time and full time work
51
, the right to parental leave
52
, the weekly number 
of working hours
53
 and the right to paid annual leave
54
. 
Moreover, the relevance afforded to these principles derives from other Euro-
pean instruments on social rights, namely the 1989 Community Charter of Fun-
                                                          
50
  Ibidem, pp. 169-170. 
51
  Court of Justice, judgment of 10 June 2010, Joined Cases C-395/08 and C-396/08, Istituto 
nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) v Tiziana Bruno and Massimo Pettini (C-395/08) 
and Daniela Lotti and Clara Matteucci (C-396/08), EU:C:2010:329, para. 32: «Clause 4 of 
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thias Döbele (C-403/01) v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV, 
EU:C:2004:584, para. 100: «the 48-hour upper limit on average weekly working time, includ-
ing overtime, constitutes a rule of Community social law of particular importance from 
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damental Social Rights for Workers and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
2000
55
, which includes all the civil and political rights, as well as the social rights 
(listed in Chapter 4 “Solidarity”), without making any distinction between them. 
Although Article 51, paragraph 2 of the Charter states that it does not modify or 
add EU competences as described in the Treaties, the Charter applies to all situa-
tions connected to matters falling under EU competences. Thanks to the Charter, 
the EU is no longer merely an economic integration process, but is also aimed at 
realising a European social model, because the Charter grants the same status to 
the social rights as to the civil rights
56
. 
After the proclamation of the Charter, the Court has referred to it when a case 
concerned a specific fundamental right; however, the general principles are often 
mentioned as well to provide added value to the rights laid down in the Charter
57
. 
After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in which the Charter was expressly 
given binding legal value, the Court nevertheless referred to its case law on gen-
eral principles or on particular important principles of social law. For instance, in 
the Commission v Germany judgment of 2010
58
, the Court recognised the funda-
mental character of the right to collective bargaining as guaranteed under Article 
28 of the Charter
59
. It then added that from such Article 28, the protection of the 
fundamental right to bargain collectively must take full account, in particular, of 
national laws and practices
60
. 
The relationship between the rights included in the Charter and the non-
written principles as stated by the Court gives rise to concerns about the relevance 
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of the Charter itself in determining the placement of the fundamental rights, in-
cluding social rights, within the EU legal order.  
When the social rights are considered as general principles, they are placed 
within the hierarchy of EU law and thus protected by the Court of Justice. It ap-
pears that there are fundamental rules within EU primary law, which include, on 
the one hand, the principle pursuant to which the fundamental rights must be pro-
tected and, on the other, similar principles, such as those regarding market free-
doms
61
. This justifies the need to balance them. However, the Court has recog-
nised that the fundamental rights are not absolute and may be limited, as stated in 
the Viking and Laval cases. Indeed, restrictions may be based on public policy 
clauses, public interests or general principles of EU law. Even if social rights are 
considered as fundamental rights and are thus part of the general principles of EU 
law, they nonetheless may be balanced with the fundamental economic freedoms 
or principles enshrined in the Treaties. Such a finding is based on the fact that EU 
primary law has pursued the main objective of the European integration and the 
smooth functioning of the internal market
62
, because the Community was original-
ly of a primarily economic nature
63
. More precisely, limitations are provided for 
in Article 52, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Charter, according to which some rights 
are not absolute and may be subject to restrictions provided that certain conditions 
are met.  
It is clear that the Charter provisions apply when EU law is implemented by 
the Member States pursuant to Article 51, paragraph 1
64
. In the case law, notably 
the Åkerberg Fransson judgment of 2013
65
, the Court established that the funda-
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mental rights must be respected by the Member States when they act within the 
scope of Union law. National legislations falling within the scope of EU law must 
thus comply with the Charter, given that all situations covered by EU law are in 
compliance with fundamental rights, and the applicability of EU law entails the 
applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter
66
. 
In the same regard, a significant case on social rights, namely on the right to 
information and consultation within the undertaking (as established by Article 27 
of the Charter), is the Association de médiation sociale (AMS) judgment of 
2014
67
. In that case, the Court re-affirmed that the fundamental rights guaranteed 
in the legal order of the European Union are applicable in all situations governed 
by EU law
68
, recalling the Åkerberg Fransson decision, which also dealt with the 
implementation of an EU directive in national legislation. However, in the Asso-
ciation de médiation sociale case, the Court stated that it was clear from the lan-
guage of «Article 27 of the Charter that, for this article to be fully effective, it 
must be given more specific expression in European Union or national law»
69
. 
Therefore, «Article 27 of the Charter, by itself or in conjunction with the provi-
sions of Directive 2002/14, must be interpreted to the effect that, where a national 
provision implementing that directive is incompatible with European Union law, 
that article of the Charter cannot be invoked in a dispute between individuals in 
order to disapply that national provision»
70
. This means that although the funda-
mental rights are included in the Charter, they nevertheless do not have direct ef-
fectiveness. 
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In addition, the remarks concern the content of the Charter, i.e. that it is not 
uniform because it includes rights and principles
71
. Such a distinction stems from 
the cited disposition of Article 51, paragraph 1, under which the European institu-
tions and Member States shall «respect the rights, observe the principles and pro-
mote the application» of the Charter. Moreover, Article 52 determines the scope 
and interpretation of the rights and principles, and specifies in paragraph 5 that 
«[t]he provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by 
legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, 
in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognisable only 
in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality».  
Some have levelled the criticism that the distinction between principles and 
rights was introduced to convince those Member States that were against the in-
clusion of the provisions of social rights, and thus their justiciability is minor
72
. 
The special status granted to principles appeared necessary, especially because the 
Charter contains many social rights, which the Member States did not want to be 
directly justiciable by individuals
73
. The divide is not clear, and above all it does 
not correspond to the distinction between the civil and political rights, as opposed 
to the social and economic rights. Thus, the distinction is relevant for the enforce-
ability of individual claims through the courts, which is more limited for princi-
ples than for rights. On the one hand, principles do not require positive actions by 
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Institutions or the Member States because they only entail the grounds for legiti-
macy control. On the other hand, rights are directly justiciable, as no implement-
ing actions are needed
74
.  
Even if the distinction is not properly explained in the provision at hand, the 
Explanation on Article 52 clarifies that principles do require the adoption of spe-
cific acts to be implemented, but they do not imply the possibility to claim posi-
tive action by the EU or the Member States
75
. According to said Explanation, the 
articles on social assistance fall within the category of principles. From the above, 
it is significant to note that the legitimacy of national measures should be assessed 
in accordance with the Charter’s provisions on the social rights76. 
In light of the distinction between rights and principles, as to the dispositions 
on the social rights, it is argued that they do not provide for rights, but consist of 
«mere programmatic principles without being immediately effective»
77
. There-
fore, they should require specific implementing actions. 
When recognising the fundamental nature of the social rights, the Court of 
Justice has also relied on international instruments. Other European bodies, such 
as the European Court of Human Rights and the European Committee for Social 
Rights, have addressed the protection of such rights. However, from a general 
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point of view, an important difference can be noted: The Court of Justice has as-
sessed the relevance and the protection of fundamental rights within the context of 
the European economic integration process. It has not focused on the rights them-
selves, but rather on the Treaties’ logic based on the precedence of the economic 
freedoms. By contrast, the European Court of Human Rights has founded its rea-
soning on the relevant right granted by evaluating the legitimacy of limitations
78
. 
To conclude, fundamental social rights are part of EU law, but they may face 
challenges in their protection in specific contexts, as in case of balancing with the 
economic freedoms, in which the latter prevail, or in times of economic crisis, in 
which national measures implementing EU actions question their protection. As to 
the latter context, the need to preserve constitutional fundamental principles that 
form part of the national legal order against possible violation by EU law has been 
put forward
79
.  
Another way to grant protection is linked to private international law (PIL) 
rules aimed at coordinating the national legal systems and avoiding conflicts in 
private matters
80
 by establishing safeguards in relation to all PIL aspects (jurisdic-
tion, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of judgments), and, in particu-
lar, with specific provisions in cases involving weaker parties, including employ-
ees
81
. There are also special clauses on the overriding mandatory provisions and 
public policy aimed at preventing the violation of the fundamental rights.  
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2.2. Fundamental social rights vis-à-vis economic freedoms. 
The recognition of the fundamental nature of social rights does not, however, 
imply their absolute protection. The Court of Justice designed a balancing test be-
tween the freedoms of movement and the social rights, according to which the 
right to collective action may be protected only when it is legitimate and propor-
tionate to the achievement of the workers’ goal82. EU principles, including the 
economic freedoms granted in the Treaties, as well as competition law, may be 
obstacles to their protection
83
. Based on the case law of the Court of Justice, it is 
possible to examine the interplay of economic integration with social policy. 
In the field of competition, in the Albany judgment of 1999
84
, the Court ex-
empted collective agreements from review under antitrust law. It addressed the re-
lationship between the right to collective bargaining and the freedom of competi-
tion. In particular, its assessment concerned a Dutch collective agreement institut-
ing a pension fund, with binding effect, that was not subject to the prohibition on 
the restriction of competition (under Article 85 ECC Treaties, now Article 101 
TFEU). This is due to the nature and function of the institution, as well as the rel-
evance of social dialogue in the European framework. According to the judgment, 
every collective agreement, even those without binding and erga omnes effect, 
implies a restriction on competition. The Court held: «It is beyond question that 
certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements between 
organisations representing employers and workers. However, the social policy ob-
jectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if manage-
ment and labour were subject to Article 85(1) of the Treaty [now Article 101, par-
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agraph 1 TFEU] when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of 
work and employment»
85
. Its reasoning assumed that the competition rules in the 
Treaty are placed alongside the Treaty’s expressed concern for a high level of em-
ployment and social protection
86
. The Court found a way to protect the social dia-
logue from the competition rules, which negatively affected the other objectives 
set by the Treaties
87
.  
The Court also considered a collective agreement to be in compliance with 
the competition rules in the van der Woude case of 2000
88
. It assessed the legiti-
macy of the provisions of a collective agreement related to health care insurance 
in accordance with Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty. After examining the na-
ture and purpose of the agreement at issue, the Court held that it contributed to 
improving the working conditions of the employees by ensuring that they had the 
necessary means to meet their medical expenses and by reducing the costs which, 
in the absence of a collective agreement, would have to be borne by the employ-
ees
89
.  
However, this finding has not always been implemented
90
.  
In the FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media case of 2014, the European judges 
refused to protect the right to a collective labour agreement aimed at establishing 
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minimum fees for self-employed service providers because the musicians were 
not workers, but were self-employed, and thus were subject to the competition 
rules
91
. By contrast, with regard to the tariffs of procurators established by profes-
sional associations, in line with its consolidated case law, the Court clarified that 
when these fees are included in the national legislation they may not constitute a 
breach of the competition rules by those professional associations
92
. 
The exemption from the competition rules is strictly connected to the contents 
of the agreement and its objectives (“nature and purpose”) aimed at governing 
work conditions. It follows that when the requirements are not met, the collective 
agreement falls within the scope of Article 101 TFEU ff. 
On the relationship between the social rights and the economic freedoms, the 
Court of Justice has delivered a significant number of decisions
93
.  
In the Schmidberger case of 2003
94
, which dealt with a demonstration on the 
Brenner motorway promoted by an association to protect the biosphere in the Al-
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pine region that allegedly hindered the free movement of goods by closing that 
motorway to all traffic, the Court affirmed that the fundamental rights, including 
the social rights, such as the freedoms of expression and association, are qualified 
as a legitimate justification for restrictions on the free movement of goods, and 
that the principle of proportionality was thus respected
95
. Nevertheless, «neither 
the freedom of expression nor the freedom of assembly guaranteed by the ECHR 
appears to be absolute but must be viewed in relation to its social purpose. Conse-
quently, the exercise of those rights may be restricted, provided that the re-
strictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not, taking ac-
count of the aim of the restrictions, constitute disproportionate and unacceptable 
interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed»
96
. The Court 
then added that the interests involved must be weighed considering all the circum-
stances of the case; in that regard, the competent authorities enjoy a wide margin 
of appreciation
97
. 
Further, in the Omega case of 2004
98
, the Court made it clear that the funda-
mental rights may, in principle, prevail over the economic freedoms and justify a 
restriction
99
. The decision addressed the question of whether it is compatible with 
the provisions on the freedom to provide services and the free movement of goods 
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contained in the Treaty establishing the European Community for a particular 
commercial activity, in the case of the operation of a so-called “laserdrome” in-
volving simulated killing action, to be prohibited under national law because it of-
fends the values enshrined in the Constitution, namely human dignity. The Court 
concluded that Community law does not preclude the «commercial exploitation of 
games simulating acts of homicide from being made subject to a national prohibi-
tion measure adopted on grounds of protecting public policy by reason of the fact 
that that activity is an affront to human dignity»
100
. Thus, the order prohibiting 
that activity does not negatively affect the freedom to provide services. 
The interrelation between the social right to a collective agreement or action 
and the internal market freedoms has been addressed in other judgments, i.e. the 
Laval quartet decisions of 2007 and 2008
101
, which were issued after the EU en-
largement occurred between 2004 and 2007. Such judgments addressed issues re-
lated to the position of social rights within the EU legal order, and how such posi-
tion is interpreted and assessed when questions regarding the balancing between 
EU principles are submitted. The aspects examined by the Court were the effec-
tiveness of the Treaty provisions, the test of proportionality and the legitimacy of 
measures that may restrict the economic freedoms.  
In the Viking judgment, the case regarded the freedom of establishment and 
the exercise of collective action promoted by the Finnish trade union aimed at 
boycotting the company’s decision to change its flag in order to apply the Estoni-
an collective contract, which was cheaper than the Finnish one. The Court recog-
nised that the social rights are fundamental and are part of the EU general princi-
ples; nevertheless, they are subject to balancing with the fundamental economic 
freedoms. The related provisions possess horizontal effectiveness, and thus they 
are invokable by private persons, including trade unions. In the case at issue, the 
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effectiveness was indeed between two private subjects, i.e. an enterprise and a 
trade union
102
. To declare that, the Court followed a personalist approach by af-
firming the possibility for enterprises to act against trade unions and seek com-
pensation
103
. 
As to the inclusion of trade unions among the persons that may invoke the ef-
fectiveness of the Treaty provisions, the Court found that trade unions are subject 
to the rules on the economic freedoms, namely Article 43 EC Treaty (now Article 
49 TFEU) on the freedoms of establishment and Article 49 EC Treaty (now Arti-
cle 56 TFEU) on the free provision of services
104
. It followed its former case law 
and clarified that those provisions do not apply «only to quasi-public organisa-
tions or to associations exercising a regulatory task and having quasi-legislative 
powers»
105
 and that «in exercising their autonomous power, pursuant to their trade 
union rights, to negotiate with employers or professional organisations the condi-
tions of employment and pay of workers, trade unions participate in the drawing 
up of agreements seeking to regulate paid work collectively»
106
. In other words, it 
interpreted the provision on the freedom of establishment as meaning that collec-
tive action initiated by a trade union or a group of trade unions against an under-
taking to force it to enter into a collective agreement falls within the scope of that 
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article
107
. Assuming that, the compatibility of collective action with EU law must 
be assessed.  
In the Viking judgment (as well as in the Laval one), the consideration of the 
principle of effectiveness, which was a driving force
108
, was followed by the eval-
uation of the proportionality test. Restrictions on the freedom of establishment are 
allowed to the extent that they are necessary to pursue the protection of workers. 
Further, the legitimacy of collective actions is to be assessed by national judges 
having regard to the circumstances of the cases, national laws and practices gov-
erning that action. Thus, the exercise of collective actions which are not connected 
to a particular labour dispute are not justifiable in so far as it impedes cross-border 
commercial activity. They only have a strategic and political objective, which 
does not prevail over the economic freedoms
109
. Accordingly, the trade unions’ 
autonomy is limited. An examination of the Court’s approach reveals that it fo-
cused on the balancing between the economic freedoms enshrined in the Treaties 
and the right to collective action, even though the latter is outside of the EU com-
petences, a barrier over which it had been able to leap in interpreting the free 
movement law, but which has stopped legislative action dead
110
. 
In calling upon the national judges to maintain a balance, i.e. to determine if 
the collective action is proportionate and justified, the Court did not directly de-
cide or give an opinion about the precedence of one right over another, thus re-
sulting in an inconsistency in its reasoning. As observed in the doctrine, «in both 
cases, the Court uses the term ‘balancing’, although the impression one gets is that 
it gave rather more weight to the economic freedoms invoked by the trade unions. 
A particular quirk of the EU judicial system is that the outcome of the balancing 
does not always have to be decided by the ECJ itself. The preliminary reference 
mechanism may create a situation where it is not the international court itself (in 
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this case, the ECJ) that decides on the balance to be struck, in a given case, be-
tween economic objectives and human rights, but the national courts where the 
case originates – albeit under guidance of general guidelines formulated by the 
ECJ»
111
. 
Moreover, according to such judgment, «collective social fundamental rights 
are underrated in such a way that they do not count in the context of a genuine 
weighing process, but merely appear in the course of the examination of an en-
croachment on a fundamental economic freedom under the heading of ‘propor-
tionality’»112. In addition, no attention was given to the collective dimension of 
the situation, because the question was confined to individual employee rights as a 
sine qua non of general interest
113
.  
The Court appears to have followed two different approaches as to the indi-
vidual and collective dimension
114
. As to individual rights, it granted a broader 
protection based on the principle of equality; however, as to the collective dimen-
sion, due to the precedence of the economic freedoms, it recognised the necessity 
to eliminate obstacles to free circulation. Though, such consideration may be crit-
icised because free movement is also the basis of the anti-discrimination princi-
ples
115
. 
Similarly, the Laval judgment was concerned with the exercise of collective 
action vis-à-vis the economic freedoms, namely the free provision of services (Ar-
ticle 49 TEC, now Article 56 TFEU). The case regarded a Swedish trade union 
that promoted a strike in order to request the application of the Swedish collective 
contract by a Latvian company in favour of Latvian workers posted in a work-
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place in Sweden. The legitimacy of the collective action was based on the protec-
tion of the national workers of the hosting State (Sweden) towards social dumping 
measures. The Court deemed the strike action to be in violation of the free provi-
sion of services rules because the protection against dumping was granted by the 
application of Directive 96/71 on the posting of workers in the hosting State
116
. 
The question arising in this case concerned whether the strike, which was aimed at 
concluding the collective agreement on the posted workers’ conditions, was a le-
gitimate action, or whether it was in violation of the free provision of services un-
der the Treaty
117
. The balancing test carried out by the Court between the funda-
mental social rights and the economic freedoms does not seem to be acceptable.  
To declare that the exercise of collective action or bargaining is in compli-
ance with EU law, the Court identified four requirements: The restriction shall 
pursue a legitimate objective in compliance with the Treaties; it shall be based on 
imperative reasons of general interest; it shall be appropriate to guarantee the real-
isation of the objective; and it shall be proportionate
118
. In the abovementioned 
cases, the Court recognised the absence of the last two requirements, i.e. appropri-
ateness and proportionality. It determined the limits and characteristics of the ex-
ercise of the right to strike, also taking into account that industrial action may 
sometimes be “voluntarily” disproportionate119.  
One criticism concerned the fact that the Court could have granted relevance 
to the social rights based on the evolution of the context. Indeed, the Lisbon Trea-
ty inserted the reference to the internal market as a highly competitive social mar-
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ket economy aiming at full employment and social progress in line with Article 3, 
paragraph 3 TEU. 
Looking back at the judges’ approach in Schmidberger, the Court first con-
firmed the restriction on the freedom of movement, and then it justified such re-
striction (the exercise of the fundamental social rights) through the recourse to 
“overriding requirements relating to public interest” and assessed the proportion-
ality between the exercise of the social rights and its objective
120
. The Court rec-
ognised that the freedoms of expression and assembly are not absolute, and thus 
such rights may be restricted provided that such limitations consist of objectives 
of general interest and are not disproportionate.  
It stems from the foregoing that according to the Court’s reasoning, the fun-
damental rights, on the one hand, may restrict the economic freedoms and, on the 
other, they do not come first like the economic freedoms; in other words, social 
rights emerge only as restrictions to the fundamental principles enshrined in the 
Treaties. In terms of the priority (between economic freedoms and social rights), 
critics have argued that the pre-Lisbon case law demonstrated a problem of incon-
sistency, because the Court did not systematically address the issue, and particu-
larly, it showed an insufficient appreciation of or respect for the normative dis-
tinctiveness of the fundamental rights and the renewing perceptions of market he-
gemony
121
. Consequently, it questioned the fundamental nature of the right to col-
lective action, including industrial action, enjoyed by trade unions within the EU 
legal order. 
In affirming the primacy of the economic freedoms, the Court «obeys the log-
ic of the Treaties», in which collective rights have no place. It follows that with 
the aim of stating the precedence of collective rights, the Court should have de-
nied the horizontal direct effect of the provisions on the freedoms of movement 
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(namely the freedoms of establishment and to provide services)
122
. However, this 
would have led to a contradiction in the Court’s reasoning123.  
By requiring an assessment of the balancing between the fundamental rights 
and the economic freedoms, the Court established a “hierarchical equivalence” be-
tween them
124
. However, such equivalence should have been determined in a 
more balanced way by recognising the higher relevance of the right to strike itself 
and by defining the extent to which it could be exercised and limited by the eco-
nomic freedoms
125
. 
Moreover, in these judgments, the Court deemed the right to collective action 
as a “right”, and not as “a freedom” as some national systems do126. In any case, 
such a remark is unlikely to have led to a different ruling. 
Collective action, as a restriction that may be justifiable, nonetheless is lim-
ited when it creates an obstacle to cross-border economic activities. In the recent 
Sähköalojen ammattiliitto judgment of 2015, the Court again recognised limita-
tions on the right to collective action
127
. 
Proportionality in the balancing of opposing rights is a difficult concept to 
reconcile with the process of collective relations
128
. The national courts have a 
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wide margin of interpretation, and this may lead to disparities in the protection of 
collective action across the EU Member States. Requiring a proportionality test in 
the case of collective actions results in the paradox that the more successful the 
strike action, the less likely it is that it would be considered proportionate
129
.  
Against this background, the Court affirmed that the fundamental rights are 
part of the EU general principles, and as a result they need to be balanced with the 
economic freedoms
130
. With specific regard to the right to strike, such a statement 
could hardly be referenced, because under Article 137, paragraph 5 EC Treaty 
(now Article 153 paragraph 5 TFEU), it falls within the Member States’ compe-
tences. It should follow that in case of conflicts between the economic freedoms 
and the right to strike, the control of its legitimacy is up to the national authorities, 
and that European judges are not allowed to intervene
131
. However, it is unlikely 
that the Court will not intervene, given that in any case the right to strike should 
be in compliance with the general principles of EU law
132
. Precisely, thanks to the 
recognition of the direct effect of the Treaty provisions on the freedoms of move-
ment, the Court extended the EU competences, and its control, into areas that fall 
within the Member States’ sovereignty133. 
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A different scenario occurs when acting under other provisions. In line with 
such a consideration, Directive 96/71 on the posting of workers is actually based 
on former Article 47, paragraph 2 EC Treaty (now Article 57, paragraph 2 TFEU) 
and Article 55 EC Treaty (now Article 66 TFEU) on the free provision of ser-
vices, and it ruled on the minimum wage, although such matter was excluded un-
der Article 137 EC Treaty
134
.  
Another critical issue related to the social rights and the economic freedoms 
is the assessment of the legitimacy of collective actions that must be carried out 
by the national judges, who may limit collective autonomy, although it constitutes 
an established common (European) tradition. Moreover, such an evaluation ad-
dresses the interplay between collective actions and the economic freedoms of the 
internal market, and not the fundamental rights of citizens or democracy. Solidari-
ty values are not considered. The Court of Justice provided the national judges 
with guidelines for the assessment of the balancing between the social rights and 
the economic freedoms which risk prejudicing the national constitutional tradi-
tions. At the end, such reasoning has the consequence of allowing companies from 
the Member States with cheaper labour costs to move into other countries. 
Employers’ rights and the freedom to provide transnational services were ad-
dressed in the Rüffert case of 2008
135
. The Court was asked whether Article 49 EC 
Treaty, in combination with Directive 96/71, precludes an authority of a Member 
State from adopting a legislative measure requiring the contracting authority to 
designate, as contractors for public works contracts, only contractors which, when 
submitting their tenders, agree in writing to pay their employees, in return for the 
performance of the services concerned, at least the wage provided for in the col-
lective agreement in force at the place where those services are performed. In the 
case, the awarded German undertaking had used, as a subcontractor, an enterprise 
established in Poland which was suspected of having employed workers on the 
building site at a wage below that provided for in the “Buildings and public 
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works” collective agreement. The Court affirmed that, pursuant to Directive 
96/71, interpreted in light of the fundamental freedom to provide services, a 
Member State is not entitled to impose on undertakings established in other Mem-
ber States, through a legislative measure, a rate of pay such as that provided for by 
the “Buildings and public works” collective agreement, as it was capable of con-
stituting a restriction within the meaning of Article 49 EC Treaty
136
. 
In the Commission v Luxembourg judgment of 2008
137
, the Court found that 
in the framework of the free provision of services, the obligation imposed by the 
national authority upon the posting employer to retain the documents necessary 
for monitoring purposes prior to the commencement of work would constitute an 
obstacle to that freedom
138
.  
After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the Court addressed the relation-
ship between collective bargaining and economic freedoms in the Commission v 
Germany case of 2010
139
. The facts of the case concerned a German collective 
contract that committed the management of the social security services to a body 
without the prior publication of a European tender. The Court found a violation of 
the relevant legislative acts. In its reasoning, it re-stated the fundamental nature of 
the right to collective bargaining as affirmed in international instruments, as well 
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as in the Charter
140
. Recalling its former case law, however, the Court specified 
that such right may be subject to certain restrictions, even if it enjoys constitution-
al protection in the Member States’ legal order. As provided in Article 28 of the 
Charter, that right must be exercised in accordance with European Union law and 
must therefore be reconciled with the requirements stemming from the freedoms 
protected by the TFEU
141
. 
To sum up, European judges have followed an approach pursuant to which 
the right to collective bargaining or action needs to be balanced with the princi-
ples envisaged in EU law. The fundamental rights are not absolute and need to be 
subject to the economic freedoms. In other words, the Court re-affirmed the prec-
edence of the internal market within the European integration process to the det-
riment of the social rights
142
. The rights to collective action and bargaining have a 
relative character because their exercise needs to be in compliance with EU law, 
and they are thus subject to the principle of proportionality, given that such rights 
could restrict the economic freedoms
143
. 
In this scenario, the judgement delivered by the Court of Justice in the CASTA 
case of 2016, a reference for a preliminary ruling concerning the application of the 
EU general principles in national public activities whose relevant elements are 
confined to a single Member State, but from which it is nevertheless possible to 
determine a certain cross-border interest, necessitates reflection
144
. The Court 
evaluated the compatibility of the Italian legislation authorising the regional 
health authorities to entrust medical transport activities to registered voluntary as-
sociations fulfilling the legal requirements, directly and without advertising, by 
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means of reimbursement of the expenditure incurred, with the EU principles on 
public health. It recognised that this was a purely internal situation (national 
transport contracts with voluntary associations) which pursued budgetary and 
public service purposes
145
. The Member States are competent in the organisation 
of their public health and social security systems, and such objectives are taken 
into consideration by EU law
146
. They indeed must guarantee the exercise of the 
fundamental freedoms in the area of health care and must not «introduce or main-
tain unjustified restrictions»; «however, in the assessment of compliance with that 
prohibition, account must be taken of the fact that the health and life of humans 
rank foremost among the assets or interests protected by the Treaty and it is for 
the Member States, which have a discretion in the matter, to decide on the degree 
of protection which they wish to afford to public health and on the way in which 
that degree of protection is to be achieved (judgement in Azienda sanitaria locale 
No 5 ‘Spezzino’ and Others, C-113/13, EU:C:2014:2440, para. 56 and the case-
law cited)»
147
. In the case at issue, the Court allowed restrictions on the economic 
freedoms in the pursuit of EU general principles, such as public health, limited 
only by the prohibition on the abuse of rights
148
. 
What if such a solution is (hypothetically) valid in the context of the protec-
tion of the social rights? The balance between economic freedoms and social 
rights should be determined on the basis of some considerations related to EU 
principles in the social context, the lawfulness of the restrictions on the economic 
freedoms, the compatibility of the national legislation with EU law, and the na-
tional law’s objective. In particular, it could be asserted that the protection of so-
cial rights may be negatively affected in the case of national legislation that pur-
sues «the objectives of the good of the community and budgetary efficiency on 
which that system is based»
149
. 
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Overall, as the Charter is binding, the Court should have changed its approach 
and given relevance to the social rights by re-balancing the priorities. The main 
issue is how the internal market, as a legal concept, is framed. The starting point 
of the Court’s findings is the economic freedoms, rather than the fundamental 
rights to collective action, including the right to strike, and to collective bargain-
ing, which are only deemed as possible exceptions. In light of the case law, a dis-
tinction amongst social values and rights must however be drawn: social values of 
public interest (such as public health, as examined above) may restrict economic 
freedoms; whereas, a social right (such as the right to collective action) may be 
restricted when its exercise and consequences may affect the internal market. 
Aside from the criticism on the balancing test required because of the hierar-
chical equivalence between social rights and market freedoms, it is significant that 
the Court recognised the social profile of the (then) Community
150
. What could be 
debated is whether social policy could constitute a priority for the EU and thus be 
considered as an autonomous policy within the European integration progress. In 
this sense, the European Pillar of Social Rights
151
, which contains principles and 
rights that are essential for fair and well-functioning labour markets and welfare 
systems, could be a first step forward in the promotion of social rights’ protection, 
notwithstanding that it serves solely as a guide without legal binding effect.  
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  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 11 December 2007, Viking, cit., para. 78; 
(Grand Chamber), judgment of 18 December 2007, Laval, cit., paras. 104-105. 
151
  See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-
union/european-pillar-social-rights_en.  
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2.3. Fundamental social rights in times of economic crisis. 
Social rights were degraded as a result of actions within the direction of the 
integration process initiated by the Court of Justice case law on the internal mar-
ket, where the precedence of the economic freedoms over social rights, as well as 
in the context of the economic governance, was recognised
152
. Nevertheless, so-
cial rights must be respected as fundamental rights that form part of the EU gen-
eral principles and are constitutionally recognised at the national level, thus con-
sisting of common constitutional traditions in the EU.  
In introducing the present analysis, the statement addressed to the European 
Parliament in 2011 by the ILO Director General is relevant, in which it was un-
derlined that «respect for fundamental principles and rights at work is non-
negotiable; not even in times of crisis when questions of fairness abound. This is 
particularly important in countries having to adopt austerity measures. We cannot 
use the crisis as an excuse to disregard internationally agreed labour standards»
153
. 
This raises the issue concerning how fundamental social rights are conceived in 
times of economic and financial crisis. The case law at European and national lev-
els demonstrates a persistent claim for the protection of constitutional rights, even 
in emergency situations. In this regard, a measure adopted in accordance with the 
mechanisms of financial assistance or of the safety of the euro area were deemed 
to restrict social-labour rights due to the national reforms affecting the social sys-
tem
154
. 
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  G. FONTANA, Crisi economica ed effettività dei diritti sociali in Europa, cit., pp. 5 and 17. 
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  ILO Director-General address to the European Parliament, Statement of 14 September 2011, 
available at www.ilo.org. 
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  On the mechanisms of financial assistance, see M. DAWSON, The Governance of EU Funda-
mental Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 189 ff.; A. VITERBO, F. 
COSTAMAGNA, L’impatto sociale della politica di condizionalità nel contesto della crisi 
nell’area euro: profili giuridici, in N. NAPOLETANO, A. SACCUCCI (a cura di), Gestione inter-
nazionale delle emergenze globali: regole e valori, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica, 2013, pp. 
167-194, spec. pp. 167-177; on measures adopted in Spain, Portugal and Greece, see C. 
MARCHESE, I diritti sociali nell’epoca dell’austerity: prospettive comparate, in Diritto pub-
blico comparato ed europeo, 2017, No. 1, pp. 141-172, spec. pp. 150-157. 
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In the crisis context, not only the democratic freedoms but also the economic 
and social rights have been at issue
155
. The anti-crisis strategy has been criticised 
because the protection of values and interests, including social rights
156
, and the 
impact of the crisis on the social dimension were not duly considered
157
.  
It appears that in the situation of economic and financial crisis, the protection 
of rights should have been greater. Such issue was addressed by the European Par-
liament in its amendments
158
 on the proposal on the strengthening of the financial 
mechanisms
159
, in which it suggested making the compliance of such mechanisms 
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  On this issue see R. CAFARI PANICO, L’affievolimento dei diritti nella crisi economica e poli-
tica dell’Unione europea, in Studi sull’integrazione europea, 2017, No. 2, pp. 289-316; F. 
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  Council of Europe, Austerity measures - a danger for democracy and social rights, adopted 
by the Parliamentary Assembly on 26 June 2012 (22
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 Sitting), available at 
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  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Protecting fundamental rights during the 
economic crisis, Working Paper, December 2010, spec. pp. 47-50, available at 
http://fra.europa.eu; A. VITERBO, F. COSTAMAGNA, L’impatto sociale, cit., p. 177 ff. 
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  European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2013 on the proposal for a regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budget-
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respect to their financial stability in the euro area (COM(2011)819 - C7-0449/2011 - 
2011/0385(COD)) P7_TA(2013)0069; Position of the European Parliament adopted at first 
reading on 12 March 2013 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) No .../2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening of economic and budgetary sur-
veillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficul-
ties with respect to their financial stability (EP-PE_TC1-COD(2011)0385). 
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  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the strengthening 
of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States experiencing or threatened with 
serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability in the euro area, COM(2011)819 fi-
nal of 23 November 2011, then Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveil-
lance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties 
with respect to their financial stability, in OJ L 140 of 27 May 2013, pp. 1-10. 
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with the social dimension and the EU democratic principles clear
160
. In particular, 
the European Parliament proposed the introduction of a new Recital No. 2 on the 
respect and promotion of social rights within the employment context, by refer-
ring to the so-called “social clause” under Article 9 TFEU161, and a new Recital 
No. 11, in which it requested the involvement of social partners and civil society 
organisations in the law-making process
162
. In the adopted Regulation No. 
472/2013, such additions were included, in conjunction with references to the 
need for compliance with Article 152 TFEU and Article 28 of the Charter
163
. 
To briefly contextualise, the legal basis of the anti-crisis measures should be 
considered
164
. This consists of the memorandum of understanding concluded after 
the decision on the loan by the Member State in difficulty with the Troika, i.e. 
Presidents of the Commission, the European Central Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. It is a programme containing all the necessary steps to be taken in 
order to overcome the crisis. This act was formed in accordance with the Treaty 
establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
165
, adopted on the basis of 
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  A. VITERBO, F. COSTAMAGNA, L’impatto sociale, cit., p. 176. 
161
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No. 2, pp. 411-444. 
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  Signed on 2 February 2012 and set up in October 2012 as a successor to the European Finan-
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Article 136, paragraph 3 TFEU
166
. The national measures adopted to overcome 
the crisis must be based on the principle of conditionality, that is to say that the 
loan is granted in so far as the country respects certain conditions in order to solve 
the economic crisis and to ensure that that mechanism will operate in a way that 
will comply with European Union law, including the measures adopted by the Un-
ion in the context of the coordination of the Member States’ economic policies167. 
The legal nature of those acts was argued by national judges as well as by authors, 
who classified them as acts having a pre-constitutional nature or being like inter-
national treaties, or like an “action plan”168. In general, according to the main crit-
icism, European institutions seemed to have found a way to interfere with the na-
tional social systems (which do not fall within the EU competences)
169
.  
It is undisputed that economic and financial adjustment programmes aimed at 
tackling the crisis may entail structural reforms and interference in the national 
social dimension, and in the welfare state in general
170
. 
The question arising in this context concerns the compatibility of such 
measures with the EU Treaty system, including general principles and fundamen-
tal rights. With the introduction of Article 9 TFEU by the Lisbon Treaty, which 
stresses the objective of enhancing the social dimension of the Union, having a 
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  Para. 3 was inserted in accordance with Article 1 of Decision 2011/199, European Council 
Decision of 25 March 2011 amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
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  Among others, see G. FONTANA, Crisi economica ed effettività dei diritti sociali in Europa, 
cit., spec. p. 11. 
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  For a short overview of the programs adopted with regard to Greece, Ireland and Portugal, see 
A. VITERBO, F. COSTAMAGNA, L’impatto sociale, cit., pp. 178-179. 
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horizontal effect
171
, EU policies and measures must observe social-related issues 
in their elaboration and implementation. Problems with compatibility would there-
fore violate EU law, and, in particular, provisions having general application
172
, as 
well as the Charter, which has been binding since the entry into force of the Lis-
bon Treaty. In addition, in light of the national case law, compatibility has also 
been claimed with regard to the constitutional rights. 
As to the assessment at the European Union level, some judgments have ad-
dressed the issues at hand. 
The Hellenic Republic v Commission case of 2013
173
 demonstrates the incon-
sistency of the situation arising in times of economic crisis related to competition 
policy. It concerned the illegality of a state aid that the Greek Government 
claimed to have delivered in the exceptional circumstances of the economic crisis. 
First, the General Court stated that «the economic crisis in the European Union 
from 2008 does not constitute a circumstance that is capable of calling in question 
the fact that the agricultural sector is exposed to strong competition within the Eu-
ropean Union» and that «the Commission has moreover adopted specific rules 
aimed at authorising certain State aid during the economic crisis, in particular, the 
[Temporary Community Framework for State aid measures], which precluded aid 
granted in the primary agricultural sector being declared compatible with the in-
ternal market»
174. However, according to the Court’s final judgment of 2016, the 
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  P. DE PASQUALE, L’economia sociale di mercato nell’Unione europea, cit., p. 273 f.; E. 
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  A. VITERBO, F. COSTAMAGNA, L’impatto sociale, cit., pp. 180-183. 
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  President of the General Court, order of 19 September 2012, Case T-52/12 R, Hellenic Re-
public v European Commission, EU:T:2012:447; General Court, judgment of 16 July 2014, 
T-52/12, Hellenic Republic v European Commission, EU:T:2014:677; Court of Justice 
(Grand Chamber), judgment of 8 March 2016, Case C-431/14 P, Hellenic Republic v Euro-
pean Commission, EU:C:2016:145. For some comments see L. IDOT, Aides à la production 
agricole et situation de crise, in Europe, May 2016, Comm. nº 5, p. 25. 
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  General Court, judgment of 16 July 2014, Hellenic Republic, cit., para. 108.  
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Greek Government failed to allege emergency circumstances
175
, and thus the 
Court declared the plea in law to be unfounded. 
In the Pringle case of 2012
176
 the Court stated the inapplicability of the Char-
ter when the Member States institute a mechanism such as the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) because the «Member States are not implementing Union law, 
within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, when they establish a stability 
mechanism such as the ESM where the EU and FEU Treaties do not confer any 
specific competence on the Union to establish such a mechanism» and its creation 
is not capable of affecting the exclusive competence held by the Union under Ar-
ticle 3, paragraph 1, letter c TFEU in the area of monetary policy for the Member 
States whose currency is the euro
177
. If the ESM is placed outside the European 
legal framework
178
, the problem is the determination of the context in which the 
institutions and the Troika act, even if not all the actions are attributable to the 
Troika (e.g. only to the Council). When EU institutions act, they are obliged to re-
spect the Charter and EU law; accordingly, even with regard to financial 
measures, the Charter should be respected, given that the protection of fundamen-
tal rights is prescribed in the relevant legislation
179
.  
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  See Article 1, para. 4 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of 
Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with re-
spect to their financial stability, in OJ L 140 of 27 May 2013, pp. 1-10, according to which 
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national rules and practice and Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
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On the compliance of the measures at issue with the Charter, it may be noted 
that, given that the ESM and the national measures adopted as a result of it are not 
included in the scope of EU law, the Member States are not obliged to respect 
Charter rights, and they are not subject to the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction180. 
However, such statement appears to be incoherent. Indeed, in the field of the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) under the Treaties, the Member States and the 
institutions, when adopting economic or monetary measures, are required to com-
ply with the Charter. Thus, given that the anti-crisis measures concern matters that 
fall under economic policy, their consistency with EU law should be ensured as 
well
181
.  
On this point, the European Parliament has noted that the programmes are not 
bound by the Charter or by the provisions of the Treaties, and has stressed «that 
pursuing economic and financial stability in the Member States and the Union as a 
whole must not undermine social stability, the European social model or the social 
                                                                                                                                                               
pean Union. Accordingly, the application of this Regulation and of those recommendations 
does not affect the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements or to take 
collective action in accordance with national law». Similarly, Recital No 7 and Article 1, pa-
ra. 2 of Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and en-
suring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, in OJ L 140 
of 27 May 2013, pp. 11-23. 
180
  For a comment, among others, see A. STEINBACH, Effect-based analysis in the court’s juris-
prudence on the euro crisis, in European Law Review, 2017, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 254-269; F. 
MUNARI, Da Pringle a Gauweiler: i tormentati anni dell’unione monetaria e i loro effetti 
sull’ordinamento giuridico europeo, in Il Diritto dell’Unione europea, 2015, No. 4, pp. 723-
755, spec. p. 741 ff. 
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  Court of Justice (Full Court), judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle, cit., paras. 158-164. 
On the responsibility of EU institutions for measures adopted within ESM, see R. CAFARI 
PANICO, L’affievolimento dei diritti nella crisi, cit., pp. 293-296, with regard to two judg-
ments related to the situation in Cyprus, Ledra Adversting and Mallis. 
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rights of EU citizens»
182
, and thus the institutions and the Member States must re-
spect those rights within the implementation of the adjustment programmes
183
. 
Also, in the Gauweiler judgment of 2015
184
, which was decided upon refer-
ence for a preliminary ruling by the German Constitutional Court, the Court of 
Justice was questioned on the adjustment programme envisaged within the ESM 
system in light of the safeguarding of constitutional rights. Some citizens claimed 
respect for their fundamental democratic rights vis-à-vis the financial risks arising 
from the policy of assistance adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB) with 
respect to countries in over-indebtedness. The main question concerned the ultra 
vires action adopted by the ECB. The German Constitutional Court found itself 
competent as to the control of the legitimacy of the ECB action in light of the fun-
damental rights granted by the German Constitution. The Court of Justice inter-
preted the provisions concerning the ECB competences and confirmed its power 
to adopt the programme in question. 
Specifically concerning the competence of the Court to address issues related 
to national measures falling within the ESM system, two orders considered Portu-
guese legislation establishing salary reductions for certain public-sector workers. 
Both in the Sindicato dos Bancarios case of 2013
185
 and in the Sindicato Nacional 
caseof 2014
186
, the Court of Justice stated that it «clearly lacks jurisdiction with 
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regard to the request», namely in connection with the 2011 Finance Law, taking 
into account the fact that the orders for reference did not contain any specific evi-
dence to support the view that that law was intended to implement EU law. Thus, 
EU law was not involved and under Article 51, paragraph 1 of the Charter, the 
Court has no power to control measures falling outside the scope of EU law
187
. 
Some deemed the requests to be an expression of a «European constitutionali-
ty issue»
188
, in which the Portuguese judges searched for a European legal basis to 
declare the national legislation at stake to be inadmissible. The national courts be-
lieved that the domestic measures were contrary to the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination, as well as to the right to fair and just working conditions. The 
social and welfare rights linked to the freedom of movement are included, as has 
been addressed by the Court of Justice in other cases
189
.  
The most recent judgment delivered by the Court of Luxembourg on the 
compatibility with Union law of the Greek discipline of collective redundancy 
adopted in times of crisis is the AGET Iraklis case of 2016
190
. It originated from a 
legal action promoted by a Greek undertaking, to which, in compliance with 
Greek law, the Ministry of Labour Law decided not to grant an authorisation for 
the collective redundancy procedure, which was necessary in the case of a failure 
of the agreement between the parties. For the purposes of the present analysis, it is 
relevant to note that, according to the Court, the alleged existence of «an acute 
economic crisis and a particularly high unemployment rate» in the country does 
not affect the assessment of the incompatibility of Greek law with the effective-
ness of Union law
191
. In this case the question was whether serious social reasons 
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might justify restrictions on the freedom of establishment and thus allow national 
measures concerning collective redundancy. As clarified in the opinion of Advo-
cate General Wahl
192
, national measures adopted in accordance with a stability 
programme cannot affect the effectiveness of EU law, namely EU provisions on 
the economic freedoms. 
Moreover, the anti-crisis measures also raised questions of compatibility with 
human rights. The European Court of Human Rights was indeed requested to in-
tervene on this issue.  
In the Felicia Mihăieş and Adrian Gavril Senteş v Rumania decision of 
2011
193
, the European judges deemed the national legislation providing for salary 
reductions compatible with the Convention, namely Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
(protection of property). The national authorities were better placed to deal with 
the case and enjoyed a margin of appreciation, provided that the proportionality 
and reasonableness principles are met. In such cases, due to the economic crisis 
and having regard to the balancing between the general public interests and indi-
vidual rights, such measures were not considered to be in violation of the Conven-
tion. 
Complaints against the cuts in wages and pensions envisaged in the national 
urgent measures adopted to respond to the financial crisis were the object of the 
Koufaki and ADEDY v Greece decision of 2013
194
. The European Court recog-
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nised the wide margin of appreciation of the States in regulating their social poli-
cy and that national legislation is legitimate unless it is manifestly without a rea-
sonable foundation. Moreover, this margin is even wider when the issues involve 
an assessment of the priorities as to the allocation of limited State resources. On 
the ground of the existence of an exceptional crisis, the Court deemed the 
measures justified
195
. 
Also, the Mateus and Santos Januariò v Portugal case
196
 concerned the pay-
ment of the applicants’ public sector pensions, which were reduced in 2012 be-
cause of cuts to Portuguese Government spending. The Court examined the com-
patibility of the reductions in the applicants’ pension payments with Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 1 and held that the reductions were proportionate in connection with 
the applicants’ right to the protection of property. In light of the exceptional fi-
nancial problems that Portugal faced at the time, and given the limited and tempo-
rary nature of the pension cuts, the Portuguese Government had struck a fair bal-
ance between the interests of the general public and the protection of the appli-
cants’ individual right to their pension payments. 
Austerity measures and the economic crisis in Greece were recently subject to 
a complaint before the European Committee of Social Rights, who delivered its 
judgment in March 2017
197
. According to the claimant, the legislation enacted be-
tween 2010 and 2014 as part of the austerity programme imposed to Greece had 
allegedly violated the provisions of the Social Charter on the rights to work, just 
conditions of work, a fair remuneration, of children and young persons to protec-
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tion, and to take part in the determination of working conditions. The Committee 
found, inter alia, that the measures imposing the reduction in the minimum wage, 
especially for workers under the age of 25, were disproportionate and excessive, 
and violated Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Social Charter. As observed by the 
Committee, the national anti-crisis legislation did not seem to achieve the objec-
tive of restoring the economic situation; by contrast, it led to serious breach of 
workers’ rights. However, such a decision is unlikely to have legally binding ef-
fects, rather it could be an interpretative guidance
198
. 
Moving at the national level, austerity measures adopted to face economic 
crisis were brought before Constitutional Courts with the aim of identifying the 
limits to the economic interventions and safeguarding social security systems and 
rights. A common element established in most of the relevant judgments of the 
Courts of such Member States consists of the minimum subsistence that is linked 
to human dignity
199
. Under their judgments, the principles of proportionality and 
reasonableness were considered in order to assess the compatibility of the 
measures. 
A short analysis of the Portuguese and Italian contexts is included here to 
show the way in which social rights, in general, are taken into account, and the 
challenges and obstacles that their protection encountered in times of crisis. In-
deed, both the Italian (Corte costituzionale) and Portuguese (Tribunal Constituci-
onal) Constitutional Courts have addressed the protection of social rights in some 
of their recent judgments, which were delivered in the context of the economic 
crisis.  
Balancing social rights with economic measures is the core issue. The nation-
al courts have claimed respect for the fundamental rights provided for in the EU 
Charter in relation to the restrictive measures adopted by the States to tackle the 
economic crisis. As pointed out by the Court of Justice, the Member States must 
respect the fundamental rights whenever they are called upon to apply EU law, as 
stated by Article 51, paragraph 1 of the EU Charter. By contrast, national 
                                                          
198
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measures imposing restrictions on the social rights, such as those in the cases be-
fore the Portuguese and Italian Constitutional Courts, should not fall within EU 
law, because Article 5 TFEU provides that the Member States shall coordinate the 
economic policies within the EU. Thus, the measures adopted by them in the field 
of economic policies should not be subject to the EU general principles.
 
 
In general, judges apply constitutional principles with the aim of fully and ef-
fectively pursuing a high level of protection for constitutional rights. The balance 
between the fundamental rights and the economic measures has been implemented 
by the Court of Justice with reference to the fundamental economic freedoms as 
the pillars of EU law. Nevertheless, one could note that EU law clearly refers to 
the common constitutional traditions of the Member States
200
; thus, the Court of 
Justice should probably also take such national values into account. The finding of 
the Court, which has recognised the economic freedoms as prevailing over the so-
cial rights, appears not to have been followed by (some) national judges. It is, 
however, important to remember that, in the social and employment contexts, the 
EU does not have an exclusive competence. Broadly speaking, both the Italian 
and Portuguese Constitutional Courts have considered the protection of social 
rights in the current economic situation, dealing with austerity measures (EU-
recommended) which have involved substantial cuts in their social provisions
201
. 
The Tribunal Constitucional, in its judgement No. 187 of 5 April 2013
202
, de-
clared the unconstitutionality of some of the austerity measures, in particular, 
those applicable to budgetary cuts
203
. The 2015 Country Report on Portugal
204
 in-
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cludes an overview of the relevant measures
205
. Moreover, it analyses the right to 
work: It «has probably been the most affected fundamental right in the context of 
the economic crisis. It has been affected by the crisis itself ([which] led to a sig-
nificant rise of unemployment) and by austerity measures. These measures in-
cluded pay-cuts, reduction[s] of severance payments and increase[s] in working 
hours without additional pay»
206
. 
Portuguese Constitutional Court judgment No. 187 of 2013 concerned the 
suspension of holiday pay, which it declared unconstitutional as a violation of the 
principle of equality. The Court stated that the international and European obliga-
tions had a constitutional legal basis, but that they should not impose legislative 
measures that lead to the violation, not only of equality and proportionality prin-
ciples, but also of human dignity
207
. The Constitutional law doctrine has deemed 
this case to be a condemnation of the violation of constitutional rights in relation 
to the EU agreement (the 2011 Economic Adjustment Programme)
208
 implement-
ed by the national provisions
209
. 
Some of the economic and financial measures that were produced to tackle 
the economic crisis have been the object of some important judgments of the Ital-
ian Corte costituzionale. Among them, sentence No. 310 of 10 December 2013
210
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concerned the freezing of the salaries of university teachers. The Court held that, 
by virtue of the reasonableness principle, the development of such measures must 
be considered in the current economic, legal, national and European contexts
211
.  
Italy has enacted a number of legislative and other measures related to the cri-
sis, which are summarised in the 2015 Country Report on Italy
212
. Among them, 
in Law No. 92/2012 – the so-called Legge Fornero213, named after the then Minis-
ter of Employment – the main objectives were more equal protection of workers, 
regardless of the type of employment contract, and more flexibility in hiring and 
dismissing workers
214
. An Italian trade union (CGIL) submitted a complaint to the 
European Commission asserting that the Reform infringed EU law (i.e. Council 
Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on 
fixed-term work) because, among other things, it eliminated the requirement for a 
justification to use short-term employment contracts and, in so doing, «trans-
late[d] into a wide broadening of the unjustified use of short-term contracts». Sim-
ilar allegations were raised to the Court of Justice in the Mascolo case of 2014
215
 
concerning the use of short-term contracts to meet essentially permanent needs in 
the Italian public education sector
216
. The Court held that «Clause 5(1) of the 
framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is 
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set out in the annex to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning 
the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and 
CEEP, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue 
in the main proceedings, which, pending the completion of competitive selection 
procedures for the recruitment of tenured staff of schools administered by the 
State, authorises the renewal of fixed-term employment contracts to fill posts of 
teachers and administrative, technical and auxiliary staff that are vacant and un-
filled without stating a definite period for the completion of those procedures and 
while excluding any possibility, for those teachers and staff, of obtaining compen-
sation for any damage suffered on account of such a renewal. It appears, subject to 
the checks to be carried out by the referring courts, that such legislation, first, 
does not permit objective and transparent criteria to be identified in order to verify 
whether the renewal of those contracts actually responds to a genuine need, is ca-
pable of achieving the objective pursued and is necessary for that purpose, and 
second, does not contain any other measure intended to prevent and punish the 
misuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts»
217
. 
As observed, in the specific and exceptional case of the economic crisis, the 
protection of social rights is affected in such a way as to undermine their “value” 
vis-à-vis economic and financial exigencies to enable the recovery of those States 
in debt and enhance safety in the euro area. It does not appear to be coherent from 
a substantive perspective in terms of safeguarding the social rights and the mini-
mum work terms and conditions. Considering the legal basis of those austerity 
measures, the EU is not “directly” involved, and thus those measures do not fall 
within the scope of EU law (as required by Article 51 of the Charter). From the 
case law, the responsibility of the European Union has been affirmed in abstracto, 
but excluded in concreto, thus making it difficult to demonstrate its extracontrac-
tual liability
218
. Nevertheless, respect for the fundamental rights must cover every 
situation independently of the specific legal basis, but as a matter of the general 
principles governing European and national actions. In addition, having in mind 
the case law in which the fundamental social rights have been considered as justi-
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fiable restrictions of the general interests to the economic freedoms, it may be de-
rived that in times of crisis the protection of the social rights and workers’ condi-
tions in general, as an overriding reason in the public interest, may also constitute 
a limit on national austerity measures. Thus, from a general point of view, in 
times of economic crisis, a balancing test must also be assessed: on the one hand, 
the general public interests (the need to recover debts and adjust the economic sit-
uation) and on the other hand, the individual rights (such as a reasonable salary).  
Against this background, recourse to collective action may be exercised to 
claim the protection of workers’ conditions vis-à-vis the austerity measures. The 
question of its legitimacy under national law will raise political considerations, as 
it is a form of protest
219
. This may also affect the legislative solutions at the pro-
cedural level regarding its exercise and effects with a view to safeguarding the 
smooth functioning of the internal market; accordingly, also private international 
issues will be at stake. The overall context calls for effective judicial remedies, in-
cluding collective redress procedures, towards the national measures to concretely 
protect workers’ interests and rights. 
                                                          
219
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2.4. In particular, the legal framework on the right to collective action.  
The exercise of the right to collective action, including all means to act col-
lectively, does not fall within EU competences and is thus covered by domestic 
laws which may differ from one State to another. Specifically related to collective 
actions, it seems clear that given the different provisions and parameters to evalu-
ate their legitimacy, difficulties may arise in situations with international implica-
tions. In EU law, it is not possible to find specific rules governing collective ac-
tion, apart from proposals for legislative acts and soft law documents of the 
Commission aimed at developing an EU action on collective redress, even if they 
do not specifically address the case of employees
220
. 
In light of the foregoing considerations on the concept of fundamental rights 
in the EU legal order and the obstacles they have faced vis-à-vis the economic 
freedoms or in times of economic crisis, in other words, when the substance of 
those rights is affected, it is important to determine the specific instruments and 
provisions on collective action in the existing European scenario, by recalling the 
case law of the Court of Justice where appropriate. 
At the regulatory level, the right to collective action, including the right to 
strike, has a constitutional basis in many States, as an individual fundamental right 
to be exercised collectively. Commonly, a strike is a form of protest considered as 
the most effective means for workers to achieve their goal. It can be freely exer-
cised, without any prior procedural requirements and without any consequences to 
individual employment contracts
221
.  
There are various international legal bases
222
 for the right to collective activi-
ties, including the right to strike, such as the 1966 International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights
223
, the ILO Conventions No. 87
224
 and No. 
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98
225
, the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)
226
, and the 1961 
(then 1996) European Social Charter (ESC)
227
. In those provisions, each State par-
ty (or Member) is deemed to undertake steps using the maximum of its available 
resources or by all appropriate means, with a view to progressively achieving the 
full realisation of the rights, and to effectively complying with these obligations. 
EU law, primarily the case law of the Court of Justice, expressly recalls said 
international and European instruments in order to endorse their objectives and 
purposes, respectively, in regulating and applying the law in the field of funda-
mental social rights.  
At the EU level, moreover, the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers protected (applicable to employers and workers, or their 
organisations) the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, as 
well as the right to resort to collective action, including the right to strike, in situa-
tions of conflicts of interests, subject to the obligations arising under national reg-
ulations and collective agreements
228
. 
In line with this, Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights clearly 
provides for the right to collective action, including the right to strike. It states: 
«Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance 
with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and con-
clude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of 
interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action». 
As a preliminary remark, the Charter makes a distinction between workers and 
                                                                                                                                                               
224
  Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 
adopted in San Francisco on 9 July 1948, 31
st
 ILC session, and entered into force on 4 July 
1950. 
225
  Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bar-
gain Collectively, adopted in Geneva on 1 July 1949, 32
nd
 ILC session, and entered into force 
on 18 July 1951. On ILO conventions, see J.R. BELLACE, Back to the Future: Freedom of As-
sociation, the Right to Strike and National Law, in King’s Law Journal, 2016, Vol. 27, No. 1, 
pp. 24-45; Ö. EDSTRÖM, The Right to Collective Action, cit., pp. 58-61. 
226
  See Article 11. See also Ö. EDSTRÖM, The Right to Collective Action, cit., pp. 61-63. 
227
  See Article 6. 
228
  See the 1989 Community Charter, section “Freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing”, points 11-13.  
75 
 
organisations, based on the differences between the Member States, where the 
right to collective action may be defined as either a collective or an individual 
right. The right to exercise collective industrial action can be utilised to achieve 
collective labour agreements offering better employment conditions than workers 
could attain individually. In other words, trade unions, whose freedom of organi-
sation is guaranteed, must be given the right to effectively act in support of work-
ers. Thus, the right to bargain for collective agreements, strengthened by industrial 
action, is decisive for such effective action. Nevertheless, Article 28 states that the 
rights must be safeguarded in accordance with Union law and with national laws 
and practices.  
On the one hand, not just procedural, but also substantive, national rules must 
be observed, because the European Union does not have exclusive competence in 
this field
229
. On the other hand, EU law, including EU objectives, values and pur-
poses, must be considered. Under the first regard, in accordance with Article 153, 
paragraph 5 TFEU (former Article 137, paragraph 5 of the EC Treaty), measures 
taken for the development of a social dimension should not apply to certain mat-
ters, including the right to strike. The Member States are in any case obliged to re-
spect the EU law general principles, as already observed. 
In relation to the lack of EU competence and the need to respect fundamental 
rights, it is necessary to mention the two decisions of the Court of Justice in the 
Viking and Laval cases
230
, in which it held that the right to strike is a fundamental 
right of the EU constitutional order, but it also recognised the need to balance 
workers’ rights with the economic freedoms. It may be observed that by affirming 
the priority of the market freedoms, the exercise of the right to collective action in 
the form of industrial action or strike may be compromised when facing a transna-
tional situation, whilst they are permissible under domestic law
231
.
 
In any case, the 
last word on the legitimacy of the collective action is left to the national judges. In 
those judgments, the Court has assessed, in accordance with EU free movement 
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principles, the collective action taken by labour unions aimed at deterring corpo-
rate migration (the undertakings wanted to reflag ships from their home country, 
Finland and Sweden, to new countries, Estonia and Latvia). In the Court of Jus-
tice’s eyes, strikes, or collective actions, are legitimate (and justifiable re-
strictions) only if they meet the conditions recognised by EU law and thus in so 
far as they do not impede cross-border commercial activity
232
. It seems that they 
can only have strategic and political objectives that do not prevail over the eco-
nomic freedoms
233
. Accordingly, the autonomy of trade unions is limited. This 
finding demonstrates that «the right of trade unions to exercise their collective 
fundamental right is very seriously hampered by the application of internal market 
law»
234
.  
In the Laval case, the Court found that trade unions had been exercising a 
fundamental right to take collective action recognised by EU law, but that its prac-
tical exercise had led to barriers to inward investment that were disproportionate 
and thus constituted a restriction on the freedom to provide services
235
. Only non-
discriminatory, justified and proportionate industrial action is lawful.  
When are collective actions legitimate? To assess this issue, the aims of the 
collective action (strike or industrial action) must be taken into account. In his 
opinion in Laval case, Advocate General Mengozzi noted that «Article 49 EC 
[now Article 56 TFEU] cannot impose obligations on trade unions which might 
impair the very substance of the right to take collective action»
236
. He then speci-
fied that the collective action shall be aimed, on the one hand, at defending the in-
terests of trade union members and, on the other, at enabling them to pursue legit-
imate objectives recognised by Community law, such as the protection of workers 
in general and the fight against social dumping in the Member State concerned. 
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Nevertheless, because the right is not absolute, its exercise must be reconciled 
with the European public interests represented by the economic freedoms, and in 
particular the free provision of services.  
One may argue that the Court of Justice respects the right to collective bar-
gaining, collective action and strike only within the limits of the economic free-
doms as a clearly lower value and not as an equivalent fundamental right. In doing 
so, it adopts a negative approach that is restricted to industrial action taken sub-
stantially by host country unions and not by posted workers
237
. On this latter is-
sue, the situation not only gives rise to substantive problems (the protection of 
posted workers’ rights), but also legal questions related to the possibility for post-
ed workers to be represented by host country trade unions and the potential effects 
on them
238
. 
The Laval case is significant both for the proceedings instituted before the 
Court of Justice, and for the complaint submitted to the European Committee of 
Social Rights (ECSR) by the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and the 
Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO)
239
, and the involvement 
of the ILO Committee that reported on the respect for the ILO Conventions. The 
problem before the ECSR was that industrial action against a foreign employer 
was forbidden under the 2010 Lex Laval in violation of Articles 6 and 19 of the 
ESC and the ILO Convention No. 87. On the one hand, in its 2013 Report, the 
ILO Committee had requested that the Swedish Government «ensure that work-
ers’ organisations representing foreign posted workers are not restricted in their 
rights simply because of the nationality of the enterprise»
240
. On the other hand, 
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after it stated its competence
241
, the ESCR affirmed that the Swedish legislation 
«constitutes a disproportionate restriction on the free enjoyment of the right of 
trade unions to engage in collective action, in so far as it prevents trade unions 
taking action to improve the employment conditions of posted workers over and 
beyond the requirements of the above-mentioned conditions». The Committee 
found the violations of Articles 6(2) and (4) and 19(4)(a) and (b) of the Social 
Charter, because the legislation introduced restrictions on the freedom to strike 
and collective bargaining. It stated that such rights are necessary for other social 
rights and reflect the rights in the national Constitutions. Ultimately, the Commit-
tee decision was in contrast with the findings of the Court of Justice. 
This collective action in the Laval case has symbolic value: the trade unions 
applied to the ESCR to seek respect for international standards, because a collec-
tive remedy aimed at protecting social rights is not available in the EU system
242
.  
In the context of the protection of human rights, with regard to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the right to collective action, including the right to 
strike, is not explicitly mentioned. Nevertheless, the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights has offered protection of the right to collective action un-
der Article 11, which provides everyone with the right to freedom of peaceful as-
sembly and of association, including the right to form and to join trade unions for 
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the protection of his interests
243
. In fact, the Court has held that «strike action is an 
important method by which trade unions protect their members’ interests. It fol-
lows that any restriction on the freedom to strike can be justified under Article 11, 
2 ECHR only if ‘prescribed by law’, in pursuance of one or more legitimate aims, 
and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the achievement of those aims»244.  
In his Concurring Opinion in Hrvatski Liječnički Sindikat v Croatia245, Judge 
Pinto de Albuquerque clarified the substance of the collective action and the strict 
connection with Article 11 ECHR. He observed that the right of association of 
workers consists of the following essential elements: the right to form and join a 
trade union, the prohibition of closed-shop agreements, the right to bargain collec-
tively with the employer and the right for a trade union to seek to persuade the 
employer to hear what it has to say on behalf of its members. Having regard to a 
democratic society, the Judge considered strike action as the ultimate practical 
«means to persuade the employer to hear» the demands of the workers. He af-
firmed: «If collective action represents the core of the workers’ freedom of asso-
ciation, strike action is the core of the core»
246
. It follows that strike action should 
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600. 
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Enerji Yap-Yol Sen v Turkey, para. 25 ff.; see also judgment of 2 October 2014, Application 
No. 48408/12, Veniamin Tymoshenko and others v Ukraine.  
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  European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 27 November 2014, Application No. 
36701/09, Hrvatski Liječnički Sindikat v Croatia.  
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  Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, Hrvatski Liječnički Sindikat v Croatia, 
cit., para. 8.  
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be accorded the status of an essential element of Article 11 and thus be an integral 
part of the wider right to the freedom of association. 
In other similar cases, the European Court interpreted the right to strike in so 
far as the freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining are consid-
ered as a means for the employees to protect their occupational interests. In the 
Schmidt and Dahlström v Sweden case of 1976, the Court recognised that strike 
action was a means within trade union activities that could be applied to provide 
protection
247
. In the Unison v the United Kingdom decision of 2002, the Court 
stated that, «while the ability to strike represents one of the most important of the 
means by which trade unions can fulfil this function, there are others» and in the 
present case «the proposed strike must be regarded therefore as concerning the 
occupational interests of the applicant’s members in the sense covered by Article 
11 of the Convention»
248
. In this regard, the Contracting States enjoy a wide mar-
gin of appreciation and are left with the choice of the means by which the freedom 
of trade unions ought to be safeguarded
249
. 
As to the right to collective bargaining, a notable case before the European 
Court of Human Rights is that of Demir and Baykara v Turkey of 2008
250
. It con-
cerned the right to collective bargaining for public service employees, including 
the right to conclude collective agreements. The employer did not comply with 
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  European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 6 February 1976, Application No. 5589/72, 
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  European Court of Human Rights, decision of 10 January 2002, Application No. 53574/99, 
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  European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), judgment of 12 November 2008, Appli-
cation No. 34503/97, Demir and Baykara v Turkey. For comments see K. LÖRCHER, The New 
Social Dimension in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): the 
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the agreement concluded with the trade union. The case was brought before the 
district court, which upheld the trade union claim. Then, the Turkish Court of 
Cassation declared the agreement void. The European Court considered the Court 
of Cassation’s ruling to be in violation of Article 11 ECHR and concluded that the 
right to collective bargaining is an essential element of the right to association
251
.  
Regarding strike actions, in the Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen judgment of 2009
252
, the 
European Court assessed whether the Government ban on strike action was dis-
proportionate and in violation of Article 11 ECHR. Following an innovative ap-
proach, taking into account the relevant international and European instruments 
on social rights
253
, it considered the right to strike as an independent right, regard-
less of other means to protect workers’ rights. It follows that the right to strike is 
covered by Article 11 as part of the freedom of association, irrespective of wheth-
er the State concerned provided for an alternative means for trade unions to de-
fend their interests. 
Granting protection to the right to strike under Article 11 ECHR enables the 
European Court to protect the social rights, even if they are not explicitly covered 
in the Convention, with the aim of guaranteeing effectiveness to the fundamental 
rights enshrined therein
254
. 
Within the Council of Europe system, another instrument is of great relevance 
in the field of social protection, as mentioned in relation to the Laval case. The 
European Social Charter (ESC), enacted in 1961 and revised in 1996, in Article 6, 
paragraph 4, explicitly protects «the right of workers and employers to collective 
action in case of conflicts of interest, including the right to strike»
255
. The ESC, 
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  European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), judgment of 12 November 2008, Demir 
and Baykara v Turkey, cit., para. 145. 
252
  European Court of Human Rights, judgment of 21 April 2009, Application No. 68959/01, 
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  E. TRIGGIANI, La complessa vicenda dei diritti sociali fondamentali nell’Unione europea, cit., 
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  For a comment, see S. EVJU, The Right to Collective Action under the European Social Char-
ter, in European Labour Law Journal, 2011, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 196-224. 
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however, does not include any effective mechanism to enforce this right. Compli-
ance by the signatory States is ensured through periodic reviews, and it was not 
until 1995 that an optional Protocol was adopted to allow a complaint before the 
European Committee of Social Rights. The Committee may also assess the com-
pliance of a national situation with the Charter, including situations in which the 
transposition of a European Union Directive into domestic law may affect the 
proper implementation of the Charter
256
. This is justified on the basis that when 
the EU Member States agree on binding measures in the form of directives which 
relate to matters within the scope of the European Social Charter, they should take 
full account of the commitments they made upon their ratification of the European 
Social Charter, just as they should of all other international instruments to which 
they are parties
257
. Ultimately, neither the ECHR nor the ESC offer an effective 
means to protect the right to strike at the European level
258
. 
As discussed above, although they are different bodies, their interplay (by re-
ciprocal references) reinforces the protection of social rights based on the consen-
sus of the States parties in such instruments. However, difficulties may arise when 
dealing with cross-border situations, such as with the economic freedoms. As-
sessment tests shall be based on a more “social” approach, despite the market 
freedoms, with the aim of finding a convergence with the other two bodies (the 
European Court and the ESCR) dedicated to the fundamental social rights’ protec-
tion. 
At the EU legislative level
259
, some acts are significant in relation to collec-
tive action which are strictly connected to the Court of Justice case law on market 
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85/2012 and its symbolic value, see S. SCIARRA, Pluralismo sindacale multilivello nella crisi, 
cit., p. 240 ff. On the role of the European Committee, see L. MOLA, La prassi del Comitato 
europeo dei diritti sociali relativa alla garanzia degli standard di tutela sociale in tempi di 
crisi economica, in N. NAPOLETANO, A. SACCUCCI (a cura di), Gestione internazionale delle 
emergenze globali. Regole e valori, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica, 2013, pp. 195-220. 
259
  See V. KOSTA, Fundamental Rights in EU Internal Market, cit., p. 229 ff. 
83 
 
freedoms and appear to pursue the realisation of the social dimension of the Un-
ion.  
Aimed at regulating the phenomenon of the posting of workers and thus 
avoiding discrimination and combatting social dumping, Directive 96/71 was 
adopted in the framework of the transnational provision of services
260
. Its Recital 
No. 22 refers to collective action by stating that the Directive does not interfere 
with the law of the Member States concerning collective action undertaken to de-
fend the interests of trades and professions. Even if no other provisions address it, 
the reference is significant in so far as it recognises the right to act collectively in 
defence of interests in accordance with national laws. 
Based on the findings of the Commission v France judgment of 1995
261
, in 
which the Court upheld the Commission’s complaint, according to which France 
failed to take appropriate measures to guarantee the free movement of goods 
blocked by protesting farmers, the so-called Monti Regulation on the functioning 
of the internal market in relation to the free movement of goods among the Mem-
ber States, was adopted in 1998
262
. It aims to ensure the free movement of goods 
in the EU, while acknowledging the right and freedom to take strike action. The 
Member States should ensure that existing alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms cover cross-border situations. In Article 2, it includes the so-called Monti 
clause: «This Regulation may not be interpreted as affecting in any way the exer-
cise of fundamental rights as recognised in Member States, including the right or 
freedom to strike. These rights may also include the right or freedom to take other 
actions covered by the specific industrial relations systems in Member States». 
This is a rare acknowledgement in an EU legal measure of the right to strike as a 
form of collective action: The Regulation establishes the priority of this right and 
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  Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
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the right or freedom to take other actions recognised in the Member States over 
the EU principle of the free movement of goods. 
In the framework of the free provision of services in the internal market, Di-
rective 2006/123/EC
263
 mentions respect for the exercise of the fundamental 
rights, including the right to take industrial action (in accordance with national 
law and practices which respect Community law)
264
, even if they must be recon-
ciled with the fundamental freedoms laid down in Articles 43 and 49 of the EC 
Treaty
265
. 
As a result of the Court of Justice rulings in the Viking and Laval cases, in or-
der to address trade union concerns that the economic freedoms were being given 
precedence over the social rights, a second Regulation (Monti II) was proposed in 
2012, but it was ultimately withdrawn due to objections from some EU Member 
States
266
. It regarded «the exercise of the right to take collective action within the 
context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services»
267
. 
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This followed the 2010 Monti Report on a new strategy for the single market
268
, 
which addressed the question of, «on a practical ground, whether the Posting of 
Workers Directive still provides an adequate basis to manage the increasing flow 
of cross-border temporary secondment of workers, while protecting workers’ 
rights. On a normative ground, the question concerns the place of workers’ right 
to take industrial action within the single market and its status vis-à-vis economic 
freedoms»
269
. In the 2010 Report, after recalling the Laval quartet sentences, the 
author suggested the introduction of a provision to guarantee the right to strike, 
affirming that «a “social progress clause” would “immunise” the right of strike, as 
recognised at national level, from the impact of single market rules».  
The goal of the proposed Monti II Regulation was to «clarify the general 
principles and applicable rules at EU level with respect to the exercise of the fun-
damental right to take collective action within the context of the freedom to pro-
vide services and the freedom of establishment, including the need to reconcile 
them in practice in cross-border situations»
270
. In the Explanatory Memorandum 
accompanying its proposal, the Commission stated that the proposed Regulation 
sought to address the «tensions between the freedoms to provide services and of 
establishment, and the exercise of fundamental rights such as the right of collec-
tive bargaining and the right to industrial action»
271
, which was recognised by the 
Court of Justice’s decisions in the Viking and Laval cases. It deemed the clarifica-
tion of the status of the right to collective action in cross-border contexts to be 
necessary. A regulatory intervention at the EU level may be «the most effective 
and efficient solution to address the specific objective [of] reducing tensions be-
tween national industrial relation systems and the freedom to provide services»
272
.  
The Proposal, in its Recitals, recalled the international instruments that pro-
vide for the right to take collective action, which is the corollary of the right to 
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collective bargaining
273
. Article 1 contained the so-called Monti clause, which 
confirmed that the draft Regulation would not have affected the exercise of fun-
damental rights, including the right to strike provided by the industrial relations 
systems of the Member States or the enforcement of collective agreements. It was 
in line with the text of a similar provision added in the Proposal for a Regulation 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (the Brussels I Recast)
274
, but it was later rejected
275
. Article 2 
of the Proposal established the general principle according to which the exercise 
of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services shall respect 
the fundamental right to take collective action, including the right or freedom to 
strike, and conversely, the exercise of the fundamental right to take collective ac-
tion, including the right or freedom to strike, shall respect these economic free-
doms. Such a mutually respect must then be in compliance with the principle of 
proportionality
276
. In addition, Article 3 provides dispute resolution mechanisms 
that the Member States shall ensure to resolve labour disputes, whenever strike 
actions or the exercise of the freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide 
services have transnational implications. However, these out-of-court settlements 
do not prevent from bringing judicial actions.  
The Proposal at least seemed to represent a framework for the regulation of 
the exercise of the right to collective action, including strike, at the EU level with-
in transnational contexts; indeed, the right to collective action itself is not affect-
ed. The Commission withdrew the proposed Regulation after several Member 
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States voiced objections concerning its legal basis
277
, and it has not made alterna-
tive proposals since then. 
At the same time, the Commission submitted a second proposal on the en-
forcement of the Posting of Workers Directive 96/71, which was adopted in 
2014
278
. This Directive aims to reconcile the exercise of the freedom to provide 
cross-border services under Article 56 TFEU with appropriate protection of the 
rights of workers who are temporarily posted abroad for that purpose. It takes into 
account the issue of how to set the right balance between the trade unions’ exer-
cise of their right to take collective action, including the right to strike, and the 
economic freedoms enshrined in the TFEU, particularly the freedom of establish-
ment and the freedom to provide services
279
. Its Article 1, paragraph 2 contains a 
subsequent version of the ‘Monti clause’, which states: «[T]his Directive shall not 
affect in any way the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in [the] Mem-
ber States and at [the] Union level, including the right or freedom to strike or to 
take other action covered by the specific industrial relations systems in [the] 
Member States, in accordance with national law and/or practice. Nor does it affect 
the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take col-
lective action in accordance with national law and/or practice». Certain features 
should be highlighted: the disappearance of the reference to the compliance with 
Community/EU law and thus the primacy granted to national law and practices; 
the mention of the right or freedom to strike among collective actions; and the 
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recognition of the protection of the right to strike as part of EU law, not only at 
the Member State level
280
. 
Collective mechanisms for the enforcement of rights are envisaged in other 
sector specific acts as a means for legal proceedings aimed at effectively protect-
ing rights. 
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2.5. Concluding considerations. 
As stated by the Court of Justice, the right to collective action is a fundamen-
tal social right and, in practice, it includes collective means for the enforcement of 
workers’ rights. Recognising the fundamental social rights as part of the EU gen-
eral principles implies that, under the hierarchical equivalence, they may be bal-
anced with the other principles enshrined in the Treaties, such as the economic 
freedoms. As a result of the balancing test, they have been mainly downgraded in 
favour of the market freedoms based on the fact that the effectiveness of the Trea-
ty provisions may not be affected by the exercise of a social right, i.e. a collective 
action (to pursue objectives related to employment terms and conditions), such as 
in the Viking and Laval cases. Nevertheless, what is more remarkable is that the 
Court affirmed that such right, and the protection of workers, could constitute a 
justifiable restriction when lawful and proportionate.  
A similar outcome has occurred in particular circumstances, such as in times 
of economic crisis, when they were undermined with the aim of implementing an 
assistance programme to pursue financial stability. Precisely, in this situation, the 
question was whether compliance with the Charter was required even in cases in 
which the measures did not fall “directly” within the scope of EU law. Although 
the Court declared its lack of jurisdiction, the Member States are obliged to ob-
serve EU principles and objectives while acting under matters falling under EU 
law, such as economic and monetary policy.  
In broader terms, as criticisms regarding the Laval quartet judgments pointed 
out, a change in the Court of Justice’s approach is needed. It must give relevance 
to individuals and promote the protection of the fundamental rights versus the 
economic principles and governance.  
For the purposes of the present study, the relevance of the social rights in the 
EU legal order has been analysed to stress the issue of the protection of workers’ 
rights, especially in cross-border situations. In this respect, the question that arises 
is how such rights are effectively protected and enforced across the EU. 
The protection and enforcement of workers’ rights is quite a wide topic, and 
therefore the possibility for workers to have recourse to collective action in cross-
border contexts is addressed. Particular attention is paid to the category of posted 
90 
 
workers, which has been involved in some judgments related to the fundamental 
social rights. The posting of workers implies legal questions as to the applicable 
regime, converging issues from the private international law perspective, as well 
as related to the market freedoms, namely the free provision of services, given 
that the pertinent legislation is based on the respective TFEU provisions.  
To conclude, and to beckon the issues that will be discussed further, in gen-
eral, the protection of rights may be pursued by the recognition (in the sense of af-
firmation) of the fundamental nature of the social rights, including the right to act 
collectively, through the provision of judicial and extrajudicial remedies, and on 
the basis of private international law instruments that establish rules for handling 
conflicts of jurisdictions or of laws. 
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Executive Summary 
 
In employment disputes, workers seek the protection of work terms and condi-
tions and social security rights against employers that have violated national legis-
lation or EU law. When moving across the EU, based on the free movement of 
workers, EU citizens are entitled to enjoy those rights in the host State by virtue of 
the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment. With the aim of protect-
ing workers, not only are minimum substantive rights specifically determined, but 
also private international law rules are established. A peculiar situation concerns 
posted workers, whose legal regime falls within the framework of the free provi-
sion of services and includes workers’ rights, minimum terms and conditions, as 
well as conflict of jurisdictions and laws rules. However, uncertainty may arise 
because of the lack of European provisions tailored to collective action as a means 
of collective enforcement of rights. 
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3.1. Introduction: the protection of workers in the EU. 
The free movement of workers across the Member States granted by Europe-
an Union (EU) primary law
281
 is closely linked to the creation of an area of free-
dom, security and justice. Thanks to the European economic integration process, 
the mobility of workers has increased, and in recent years many efforts have been 
made by European institutions to protect workers. These efforts have addressed 
difficulties deriving from the need to safeguard the enlargement of the labour 
market at the European level, but also to ensure the effective guarantee of the fun-
damental freedoms provided by the Treaties in order to avoid social dumping 
within national labour markets
282
. The fundamental economic freedoms are im-
plemented by the Union with the aim of guaranteeing a level playing field for 
businesses and respect for the rights of workers. 
«The completion of the internal market offers a dynamic environment for the 
transnational provision of services, prompting a growing number of undertakings 
to post employees abroad temporarily to perform work in the territory of a Mem-
ber State other than the State in which they are habitually employed»
283
. This is 
the case for posted workers. Therefore, in view of fair competition and the smooth 
functioning of the internal market, obstacles may occur if no (common and Euro-
pean) rules require respect for certain working terms and conditions
284
. These 
rules may be based, on the one hand, on the free provision of services and, on the 
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other, on judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters aimed at creating 
and developing an area of freedom, security and justice
285
. Indeed, the posting of 
workers regime, as described below, has been adopted to resolve questions related 
to the temporary performance of economic activity in another EU Member State. 
The main aim was to impede the distortion of the internal market, and thus to 
ensure minimum standards for work conditions in all the EU Member States. 
Based on the existing legislative scenario, EU initiatives and case law, remarks on 
the need to regulate procedures at the EU level are provided in this Chapter, espe-
cially with regard to collective action as a means of enforcement. Indeed, reme-
dies contribute to the safeguarding of the protection of the same rights in all the 
Member States. This enables market actors (workers, as well as consumers and 
businesses) to benefit from the internal market. To reap the full benefits of the Eu-
ropean judicial area, access to justice must be made easier, particularly in cross-
border proceedings
286
.  
The protection of workers is addressed by EU legislation, within the scope of 
the free movement of workers or the free provision of services
287
. Under the first 
category, the EU has always had competence from the Treaty of Rome to adopt 
legislation governing employment protection on the basis of the former Article 
118
288
, which referred to matters relating to «employment, labour law and work-
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  With specific regard to posted workers; see further infra in this Chapter. 
288
  Then Article 137 EC Treaty, now Article 153 TFEU according to which the European Par-
liament and the Council may also adopt non-harmonising measures designed simply to en-
courage cooperation between Member States in «the combating of social exclusion” and in 
the modernisation of social protection systems». This provision specifies the EU competence 
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ing conditions, the right of association and collective bargaining between employ-
ers and workers».  
By way of example, EU directives now cover various areas of general em-
ployment protection law, including the employees’ right to information as to their 
contractual terms of employment, the establishment of a European Works Council 
or other procedures for informing and consulting employees in EU-wide (groups 
of) undertakings; the information and consultation of employees to promote social 
dialogue between management and labour; the rights of workers to rest breaks, 
rest periods and paid annual leave; the protection of young people at work; the 
right to parental leave on the birth or adoption of a child; the rights of part-time or 
fixed-term workers; the rights of workers in the event of collective redundancies; 
the rights of workers on the insolvency of their employer; and the rights of posted 
workers. The general principles of EU law in the employment context have been 
affirmed, such as the equality between men and women and non-discrimination 
based on transgendered status, racial or ethnic origin, disability, age, sexual orien-
tation, and religion or belief
289
.  
Based on the EU legislation on the protection of workers, the right to collec-
tive action is implemented by provisions establishing the obligation upon the 
                                                                                                                                                               
to make directives which set out minimum requirements (always allowing Member States to 
maintain or introduce more stringent protective measures compatible with the Treaties) in the 
following fields: (a) improvement, in particular, of the working environment to protect work-
ers’ health and safety; (b) working conditions; (c) social security and social protection of 
workers; (d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated; (e) the in-
formation and consultation of workers; (f) representation and collective defence of the inter-
ests of workers and employers, including co-determination; (g) conditions of employment for 
third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory; (h) the integration of persons ex-
cluded from the labour market, without prejudice to any EU vocational training policy made 
under Article 166 TFEU; (i) equality between men and women with regard to labour market 
opportunities and treatment at work. For a comment on this Article, see L. CALAFÀ, Art. 153 
TFUE, in F. POCAR. M.C. BARUFFI (a cura di), Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione 
europea, Padova, CEDAM, 2ª ed., 2014, pp. 994-999. 
289
  On the Directives adopted in this field, see M. ROCCELLA, T. TREU, Diritto del lavoro 
dell’Unione europea, cit., p. 89 ff.; L. CALAFÀ, Art. 153 TFUE, cit., pp. 997-999; in general 
on the free movement of workers F. POCAR, I. VIARENGO, Diritto comunitario del lavoro, Pa-
dova, CEDAM, 2011. 
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Member States to ensure remedies to workers, as well as to representative associa-
tions, organisations or other similar entities. In this regard, Directive 2014/54
290
, 
which was adopted in the framework of the free movement for workers
291
, is sig-
nificant. It requires the national authorities to ensure that judicial procedures are 
available for all EU workers in cases of discrimination or violations of EU or na-
tional law. In addition, organisations, associations, trade unions or other entities 
may represent or support EU workers and their families
292
. The right to take col-
lective action is expressly included and safeguarded, provided that it complies 
with national laws and practice
293
. 
Similar provisions on the right to take actions can be found in the legal 
framework concerning posted workers, who are workers temporarily moved to 
another State to perform a service. This situation implies that, on the one hand, the 
employer of posted workers makes use of the free movement of services. On the 
other hand, the worker does not need to avail himself of said freedom because he 
is not deemed to enter the labour market of the host State. Directive 96/71 on the 
                                                          
290
  Directive 2014/54/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on 
measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of 
movement for workers, in OJ L 128 of 30 April 2014, pp. 8-14. 
291
  The relevant rules are contained in Regulation (EU) No 492/2011 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for workers within the Union, in 
OJ L 141 of 27 May 2011, pp. 1-12, that updates (and codifies) earlier legislation on the free-
dom to move and work of EU citizens in another EU country.  
292
  See Recitals Nos. 15 and 29 ensure the possibility for entities to represent workers and the 
respect for the right to collective action; and Article 3 on the defence of rights. 
293
  Article 3, paras. 2-4 states that «2. Member States shall ensure that associations, organisa-
tions, including the social partners, or other legal entities, which have, in accordance with the 
criteria laid down in their national law, practice or collective agreements, a legitimate interest 
in ensuring that this Directive is complied with, may engage, either on behalf of or in support 
of, Union workers and members of their family, with their approval, in any judicial and/or 
administrative procedure provided for the enforcement of the rights referred to in Article 1. 3. 
Paragraph 2 shall apply without prejudice to other competences and collective rights of the 
social partners, employees’ and employers’ representatives, where applicable, including the 
right to take action on behalf of a collective interest, under national law or practice. 4. Para-
graph 2 shall apply without prejudice to national rules of procedure concerning representation 
and defence in court proceedings». 
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posting of workers and the Enforcement Directive 2014/67, which sets out control 
mechanisms related to the former
294
, are thus considered to assess questions con-
cerning the protection of posted workers that may arise within transnational litiga-
tion from the substantive, procedural and private international law perspectives. 
As to the substantive rights, minimum requirements for employment terms and 
conditions are provided (through the harmonisation of national laws), even if their 
material content is not specified because it is not within EU competence. With re-
gard to the procedural mechanisms to defend their rights, the fundamental right to 
an effective remedy as established in the Charter under Article 47 is referenced. 
Lastly, providing for the law applicable to posted workers and the competent au-
thority to hear the disputes falls within the protective function of private interna-
tional law rules. Overall, the legislation at hand can be defined as comprehensive, 
as these three aspects are inter-connected and pursue the same objective of pro-
tecting workers in the EU. The interaction between the fundamental rights and the 
procedural means of enforcement is indisputable. In other words, the legislation 
on the posting of workers contains substantive provisions on the rights and obliga-
tions upon the posting undertakings and the Member States, procedural mecha-
nisms for control and rules on conflicts of jurisdictions and of applicable laws. 
However, with regard to the existing context, it appears that trade unions have 
not engaged extensively to protect workers’ rights, because few cases have ad-
dressed trade union actions before the Court of Justice. It could be argued that 
harmonising the rules (established in the Directives) does not offer an effective 
(means of) protection, because they do not impose specific remedies, but only ob-
ligations upon the Member States to enforce workers’ rights, including the possi-
bility for trade unions or other associations to act. In addition, national laws and 
practices concerning such entities must be observed. It follows that the differences 
between them may still cause legal uncertainty and discourage collective action in 
cross-border contexts. 
                                                          
294
  Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the 
enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of 
the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative co-
operation through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’), in OJ L 
159 of 28 May 2014, pp. 11-31. 
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3.2. The legal framework on posted workers.  
According to the general rule, workers who ordinarily work in the country of 
establishment of their employer are covered by the law of their (employer’s) home 
State, even when they are temporarily posted to another State (the host State) to 
perform services there. So, the posting is not exercised within the free movement 
of workers, and the workers do not enter the labour market of the host State
295
. 
This has caused a differentiation of the employment conditions applying to work-
ers (local and posted) employed on the same site. The local workers would be pro-
tected according to the local standards, whereas the standards of the home State of 
the service provider would be applied to the posted workers. The ensuing inequal-
ity in labour protection leads to a comparative advantage for undertakings estab-
lished in low-cost countries, which, in turn, may negatively affect the employment 
conditions in the host State. Accordingly, high-cost States might be tempted to ex-
tend their employment protection rules to all labour performed within their territo-
ry
296
. This has given rise to the problem of social dumping, especially when the 
Eastern countries became Members of the Union
297
. Further, the host States have 
faced difficulties in striking the right balance between workers’ protection and the 
freedom to provide services and other fundamental principles of the internal mar-
ket. 
In this context, relevant legislative actions were adopted in order to regulate 
the posting of workers who moved in one Member State in the framework of the 
                                                          
295
  A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment: reflections 
from the European Union, in A. BLACKETT, A. TREBILCOCK (edited by), Research Handbook 
on Transnational Labour law, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing, 2015, pp. 438-454, spec. p. 448. 
296
  Ibidem, p. 449. 
297
  M. FORNASIER, Employment, Posting of Workers, in J. BASEDOW, G. RÜHL, F. FERRARI, P. DE 
MIGUEL ASENSIO (edited by), Encyclopedia of Private International Law, Cheltenham, UK, 
Northampton, MA, USA, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017, pp. 116-123; C. BARNARD, The 
Worker Protection Justification: Lessons from Consumer Law, in P. KOUTRAKOS, N.N. 
SHUIBHNE, P. SYRPIS (edited by), Exceptions from EU Free Movement Law, Oxford and Port-
land, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2016, pp. 106-130, spec. p. 107. 
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cross-border provision of services: Directive 96/71
298
, Directive 2014/67 (the En-
forcement Directive) and the 2016 proposal for a Directive amending the for-
mer
299
. These acts are aimed at guaranteeing working conditions across the EU 
Member States by providing minimum standards and requiring the adoption of ef-
fective mechanisms for the protection of posted workers’ rights. 
Back in 1990, in the context of the potential enlargement of the EU Members 
and the increase in employment relationships based on the enjoyment of the free 
movement of workers and services, the Commission addressed the situation in-
volving workers who temporarily perform work in another country other than the 
State in whose territory they habitually work. In these cases, the question was 
which national labour legislation should be applied to undertakings which posted 
a worker to carry out temporary work in another Member State. The private inter-
national law rules of the national systems applied, and the outcome was legal un-
certainty, thus causing distortions of competition and difficulties in enjoying the 
market freedoms. Based on statistical data and on the case law of the Court of Jus-
tice, the Commission presented a proposal for a directive on the posting of work-
ers
300
, which was then enacted in 1996, i.e. Directive 96/71.  
                                                          
298
  For an analysis, see M. ROCCELLA, T. TREU, Diritto del lavoro dell’Unione europea, cit., pp. 
158-164; S. GIUBBONI, Libertà economiche fondamentali e diritto del lavoro, oggi, in Europa 
e diritto privato, 2015, No. 2, pp. 493-509, spec. p. 499 ff.; D. DIVERIO, Art. 56 TFUE, in F. 
POCAR. M.C. BARUFFI (a cura di), Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione europea, cit., 
pp. 417-428, spec. pp. 425-426; U. CARABELLI, Europa dei mercati e conflitto sociale, Bari, 
Cacucci Editore, 2009, p. 13 ff.; U. CARABELLI, Una sfida determinante per il futuro dei di-
ritti sociali in Europa: la tutela dei lavoratori di fronte alla libertà di prestazione dei servizi 
nella CE, in Rivista giuridica del lavoro, 2007, No. 1, pp. 33-134. 
299
  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, COM(2016)128 final of 
8 March 2016. 
300
  Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services, COM(91)230 final of 1 August 1991. 
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However, as early as in 1972
301
 and 1976
302
, the Commission had submitted 
legislative proposals, effectively the forerunners to Directive 96/71, which were 
based on a private international law background and were focused on the freedom 
of movement of workers under Article 39 of the EC Treaty (previously Article 48 
of the EEC Treaty). They were later withdrawn following the adoption in 1980 of 
the Rome Convention
303
.  
Directive 96/71 addressed the issue of which national law should apply to 
posted employees
304
 in light of the Court of Justice case law. It is also a political 
solution. Indeed, the posting of workers’ regime in the context of the free provi-
sion of services opposes the interests of the host State’s providers and workers, 
and works in favour of the interests of companies performing cross-border ser-
vices (and sometimes even the interests of the posted workers). In addition, it op-
poses the interests of high-cost States and those of low-cost sending States. Di-
rective 96/71 tried to balance these interests
305
. Posted workers are employed by 
the sending company and are therefore subject to the law of that Member State in 
terms of the employment relationship. According to the Directive, they are enti-
tled by law to the minimum conditions provided by the legislation of the host 
Member State in which the tasks are carried out
306
. In other words, the Directive 
                                                          
301
  Proposition de règlement (CEE) du Conseil relatif aux dispositions concernant les conflits de 
lois en matière de relations de travail à l’intérieur de la Communauté of 23 March 1972, in OJ 
C 49 of 18 May 1972. 
302
  Amended proposal for a Regulation of the Council on the provisions on conflict of laws on 
employment relationships within the Community, COM(75)653 final of 28 April 1976. 
303
  Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature in Rome on 
19 June 1980, in OJ L 266 of 9 October 1980, pp. 1-19; on the former proposals see S. EVJU, 
Cross-border services, posting of workers, and jurisdictional alternation, in European La-
bour Law Journal, 2010, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 89-98, spec. p. 90; S. EVJU, Revisiting the Posted 
Workers Directive: Conflict of Laws and Laws in Conflict, in Cambridge Yearbook of Euro-
pean Legal Studies, 2009-2010, pp. 151-182, spec. p. 156. 
304
  Under Article 2 of Directive 96/71 «posted worker means a worker who, for a limited period, 
carries out his work in the territory of a Member State other than the State in which he nor-
mally works». 
305
  A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment, cit., p. 450. 
306
  See Article 3 and Recital No. 6 of Directive 96/71. For an analysis, see G. ORLANDINI, Mer-
cato unico dei servizi e tutela del lavoro, Milano, Franco Angeli, 2013, pp. 38-42. This Arti-
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established a core set of terms and conditions of employment which need to be 
complied with by the service provider in the Member State where the posting 
takes place to ensure the minimum protection of the posted workers concerned. 
As set forth in its first Recital, the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of 
persons and services constitutes one of the objectives of the Community pursuant 
to (former) Article 3, letter c of the EC Treaty. Indeed, the ultimate goal of the Di-
rective was to enhance the economic dimension of the European market by pro-
tecting persons enjoying their right to freely move
307
. 
The Directive drew inspiration from the Court of Justice case law
308
.  
In the Rush Portuguesa judgment of 1990, the Court incidentally affirmed the 
applicability of the host Member State’s law309. The case concerned the provision 
of services of a Portuguese undertaking in France and the interpretation of Arti-
cles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty (now Articles 56 and 57 of the TFEU). The dis-
pute regarded an undertaking established in Portugal specialising in construction 
and public works (Rush Portuguesa) and the French Office National 
d’immigration. Rush Portuguesa entered into a subcontract with a French under-
taking for the carrying out of works for the construction of a railway line in west-
ern France. For that purpose, it brought its Portuguese employees from Portugal to 
France. The French Office National d’immigration requested specific conditions 
for the Portuguese workers, i.e. conditions as to the engagement in situ and an ob-
                                                                                                                                                               
cle is further clarified in the 2016 proposal by introducing a few amendments, such as the 
term ‘remuneration’. However, in relation to this, some national parliaments raised many 
doubts about its compatibility with the principle of subsidiarity, because it violated Member 
States’ prerogatives in this field (for more information, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-16-2546_en.htm and documents cited therein). 
307
  See Recital No. 3 of Directive 96/71. 
308
  See, before the internal market was launched, on the interpretation of Regulation No 3 of the 
Council of the EEC concerning social security for migrant workers, Court of Justice, judg-
ment of 17 December 1970, Case 35/70, S.A.R.L. Manpower v Caisse primaire d'assurance 
maladie de Strasbourg, EU:C:1970:120; and judgment of 5 December 1967, Case 19/67, 
Bestuur der Sociale Verzekeringsbank v J. H. van der Vecht, EU:C:1967:49. 
309
  Court of Justice, judgment of 27 March 1990, Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa Ldª v Office 
national d’immigration, EU:C:1990:142. 
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ligation to obtain a work permit
310
. If the case had fallen within the free move-
ment of workers, those requirements could have been mandated.  
When workers are posted in another Member State within the free movement 
of persons, and not within the free provision of services (based on the principle of 
the home State), it is undisputed that the host Member State’s legislation shall ap-
ply (by virtue of the principle of equal treatment). In such cases, protection is 
granted to both posted and national workers, and downward competition is ex-
cluded. By contrast, the posting company could be affected by reverse discrimina-
tion because it will be subject to different legislation that eventually offers fewer 
guarantees. More relevance should have been given to the prohibition of discrimi-
nation by the Court when assessing this issue in the case at hand
311
. 
The Court determined the situation of Rush Portuguesa within the free provi-
sion of services because «there is a temporary movement of workers who are sent 
to another Member State to carry out construction work or public works as part of 
a provision of services by their employer. In fact, such workers return to their 
country of origin after the completion of their work without at any time gaining 
access to the labour market of the host Member State»
312
. Therefore, the authori-
ties of the host Member State may not impose on the supplier of services condi-
                                                          
310
  M. ROCCA, Posting of Workers and Collective Labour Law: There and Back Again. Between 
Internal Market and Fundamental Rights, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, Intersentia, 2015, p. 
150 ff. and 289 ff.; M. KULLMANN, The Principle of Effet Utile and Its Impact on National 
Methods for Enforcing the Rights of Posted Workers, in The International Journal of Com-
parative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 2013, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 283-304, spec. p. 
293 ff.; on the requirement of a work permit, see also application of 21 April 2017, Case C-
18/17, Danieli & C. Officine Meccaniche and Others v Arbeitsmarktservice Leoben, in pro-
gress. 
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  I. INGRAVALLO, La Corte di giustizia tra diritto di sciopero e libertà economiche fondamen-
tali. Quale bilanciamento?, in La Comunità internazionale, 2008, No. 4, pp. 641-662, spec. 
pp. 654-655. See also G. FONTANA, Crisi economica ed effettività dei diritti sociali in Euro-
pa, 27 novembre 2013, pp. 1-57, spec. p. 38 f., available at www.forumcostituzionale.it. 
312
  Court of Justice, judgment of 27 March 1990, Rush Portuguesa, cit., para. 15. 
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tions relating to the recruitment of manpower in situ or the obtaining of work 
permits for the Portuguese work-force
313
.  
It must be noted that, at that time, the provision on the free movement of 
workers was not applicable to Portugal due to the transitional regime, and thus Ar-
ticle 39 EC Treaty was not yet applicable
314
. Nevertheless, the Court deemed the 
situation in the case at issue to be different from the cases in which workers 
moved abroad to work. On the one hand, it identified the difference between the 
economic freedoms and their functions within the internal market and, on the oth-
er, it did appear to have found a solution to avoid concerns about social dumping 
practices
315
. 
In the ruling, the Court also affirmed: «Community law does not preclude 
Member States from extending their legislation, or collective labour agreements 
entered into by both sides of industry, to any person who is employed, even tem-
porarily, within their territory, no matter in which country the employer is estab-
lished; nor does Community law prohibit Member States from enforcing those 
rules by appropriate means»
316
. This means that the legislation of the host country 
shall apply to workers temporarily posted in its territory. Accordingly, such law 
may better protect workers’ rights while respecting the freedom of the transna-
                                                          
313
  Ibidem, para. 19. The Court also prohibited prior authorisation or verification of notification 
made before the undertakings post their workers: judgment of 7 October 2010, Case C-
515/08, Criminal proceedings against Vítor Manuel dos Santos Palhota and Others, 
EU:C:2010:589; see M. KULLMANN, The Principle of Effet Utile and Its Impact on National 
Methods for Enforcing the Rights of Posted Workers, cit., p. 294. 
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  G. ORLANDINI, Mercato unico dei servizi e tutela del lavoro, cit., pp. 17-21. 
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 27 March 1990, Rush Portuguesa, cit., para. 18: «Community 
law does not preclude Member States from extending their legislation, or collective labour 
agreements entered into by both sides of industry, to any person who is employed, even tem-
porarily, within their territory, no matter in which country the employer is established; nor 
does Community law prohibit Member States from enforcing those rules by appropriate 
means». 
316
  Ibidem. 
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tional provision of services
317
. The Court further affirmed that the host Member 
State shall enforce its law by any means when the protection conferred under its 
law is not guaranteed by identical or essentially similar obligations by which the 
undertaking is already bound in the Member State where it is established
318
.  
The Säger case of 1991
319
 contributed to the development of the legislation at 
issue. In that case, the Court addressed problems related to the social security sys-
tems applicable to posted workers. Article 49 EC Treaty (now Article 56 TFEU) 
was interpreted as not only prohibiting discriminatory measures, but also as 
providing for the right to market access in the host countries
320
. It follows that the 
national provisions of the host country could impede the freedom of cross-border 
activity when they are less favourable than the home country’s provisions. There-
fore, any national legislation that imposes stricter conditions upon foreign under-
takings was deemed to be in violation of EU law, unless it is justified by overrid-
ing reasons of public interest
321
. 
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  In this regard, see Recital No. 5 of Directive 96/71: «any such promotion of the transnational 
provision of services requires a climate of fair competition and measures guaranteeing respect 
for the rights of workers». 
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  See, inter alia, Court of Justice, judgment of 21 October 2004, Case C-445/03, Commission 
of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, EU:C:2004:655, para. 29. 
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 25 July 1991, Case C-25/90, Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & 
Co. Ltd., EU:C:1991:331. 
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  Ibidem, para. 12: «Article 59 of the Treaty requires not only the elimination of all discrimina-
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similar services». See M. FORNASIER, Employment, Posting of Workers, cit., pp. 117-118. 
321
  Ibidem, para. 15: «the freedom to provide services may be limited only by rules which are 
justified by imperative reasons relating to the public interest and which apply to all persons or 
undertakings pursuing an activity in the State of destination, in so far as that interest is not 
protected by the rules to which the person providing the services is subject in the Member 
State in which he is established. In particular, those requirements must be objectively neces-
sary in order to ensure compliance with professional rules and to guarantee the protection of 
the recipient of services and they must not exceed what is necessary to attain those objec-
tives». 
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These conclusions find a confirmation in the text of the Directive
322
. It is 
based on Article 53, paragraph 1 and 62 TFEU on the free provision of services. 
Recital No. 5 states that fair competition and measures guaranteeing respect for 
the rights of workers are to be provided in the framework of the transnational pro-
vision of services
323
. The following Recital No. 6 identifies the problem, i.e. 
which legislation is applicable to the employment relationship involving posted 
workers.  
Article 1 limits the scope of application of the Directive by determining that it 
covers the situation in which undertakings established in a Member State post 
workers to the territory of another Member State to perform services
324
. The situa-
tion of posting was clarified by the Court in the Vicoplus case of 2011
325
. It stated 
that there must be an employment relationship between the temporary employ-
ment undertaking or placement agency and the worker during the period of the 
posting
326
. Workers are hired out in accordance with Article 1, paragraph 3, letter 
c, where, in contrast to a temporary movement, the movement of workers to an-
other Member State constitutes the very purpose of a transnational provision of 
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  For an analysis of the Directive and its implementation in some Member States, see A.A.H. 
VAN HOEK, M. HOUWERZIJL, Complementary study on the legal aspects of the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services in the European Union, Contract 
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EU Internal Market, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 196-200. 
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  On the personal scope see C. BARNARD, EU Employment Law, Oxford, Oxfrod University 
Press, 4
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 ed., 2012, p. 218 ff.; A.A.H. VAN HOEK, M. HOUWERZIJL, ‘Posting’ and ‘Posted 
Workers’: The Need for Clear Definitions of Two Key Concepts of the Posting of Workers Di-
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 10 February 2011, Joined Cases C-307/09, C-308/09 and C-
309/09, Vicoplus SC PUH (C-307/09), BAM Vermeer Contracting sp. zoo (C-308/09) and 
Olbek Industrial Services sp. zoo (C-309/09) v Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegen-
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delivered on 15 January 2015, Case C-586/13, Martin Meat v Géza Simonfay and Ulrich Sal-
burg, EU:C:2015:15, para. 21 ff. For an analysis see M. ROCCA, Posting of Workers and Col-
lective Labour Law, cit., p. 205 ff. 
326
  Court of Justice, judgment of 10 February 2011, Vicoplus, cit., para. 44. 
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services
327
, and they work under the control and direction of the user undertak-
ing
328
. The posted workers remain in the employ of the undertaking providing the 
service, no contract of employment is entered into with the user undertaking
329
, 
and they return to the Member State of origin after the completion of the ser-
vice
330
. 
Article 2 defines a posted worker as a worker who for a limited period of one 
year, according to Article 3, paragraph 6, carries out his work in the territory of a 
Member State other than the State in which he normally works. From a private in-
ternational law perspective, this phrase is similar but not identical to the connect-
ing factor of Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Rome I Regulation, which determines as 
the applicable law that of «the country in which or, failing that, from which the 
employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract»
331
.  
Article 3, paragraph 1 of Directive 96/71 provides for substantive protection 
by establishing a conflict of laws rule according to which the Member States shall 
ensure that the posting undertakings guarantee workers posted to their territory the 
terms and conditions of employment (seven basic labour standards)
332
 which, in 
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di), Esternalizzazioni e tutela dei lavoratori, Torino, UTET Giuridica, 2014, pp. 637-674, 
spec. p. 667. 
328
  Court of Justice, judgment of 10 February 2011, Vicoplus, cit., para. 47, where the Court also 
specified that «That is the corollary of the fact that such a worker does not carry out his work 
in the context of a provision of services undertaken by his employer in the host Member 
State». 
329
  Ibidem, para. 50. 
330
  Ibidem, para. 49. 
331
  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), in OJ L 177 of 4 July 2008, pp. 6-
16. In relation to Article 3 of Directive 96/71, see further infra in this para.  
332
  These are: «(a) maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; (b) minimum paid annual 
holidays; (c) the minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates; this point does not apply to 
supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes; (d) the conditions of hiring-out of 
workers, in particular the supply of workers by temporary employment undertakings; (e) 
health, safety and hygiene at work; (f) protective measures with regard to the terms and con-
ditions of employment of pregnant women or women who have recently given birth, of chil-
dren and of young people; (g) equality of treatment between men and women and other provi-
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the Member State where the work is carried out, are set by law, regulation or col-
lective agreements that are universally applicable. This means that the employ-
ment terms and conditions provided by the national laws of the host country shall 
apply to the posted workers in that country, that is to say the law applicable to 
posted workers is the law of the host State
333
, «whatever the law applicable to the 
employment relationship».  
All the mandatory rules in the areas of protection mentioned in Article 3 must 
be considered to apply as an overriding mandatory protection for all workers post-
ed to that territory
334
. The Member States are allowed to apply their own laws. 
However, in cross-border situations, the national legislation must be coordinated 
by EU actions «in order to lay down a nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum 
protection to be observed in the host country by employers who post workers to 
perform temporary work in the territory of a Member State where the services are 
provided»
335
. The Directive does not harmonise the material content of the man-
datory rules for minimum protection. That content may be determined by national 
laws (as well as a collective agreement), in accordance with EU law
336
.  
                                                                                                                                                               
sions on non-discrimination». The reason why these matters are listed is that these employ-
ment standards are of immediate interest during the period of posting: see Proposal for a 
Council Directive concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services, COM(91)230 final of 1 August 1991, cit. On this point see U. GRUŠIĆ, The Europe-
an Private International Law of Employment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, 
p. 254 ff, spec. p. 264 ff. 
333
  For further explanations see Communication from the Commission to the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - 
The implementation of Directive 96/71/EC in the Member States, COM(2003)458 final of 25 
July 2003, para. 4.1.2. See also I. VIARENGO, La legge applicabile al lavoratore distaccato in 
un altro Stato membro nell’ambito di una prestazione di servizi, in B. NASCIMBENE (a cura 
di), La libera circolazione dei lavoratori. Trent’anni di applicazione delle norme comunita-
rie, Milano, Giuffrè Editore, 1998, pp. 175-186. 
334
  A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment, cit., p. 450. 
335
  Recitals Nos. 13 to 15 of Directive 96/71. 
336
  The Court intervened to define the conditions for example in the judgment of 12 February 
2015, Case C-396/13, Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry v Elektrobudowa Spolka Akcyjna, 
EU:C:2015:86, spec. paras. 27-70. On this case see S. GIUBBONI, Salario minimo e distacco 
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In the context of the award of a public contract, in the RegioPost judgment of 
2015, the Court of Justice clarified that, in accordance with Article 26 of Directive 
2004/18 on public works contracts and Article 3 of Directive 96/71, «the host 
Member State may lay down a mandatory rule for minimum protection (…), 
which requires undertakings established in other Member States to comply with 
an obligation in respect of a minimum rate of pay for the benefit of their workers 
posted to the territory of the host Member State in order to perform that public 
contract. Such a rule is part of the level of protection which must be guaranteed to 
those workers»
337
. 
Hence, Article 3 aims to state a minimum threshold in the level of protection 
offered to posted workers. However, the Court of Justice interpreted the Directive 
as imposing a maximum. In this respect, the Viking and Laval judgments
338
 were 
criticised because of the narrow interpretation according to which the Directive 
provided maximum limits and not minimum standards upon posted workers’ con-
ditions
339
; therefore, they are not amendable in melius by a collective agreement 
                                                                                                                                                               
transnazionale, in Rivista giuridica del lavoro e della previdenza sociale, 2015, No. 2, part II, 
pp. 222-228. 
337
  Court of Justice, judgment of 17 November 2015, Case C-115/14, RegioPost GmbH & Co. 
KG v Stadt Landau in der Pfalz, EU:C:2015:760, paras. 61-66. On this subject see F. 
COSTAMAGNA, Minimum wage between public procurement and posted workers: anything 
new after the RegioPost case?, in European Law Review, 2017, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 101-111. 
To that effect see also Court of Justice, judgment of 18 September 2014, Case C-549/13, 
Bundesdruckerei GmbH v Stadt Dortmund, EU:C:2014:2235; judgment of 7 November 2013, 
Case C-522/12, Tevfik Isbir v DB Services GmbH, EU:C:2013:711. 
338
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 11 December 2007, Case C-438/05, Interna-
tional Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and 
OÜ Viking Line Eesti, EU:C:2007:772; Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 18 
December 2007, Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbun-
det, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerför-
bundet, EU:C:2007:809. 
339
  See P. MENGOZZI, Il principio personalista nel diritto dell’Unione Europea, Padova, 
CEDAM, 2010, p. 149 ff. 
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(even more when collective contracts do not have erga omnes effectiveness)
340
. 
The Directive limits the application of the host State labour law to the areas men-
tioned therein unless the rule to be applied is considered to be part of public poli-
cy. This interpretation thus leaves less room for the application of the local labour 
standards
341
. For instance, as affirmed in the Rüffert case, the host State may not 
require posting undertakings to pay wages above the minimum rate of pay fixed in 
the national legislation or the collective agreement
342
.  
Overall, in light of Article 3, the Directive has been interpreted as pursuing 
the full harmonisation of national systems, because the host States do not have 
discretion to offer more favourable terms and conditions and thus to go beyond 
the requirements provided in the Directive
343
. 
At this point, it is worthwhile to mention the interrelation
344
 of the Directive 
with the existing (at that time) private international law instruments, namely the 
1980 Rome Convention
345
. The coordination between these acts is governed by 
Article 20 of the Convention, now Article 23 of the Regulation under which «the 
[it] does not affect the application of provisions which, in relation to a particular 
matter, lay down choice-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations and which 
are or will be contained in acts of the institutions of the European Communities or 
                                                          
340
  M. ROCCELLA, T. TREU, Diritto del lavoro dell’Unione europea, cit., p. 443; S. GIUBBONI, 
Libertà economiche fondamentali e diritto del lavoro, cit., spec. p. 499; G. FONTANA, Crisi 
economica ed effettività dei diritti sociali in Europa, cit., pp. 37-38.  
341
  A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment, cit. p. 451. 
342
  Court of Justice, judgment of 3 April 2008, Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersach-
sen, EU:C:2008:189, para. 34; commented, inter alia, by V. KOSTA, Fundamental Rights in 
EU Internal Market, cit., pp. 202-207. On minimum wage of pay and part-time posting see 
Court of Justice, judgment of 15 March 2001, Case C-165/98, Criminal proceedings against 
André Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL, as the party civilly liable, third 
parties: Eric Guillaume and Others, EU:C:2001:162, commented by M. ROCCA, Posting of 
Workers and Collective Labour Law, cit., p. 164 ff. 
343
  M. FORNASIER, Employment, Posting of Workers, cit., pp. 120-121. 
344
  Communication COM(2003)458 final, cit., para. 2.3.1.1; see also, among others, C. 
BARNARD, EU Employment Law, cit., pp. 229-234; S. EVJU, Cross-border services, posting of 
workers, and jurisdictional alternation, in European Labour Law Journal, 2010, Vol. 1, No. 
1, pp. 89-98, spec. p. 90. 
345
  See Recitals Nos. 7 to 11 of Directive 96/71. 
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in national laws harmonized in implementation of such acts»
346
. This means that 
Article 3 of the Posting of Workers Directive takes precedence as lex specialis 
over the rules laid down in the Convention, now the Rome I Regulation
347
. 
The provision on the law applicable to employment relationships involving 
posted workers set forth in Article 3 of the Directive supplements the 1980 Rome 
Convention, now the Rome I Regulation
348
. Article 8 of the latter determines, pur-
suant to paragraph 2, that in the absence of a choice by the parties the law appli-
cable to employment contracts is the law of the habitual place of work (lex loci 
laboris). However, the Directive specifically addresses the situation of posted 
workers by establishing the applicability of the law of the host State.  
The difference lies in the interpretation of the employment relation and the 
fact that the worker is «temporarily employed in another country». The Regula-
tion ensures that during a temporary posting, the law applicable to the contract 
does not change. Such situation occurs when «the employee is expected to resume 
working in the country of origin after carrying out his tasks abroad»
349
. The Di-
rective instead refers to situations of posting lasting one year, provided that the 
requirements to define the situation of posting are met. It follows from the above 
that when the host State law is applicable under Article 8 of the Rome I Regula-
tion (by choice of the parties or as the law applicable in the absence of a choice), 
                                                          
346
  See also Recital No. 11 of Directive 96/71. 
347
  As to the coordination of Article 3 of Directive 96/71 and Article 7 of 1980 Rome Conven-
tion the Commission affirmed that «The Directive must therefore be regarded as an imple-
mentation of Article 7 of the Rome Convention, concerning overriding mandatory rules» and 
«The Rome Convention and the Directive not having the same objectives, there is no incon-
sistency between these instruments»: see Green paper on the conversion of the Rome Con-
vention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual obligations into a Community instrument 
and its modernisation, COM(2002)654 final of 14 January 2003, point 3.2.9.2. 
348
  For a comment see A.A.H. VAN HOEK, M. HOUWERZIJL, Complementary study on the legal 
aspects of the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services in the Europe-
an Union, cit., Final Report, p. 20 ff. 
349
  See Recital No. 36 of Rome I Regulation, that also specifies that «The conclusion of a new 
contract of employment with the original employer or an employer belonging to the same 
group of companies as the original employer should not preclude the employee from being 
regarded as carrying out his work in another country temporarily». 
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the restrictions imposed by the Directive do not apply. On the contrary, the Di-
rective restricts the operation of Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Regulation and the 
applicability of the country of origin principle
350
. 
Paragraph 4 of Article 3 of the Directive allows the Member States to provide 
exemptions by means of collective agreements within the meaning of paragraph 8 
of the same Article, concerning one or more sectors of activity, where the length 
of the posting does not exceed one month, as well as on the grounds that the 
amount of work to be done is not significant (paragraph 5). 
Article 3, paragraph 7 prescribes that the obligation to protect the hard nucle-
us of the host State does not prevent the application of employment terms and 
conditions that are more favourable to workers. So, the workers may enjoy the 
terms and conditions of their home State when they are more favourable.  
However, the public policy provisions of the host State law may extend to 
posted workers employment conditions on matters other than the hard nucleus. 
This is provided for in Article 3, paragraph 10 which, by virtue of the equal treat-
ment principle, allows the application to posting undertakings of national laws, in 
compliance with the Treaty, on terms and conditions of employment on matters 
other than those referred to in paragraph 1 when they consist of public policy pro-
visions
351
, and «public policy may be relied on only if there is a genuine and suf-
                                                          
350
  M. FORNASIER, Employment, Posting of Workers, cit., pp. 119-120. 
351
  Communication COM(2003)458 final, cit., para. 4.1.2.2, according to which public policy 
provisions are «mandatory rules from which there can be no derogation and which, by their 
nature and objective, meet the imperative requirements of the public interest. These may in-
clude, in particular, the prohibition of forced labour or the involvement of public authorities 
in monitoring compliance with legislation on working conditions». See also Court of Justice, 
judgment of 23 November 1999, Joined Cases C-369/96 and C-376/96, Criminal proceedings 
against Jean-Claude Arblade and Arblade & Fils SARL (C-369/96) and Bernard Leloup, 
Serge Leloup and Sofrage SARL (C-376/96), EU:C:1999:575, para. 30: «public-order legisla-
tion (…) must be understood as applying to national provisions compliance with which has 
been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic order in 
the Member State concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons present on the 
national territory of that Member State and all legal relationships within that State». 
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ficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society»
352
. This concept, 
which is to be interpreted narrowly, includes the protection of workers. The 
Member States may offer more favourable employment terms and conditions than 
those provided in the EU directives that harmonised the pertinent employment 
matters. Nevertheless, the undertakings posting workers in another State must 
comply with the minimum standards covered by those directives. Therefore, the 
compatibility with public policy may not be invoked unless the State where the 
undertaking is seated did not correctly transpose the Directive
353
. 
In the Arblade judgment of 1999
354
, the Court recalled that the application of 
national rules to providers of services established in other Member States must be 
appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue and 
must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it. The protection of work-
ers is included among the overriding reasons relating to the public interest which 
may justify restrictions on the fundamental freedoms
355
. A restriction on the free 
                                                          
352
  Court of Justice, judgment of 19 June 2008, Case C-319/06, Commission of the European 
Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, EU:C:2008:350, para. 50. See V. KOSTA, Fun-
damental Rights in EU Internal Market, cit., pp. 207-209; G. ORLANDINI, Il distacco transna-
zionale, cit., p. 649 ff. 
353
  G. ORLANDINI, Mercato unico dei servizi e tutela del lavoro, cit., p. 29. 
354
  Court of Justice, judgment of 23 November 1999, Arblade, cit. For an analysis see M. 
ROCCA, Posting of Workers and Collective Labour Law, cit., p. 160 ff. 
355
  Court of Justice, judgment of 23 November 1999, Arblade, cit., paras. 36-38. Similarly, Court 
of Justice, judgment of 17 December 1981, Case 279/80, Criminal proceedings against Alfred 
John Webb, EU:C:1981:314, para. 19. See also M. FORNASIER, Employment, Posting of 
Workers, cit., p. 118, which wondered who shall be protected by mandatory provisions of the 
host State law: the posted workers, the workers of the host State, or either group. It is then in-
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from the Court’s case law: when it refers to worker protection as a justification it relates to 
decent working conditions and prevails over EU market freedoms; by contrast, when rejecting 
the worker protection justification, it may be prioritising the Union interest in worker welfare: 
C. BARNARD, The Worker Protection Justification, cit., p. 109 ff. To be precise, the term 
worker protection is used in the present work to refer to all workers’ rights and the possibility 
to enjoy rights when moving abroad, including all substantive (work terms and conditions) 
and procedural rights (such as remedies). 
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movement of services can be accepted only if it is justified by overriding reasons 
of public interest and is proportionate
356
.  
The application of the host State law may put the foreign service provider at a 
disadvantage by obliging it to fulfil double standards (home State and host State), 
as well as depriving it of the comparative advantage. The Court of Justice af-
firmed that this is an obstacle to the free provision of services which can only be 
justified under specific conditions, which are elaborated in its case law. The Court 
recognised the protection of posted workers as a legitimate interest of the host 
State, but the application of the host State law must be both necessary and propor-
tionate. One of the conditions for the application of the host State law is that it of-
fers a real advantage to the workers concerned. When workers enjoy a comparable 
protection under the home State law, the application of the host State law is not 
justified
357
.  
In the Finalarte case of 2001, the Court stressed that restricting measures 
may not be founded on national economic objectives, such as the protection of na-
tional undertakings
358
. The Court’s reasoning clarified that the national courts 
shall assess whether the host State’s rules «confer a genuine benefit on the work-
ers concerned, which significantly adds to their social protection»
359
. This means 
that there are provisions aimed at combatting social dumping, as well as others 
that offer protection for workers. What stems from the above is that the Court did 
                                                          
356
  J. MALMBERG, Regulating Posted Work – Before and After the Laval Quartet, in M. 
RÖNNMAR (edited by), Labour Law, Fundamental Rights and Social Europe, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2011, pp. 77-88, spec. p. 78. 
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  A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment, cit., pp. 
449-450. 
358
  See Court of Justice, judgment of 25 October 2001, Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 
to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98, Finalarte Sociedade de Construção Civil Ldª (C-49/98), 
Portugaia Construções Ldª (C-70/98) and Engil Sociedade de Construção Civil SA (C-71/98) 
v Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleichskasse der Bauwirtschaft and Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleich-
skasse der Bauwirtschaft v Amilcar Oliveira Rocha (C-50/98), Tudor Stone Ltd (C-52/98), 
Tecnamb-Tecnologia do Ambiante Ldª (C-53/98), Turiprata Construções Civil Ldª (C-54/98), 
Duarte dos Santos Sousa (C-68/98) and Santos & Kewitz Construções Ldª (C-69/98), 
EU:C:2001:564, para. 39. 
359
  Ibidem, para. 42. 
113 
 
not consider anti-dumping measures as a national economic objective; on the con-
trary, such measures consist in one of the principles over which the economic in-
tegration process is based. Moreover, in this context, national downstream compe-
tition policies are not allowed
360
. 
With regard to mandatory rules, the relationship with the applicable private 
international law instrument must be considered
361
. Article 9 of the Rome I Regu-
lation
362
 establishes the applicability of the overriding mandatory provisions of the 
law of the forum. In relation to Directive 96/71, Recital No. 34 of the Regulation 
clarifies that the rule on individual employment contracts should not prejudice the 
application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the country in which a 
worker is posted in accordance with said Directive. The Directive designates the 
mandatory provisions to be observed during the period of transnational posting in 
the host Member State. These rules constitute a nucleus of minimum protection 
for posted workers, and in this sense the Directive concretises the abstract concept 
of overriding mandatory provisions in the context of the posting of workers, while 
respecting the principle of equality of treatment between national and non-
national providers of services by virtue of Article 49 of the EC Treaty (now Arti-
cle 53 TFEU) and between national and non-national workers
363
.  
Returning to the content of Directive 96/71, Article 4 imposes the Member 
States to designate competent national authorities with the aim of cooperating for 
the purposes of the Directive, while Article 5 provides that appropriate measures 
shall be adopted in the event of a failure to comply with this Directive, including 
adequate procedures available to workers and/or their representatives for the en-
forcement of obligations. This last provision is indeed of interest in the assess-
ment of the remedies involving posted workers, especially through collective 
                                                          
360
  M. ROCCA, Posting of Workers and Collective Labour Law, cit., p. 169 ff.; G. ORLANDINI, 
Mercato unico dei servizi e tutela del lavoro, cit., p. 21. 
361
  On this point see A.A.H. VAN HOEK, M. HOUWERZIJL, Complementary study on the legal as-
pects of the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services in the European 
Union, cit., Final Report, cit., p. 26 ff. 
362
  It replaced Article 7 of the Convention, that is mentioned in Recital No. 10 of Directive 
96/71. 
363
  M. FORNASIER, Employment, Posting of Workers, cit., p. 120. 
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mechanisms, which, given the transnational nature of the situation, may entail is-
sues of private international law and from a procedural perspective.  
The Court of Justice faced the question of trade unions representing posted 
workers in the Sähköalojen ammattiliitto judgment of 2015
364
. In this case, the 
Polish undertaking argued that the Sähköalojen ammattiliitto, the Finnish trade 
union, did not have standing to bring proceedings on behalf of the posted workers 
on the grounds that Polish law prohibits the assignment of claims arising from an 
employment relationship. On the contrary, the Court held that its locus standi be-
fore the referring (Finnish) court was governed by Finnish procedural law, which 
is applicable according to the principle of lex fori. Therefore, under Finnish law, 
the applicant had standing to bring proceedings on behalf of the posted work-
ers
365
. The European judges affirmed that Polish law, i.e. the Polish Labour Code, 
to which the Polish undertaking referred, was not relevant with regard to the locus 
standi of the Finnish trade union before the referring (Finnish) court, which was 
governed by Finnish law. Thus, it did not prevent that trade union from bringing 
an action before the Satakunnan käräjäoikeus (Finnish court).  
The Court concluded that «Directive 96/71 (…), read in the light of Article 47 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, prevents a rule of 
the Member State of the seat of the undertaking that has posted workers to the ter-
ritory of another Member State – under which the assignment of claims arising 
from employment relationships is prohibited – from barring a trade union from 
bringing an action before a court of the second Member State, in which the work 
is performed, in order to recover for the posted workers, pay claims which relate 
to the minimum wage, within the meaning of Directive 96/71, and which have 
been assigned to it, that assignment being in conformity with the law in force in 
the second Member State»
366
. In other words, national trade unions may represent 
non-national posted workers and are subject to the lex fori which may be the law 
of the host country
367
. This finding could be connected to Recital No. 22 of the 
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 12 February 2015, Sähköalojen ammattiliitto, cit. 
365
  Ibidem, paras. 19-21. 
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  Ibidem, para. 26. 
367
  M. ROCCELLA, T. TREU, Diritto del lavoro dell’Unione europea, cit., pp. 448-449. 
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Directive, according to which the law of the Member States concerning collective 
action to defend the interests of trades and professions is not prejudiced. It is sig-
nificant that the Court valorised the role of trade unions in the place where the 
posted workers perform their services, in contrast to the previous rulings in the 
Laval case
368
. 
Although the Court did not question or raise any doubts concerning the law 
applicable to trade unions involving posted workers (because it applied the host 
State law, which allows national trade unions to represent posted workers), it ap-
pears that private international law issues also deserve attention with regard to the 
coordination with other connecting factors provided in the Directive or in the En-
forcement Directive 2014/67, as well as in the existing instruments aimed at pro-
tecting employees
369
.  
Article 6 establishes a conflict of jurisdictions rule according to which judi-
cial proceedings may be instituted in the host Member State, without prejudice to 
the right to institute proceedings in another State under existing international con-
ventions on jurisdiction. This is an additional (alternative) forum where the em-
ployee can sue his/her employer only to enforce the terms and conditions of em-
ployment set forth in Article 3 of Directive 96/71
370
. This new specific jurisdic-
tion is tailored to the peculiar situation in which posted workers find themselves. 
Thus, this clause constitutes a provision governing a specific matter, as authorised 
by Article 67 of the Brussels I Regulation (now Article 67 of the Brussels I bis 
Regulation)
371
 and may be interpreted as an exception to the general rules
372
. It 
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  A. MATTEI, La Direttiva Enforcement n. 2014/67/UE e il recepimento nell’ordinamento ita-
liano, in Rivista giuridica del lavoro e della previdenza sociale, 2017, No. 1, part I, pp. 147-
168, spec. pp. 156-157. 
369
  See infra, in Chapter 5. 
370
  Communication COM(2003)458 final, cit., para. 4.1.2.3; on the implementation of Article 6 
in some Member States see A.A.H. VAN HOEK, M. HOUWERZIJL, Complementary study on the 
legal aspects of the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services in the 
European Union, cit., Executive Summary, p. 20 ff. 
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tion and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I), in OJ L 12 of 
16 January 2001, pp. 1-23; Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
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has also been interpreted as the consequence of the duty to apply the mandatory 
employment provisions of the host State, which is imposed only upon the host 
State itself. Indeed, the alternative forum recognises the courts of the host State as 
competent. Nevertheless, difficulties in instituting legal proceedings may be faced 
by posted workers, such as language barriers and unfamiliarity with the legal sys-
tem. Looking at other available fora, they may bring actions before the courts of 
their home State where the employer is domiciled in accordance with Article 21 
of the Brussels I bis Regulation. These courts, however, do not have the duty to 
apply the protective standards provided by the host State law
373
. 
The remaining Article 7 sets the deadline to implement the Directive, and Ar-
ticle 8 states the Commission commitment to review its application
374
. 
With respect to the last aspect, in the 2003 Communication
375
 the Commis-
sion pointed out the problems faced by the Member States related to the practical 
application of the Directive. Crucial issues included: the unclear definition of the 
mandatory provisions, as well as the rights and obligations arising out of the Di-
rective; the lack of an explicit transposition of the jurisdiction clause of Article 6; 
and obstacles in seeking information and in monitoring compliance.  
In 2006 the Commission adopted a guidance for the Member States concern-
ing the implementation of the Directive in a more effective manner and in light of 
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cember 2012, pp. 1-32. 
372
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the Court of Justice case law
376
, followed by the 2007 Communication, in which it 
presented the outcomes of the monitoring process based mainly on information 
given by the Member States and the Social Partners at the EU level in reply to 
questionnaires submitted to them in October 2006
377
. The policy documents 
showed that many Member States rely solely on their own national measures and 
instruments to control service providers, due to the absence of administrative co-
operation, and problems related to access to information and cross-border en-
forcement. 
After conducting a public consultation in 2015
378
, the Commission presented 
a proposal on 8 March 2016 amending Directive 96/71
379
 that, as underlined in the 
Explanatory Memorandum, it does not cover the aspects regulated by the 2014 
Enforcement Directive, which provides for instruments to fight and sanction cir-
cumventions, fraud and abuses, with the result that they are complementary to 
each other and mutually reinforcing
380
.  
As to the content of the 2016 proposal
381
, in general, the revision introduced 
changes in three main areas: the remuneration of posted workers, rules on tempo-
                                                          
376
  Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the posting of workers in the framework 
of the provision of services, COM(2006)159 final of 4 April 2006. 
377
  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services: maximising its benefits and potential while guaran-
teeing the protection of workers, COM(2007)304 final of 13 June 2007. 
378
  Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment, Accompanying the document 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council amending Directive 
96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, 
SWD(2016)52 final of 8 March 2016. 
379
  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
96/71/EC of The European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, COM(2016)128 final of 
8 March 2016, cit.  
380
  Explanatory Memorandum of the 2016 proposal, pp. 2-3. On the Enforcement Directive, see 
infra in this Chapter, para. 3.3. 
381
  M. SCHMID-DRÜNER, The revision of the Posting of Workers Directive, PE 607.346, October 
2017, available at www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses; E. VOSS, Posting of Work-
ers Directive – current situation and challanges, PE 579.001, June 2016, p. 42 ff., available 
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rary agency workers, and long-term posting. A new provision on the labour law to 
be applied to posted workers when the anticipated or the effective duration of 
posting exceeds twenty-four months, is introduced
382
. In those cases, the host 
Member State is deemed to be the country in which the work is habitually carried 
out; thus, in line with the rules of the Rome I Regulation
383
, its law will apply to 
posted workers’ employment contracts when no choice of law is made. Neverthe-
less, the provisions that cannot be derogated under the law of the host State will 
apply. The requirement of a twenty-four month duration is based on the Court of 
Justice case law, according to which the distinction between the freedom of estab-
lishment and the freedom to provide services (temporarily) needs to be made on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into account not only the duration, but also the regulari-
ty, periodicity and continuity of the provision of services
384
. 
Other amendments address the use of the term “remuneration” instead of 
“minimum rates of pay”385, as requested by the Court of Justice386, and the intro-
                                                                                                                                                               
at www.europarl.europa.eu/studies; and M. KISS, Posting of Workers Directive: Legislation 
in Progress, PE 582.043, March 2017; K. EISELE, G. CARUSO, Revision of the Posting of 
Workers Directive, PE 581.381, May 2016; M. REMAC, Posting of Workers – part of the ex-
pected Labour Mobility Package, Implementation Appraisal, PE 558.784, September 2015, 
all available at www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank. With regard to the legal basis, see Euro-
pean Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Opinion on the legal basis of the Commission 
proposal for a Directive concerning the posting of workers (COM(2016)0128 – C8-
0114/2016 – 2016/0070(COD)), PE 604.710v02-00. For comments see P. MATTERA, Emploi, 
affaires sociales, compétences et mobilité des travailleurs, in Revue du Droit de l’Union Eu-
ropéenne, 2016, No. 2, pp. 357-363. 
382
  New Article 2a. 
383
  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), in OJ L 177 of 4 July 2008, pp. 6-
16. 
384
  Court of Justice, judgment of 30 November 1995, Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v Con-
siglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, EU:C:1995:411. 
385
  The current Directive requires that posted workers are subject to the minimum rates of pay; 
while the 2016 proposal foresees that the same rules on remuneration of the host State apply 
as laid down by law or by universally applicable collective agreements. As to collective 
agreements, the Commission proposed that their rules become mandatory for posted workers 
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duction of an obligation upon the Member States to publish information on the 
constituent elements of remuneration
387
. Given that the rules on remuneration are 
established by the Member States in accordance with their law and practice, it fol-
lows that such rules on remuneration applicable to local workers are also valid for 
posted workers. Moreover, a new provision on situations of subcontracting chains 
gives the Member States the power to oblige undertakings to subcontract only to 
others that grant workers certain conditions on remuneration applicable to the 
contractor. Another new paragraph sets the conditions applicable to workers in 
specific cases, such as workers hired out by a cross-border agency
388
. 
The proposal establishes that the posted workers will generally benefit from 
the same rules governing pay and working conditions as those applicable to the 
local workers in the host country. The Commission sought to implement the prin-
ciple that the same work at the same place should be remunerated in the same 
manner
389
. Equal treatment and the prohibition of any discrimination based on na-
tionality have been enshrined in EU law since the founding Treaties
390
. The prin-
ciple of equal pay has been implemented through secondary law, not only be-
tween women and men, but also between employees with fixed-term contracts and 
comparable permanent workers, between part-time and full-time workers and be-
tween temporary agency workers and comparable workers of the user undertak-
                                                                                                                                                               
in all economic sectors, contrary to the current regime that concerns only the construction 
sector. 
386
  Court of Justice, judgment of 12 February 2015, Sähköalojen ammattiliitto, cit., para. 66; 
judgment of 16 March 2006, Joined Cases C-131/04 and C-257/04, C. D. Robinson-Steele v 
R. D. Retail Services Ltd (C-131/04), Michael Jason Clarke v Frank Staddon Ltd and J. C. 
Caulfield and Others v Hanson Clay Products Ltd (C-257/04), EU:C:2006:177, para. 50; see 
also (Grand Chamber), judgment of 20 January 2009, Joined Cases C-350/06 and C-520/06, 
Gerhard Schultz-Hoff v Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (C-350/06) and Stringer and 
Others v Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (C-520/06), EU:C:2009:18, para. 58. 
387
  Article 1, para. 2, lett. (a), of the 2016 proposal. 
388
  Article 1, para. 2, lett. (b) and (c), of the 2016 proposal. 
389
  See F. BANO, I confini della legalità. Distacco e manodopera low cost, in D. GOTTARDI (a 
cura di), Legal Frame Work. Lavoro e legalità nella società dell’inclusione, Torino, Giappi-
chelli Editore, 2016, pp. 223-237, spec. p. 231 f. 
390
  See (now) Article 45 TFEU. 
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ing. On the one hand, the posting of workers needs to be facilitated and, on the 
other, fair competition and respect for the rights of workers need to be achieved in 
light of Article 3 TEU, according to which the Union shall promote social justice 
and protection, and Article 9 TFEU, which gives the Union the task of promoting 
a high level of employment, in order to guarantee an adequate social protection 
and to combat social exclusion
391
. 
The objective of the proposal is thus to ensure that the implementation of the 
freedom to provide services in the Union takes place under conditions that guaran-
tee a level playing field between foreign and local competitors and respect for the 
rights of workers. Almost twenty years after its adoption, the Commission found 
that Directive 96/71 no longer ensures such conditions against the background of 
the current economic and social situations in the Member States. Therefore, the 
targeted amendments to Directive 96/71 are aimed at striking the right balance be-
tween the freedom to provide services and the protection of posted workers’ 
rights
392
. 
As the parliaments of eleven Member States have issued fourteen reasoned 
opinions, the yellow card procedure has been triggered
393
. In particular, the na-
tional complaints have argued that the Commission did not provide a detailed and 
sufficient statement on subsidiarity
394
; it did not engage in a wide enough consul-
tation of all the stakeholders, including the social partners at the local and regional 
levels; it did not duly evaluated the necessity of the proposal and the scale of the 
problem; the legislation was premature, as the deadline for the transposition of the 
Enforcement Directive was on 18 June 2016; and from a substantial point of view, 
                                                          
391
  See also Recital No. 3 of the 2016 proposal. 
392
  Recital No. 4 of the 2016 proposal. 
393
  Within the deadline in relation to the review under the subsidiarity principle (10 May 2016), 
reasoned opinions were submitted by the national Parliaments of Romania, the Czech Repub-
lic, Poland, Lithuania, Croatia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia
 
(available at www.ipex.eu). The threshold required to trigger the procedure was set to 19 votes 
(one third of the 56 total votes allocated to national Parliaments). The opinions represented 22 
votes out of 56 in total. 
394
  The arguments affirming that the objective of the action could be better achieved at Member 
State level and that the Commission has not sufficiently proved that the action should be bet-
ter achieved at Union level were stressed in the majority of the reasoned opinions. 
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it was in contrast with the principles of the Single Market, given that it did not 
consider the costs related to posting, thus removing the competitive advantage of 
the service providers. The Commission then adopted a Communication
395
 stating 
that the proposal for a revision of the Directive did not constitute a breach of the 
subsidiarity principle, as emphasised in a press-release by the Commissioner for 
Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility, Ms Marianne 
Thyssen
396
. It insisted, inter alia, that the objectives of the proposal are to facili-
tate the correct functioning of the Internal Market, in particular the freedom to 
provide services (by virtue of Article 57 TFEU, according to which any person 
providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily pursue his or her activity 
in the Member State where the service is provided, under the same conditions as 
are imposed by that State on its own nationals), while ensuring a more level play-
ing field between national and cross-border service providers, an adequate protec-
tion of posted workers, and clarity and predictability regarding the legal frame-
work applicable to posted workers. In arguing that such purposes could be better 
achieved at the Union level, the Commissioner explained that if the Member 
States act unilaterally, at the national level, on the targeted changes proposed by 
the draft legislative act, their actions could lead to a fragmentation of the Internal 
Market as regards the freedom to provide services. 
Under the legislative procedure
397
, negotiations have been initiated and re-
ports adopted by the institutions
398
 under which amendments have been tabled, 
                                                          
395
  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the Na-
tional Parliaments on the proposal for a Directive amending the Posting of Workers Directive, 
with regard to the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with Protocol No 2, 
COM(2016)505 final of 20 July 2016. 
396
  Available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2546_en.htm.  
397
  Available at www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil.  
398
  European Parliament, Report of 23 October 2017 on the proposal for a directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 96/71/EC of The European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services (2016/0070(COD)), A8-0319/2017; the Council 
reached an agreement on 23 October 2017, see General approach of 18 October 2017, ST 
13153 2017 INIT, and of 23 October 2017, ST 13612 2017 INIT, available at 
www.consilium.europa.eu. 
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such as the reduction of the length of posting, and the determination of work con-
ditions, especially remuneration. It appears that developments in the law-making 
process will mostly lie on political grounds with countries debating about the op-
portunity to provide for the principle of equal pay for equal work in the same 
place.  
To conclude, the rules on the applicable law and on the alternative forum 
have not been changed substantially, but the provision in the proposed Recital No. 
8 and Article 2a, that, in the case of a long-term posting of more than twenty-four 
months, the host State is deemed to be the country in which the work is carried 
out in line with the principle of the Rome I Regulation
399
. No amendments regard-
ing collective redress as a means for the protection of workers’ rights were sub-
mitted. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that the Council suggested the addi-
tion of a new Recital No. 11a concerning the recognition of fundamental rights, 
including the right or freedom to strike in accordance with national laws and prac-
tice
400
. 
                                                          
399
  See F. VAN OVERBEEKE, The Commission’s proposal to amend the Posting of Workers Di-
rective and private international law implications, in Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, 
2017, No. 2, pp. 178-194, spec. pp. 188-189. 
400
  General approach of 23 October 2017, cit. 
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3.3. The enforcement of workers’ rights in the EU. 
In the framework of the transnational provision of services, Directive 96/71 
was adopted with the aim of establishing minimum working terms and conditions. 
However, according to European institution studies and Court of Justice case law, 
the Directive did not grant effective remedies for employees seeking protection of 
their rights. Against this background, Directive 2014/67
401
 intervened in order to 
complement and introduce mechanisms to control the authenticity of posting, to 
enforce sanctions and to impose a duty to inform upon the competent authorities. 
One provision, Article 11, recognises the right (of workers individually or repre-
sented by trade unions) to institute  judicial or administrative proceedings for the 
defence of posted workers’ rights. Given that specific EU private international law 
rules are lacking, whether collective redress, among collective actions, may be 
successfully promoted is subject to question, and it is unclear which rules apply to 
cross-border judicial proceedings. In the end, judicial cooperation in civil and 
commercial matters is closely linked to the free movement of persons and ser-
vices, and the general principle of the mutual recognition of judgments is neces-
sary for the proper functioning of the internal market. 
Because posted workers will not be fully integrated into the industrial rela-
tions of the host State, they will not in practice be covered by the normal mecha-
nisms for the supervision and control of working conditions in the host State. Nor 
will they, in practice, be under any close scrutiny by the control mechanisms in 
the State of origin. In this way, there is a risk of creating a free zone for irregular 
and undeclared work where neither the labour laws of the host State nor the labour 
laws of the State of origin are enforced in practice. It is of key importance for 
posted workers the access to legal remedies against abuses in the host country to 
be strengthened
402
. 
                                                          
401
  Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the 
enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC, cit. 
402
  M. MONTI, Report on a New Strategy for the Single Market at the Service of Europe’s Econ-
omy and Society. Report to the President of the European Commission, 9 May 2010, p. 70, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/monti_report_final_10_05_-
2010_en.pdf. 
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In the framework on posted workers, not only are the substantive aspects, i.e. 
work terms and conditions, regulated in favour of employees moved temporarily 
abroad by virtue of the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination, the 
procedural measures mainly falling within the administrative and judicial coop-
eration, as well as the provisions concerning the defence of their rights that re-
quire Member States to ensure remedies, are also provided with the aim of offer-
ing a high level of effectiveness of the protection for posted workers. In this re-
gard, the Enforcement Directive is considered herein in order to assess whether it 
could constitute an effective basis for workers to resort to collective mechanisms 
of protection. 
Transnational litigation in the employment context still has no legislative ba-
sis at the EU level, and private international law issues need to be addressed as 
well, given their function of safeguarding weaker parties by establishing protec-
tive grounds for the determination of jurisdiction and applicable law. The necessi-
ty to act is pointed out in light of the existing regulations and non-binding instru-
ments. 
Since the adoption of Directive 96/71, the documents of the European institu-
tions
403
 and the Court of Justice case law
404
 have reported several deficiencies and 
problems with the application of the Directive. In order to pursue the effective 
implementation of this Directive and the respect for the obligations upon the 
Member States in cases concerning posted workers in the framework of the provi-
sion of services, the Enforcement Directive intervened to fill the gaps and over-
come the difficulties arising from the application of the former regime.  
                                                          
403
  See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the enforce-
ment of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provi-
sion of services, COM(2012)131 final of 21 March 2012, p. 4 ff.; for further considerations, 
see Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The implementation of Di-
rective 96/71/EC in the Member States, COM(2003)458 final of 25 July 2003. 
404
  Especially in the so-called Laval quartet judgments, also considered in Chapter 2: Court of 
Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 11 December 2007, Viking, cit.; (Grand Chamber), 
judgment of 18 December 2007, Laval, cit.; judgment of 3 April 2008, Rüffert, cit.; judgment 
of 19 June 2008, Commission v Luxemburg, cit. 
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Directive 2014/67 aims to improve, enhance and reinforce the way in which 
Directive 96/71 was implemented, applied and enforced in practice across the Eu-
ropean Union by establishing a general common framework of appropriate provi-
sions and actions. It imposes measures to prevent any circumvention or abuse of 
the rules, as well as the obligation to determine proportionate and effective sanc-
tions. At the same time, it ensures guarantees for the protection of posted workers’ 
rights and the removal of unjustified obstacles to the free provision of services
405
. 
On the one hand, the Enforcement Directive specifies how to identify a genu-
ine posting by providing for factual elements set forth in Article 4, which are con-
sidered indicative and non-exhaustive, and do not need to be all satisfied in every 
posting case
406
. Particularly, paragraph 2 lists factors in order to determine wheth-
er an undertaking is genuinely performing substantial activities in the Member 
State of establishment, whereas paragraph 3 concerns the assessment of whether a 
posted worker is temporarily carrying out his or her work in a Member State other 
than the one in which he or she normally works. The identification of such ele-
ments, and the factual situation and circumstances in which a posted worker is ex-
pected to carry out his or her activities, is closely linked to the purpose of prevent-
ing, avoiding and combatting abuse
407
 and circumvention of the applicable rules 
                                                          
405
  See Proposal COM(2012)131 final, cit., p. 11, and Article 1 of Directive 2014/67. For an ana-
lysis, see A. MATTEI, La Direttiva Enforcement n. 2014/67/UE e il recepimento 
nell’ordinamento italiano, cit., pp. 147-168; M. ROCCELLA, T. TREU, Diritto del lavoro 
dell’Unione europea, cit., pp. 164-167; E. VOSS, Posting of Workers Directive – current si-
tuation and challanges, cit., p. 42 ff.; M. ROCCA, Posting of Workers and Collective Labour 
Law, cit., p. 327 ff.; A. ALLAMPRESE, G. ORLANDINI, La Direttiva 2014/67 del 15 maggio 
2014 di attuazione della Direttiva 96/71 sul distacco transnazionale dei lavoratori. Un primo 
commento, 2014, available at www.cgil.it; A. DEFOSSEZ, La directive 2014/67/UE relative à 
l’exécution de la directive 96/71/CE concernant le détachement de travailleurs: un premier 
pas dans une bonne direction, in Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 2014, No. 4, pp. 833-
847; G. ORLANDINI, Mercato unico dei servizi e tutela del lavoro, cit., pp. 117-127;  
406
  Recital No. 5 of Directive 2014/67. See also Proposal COM(2012)131 final, cit., pp. 13-14; F. 
BANO, I confini della legalità. Distacco e manodopera low cost, cit., spec. p. 227 ff.; M. 
ROCCELLA, T. TREU, Diritto del lavoro dell’Unione europea, cit., p. 165. 
407
  There may be abuses because of the lower cost thanks to the application of less burdensome 
existing protection upon posted workers in their home country. 
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by undertakings taking improper or fraudulent advantage of the freedom to pro-
vide services enshrined in the TFEU or of the application of Directive 96/71. The 
implementation and monitoring of the authenticity of posting required the intro-
duction of indicative elements, thus facilitating a common interpretation at the 
Union level
408
.  
On the other hand, the assessment of said constituent factual elements, the 
temporary nature of the posting and the condition that the employer is genuinely 
established in the Member State in which the posting takes place need to be car-
ried out by the competent authority of the host Member State and, where neces-
sary, in close cooperation with the home Member State
409
 through the exchange of 
information
410
.  
Other provisions concern the access to information (Article 5), administrative 
cooperation (Articles 6 to 8), monitoring compliance (Articles 9 and 10), the de-
fence of rights (Article 11), subcontracting liability (Article 12), and cross-border 
enforcement of financial administrative penalties and/or fines (Articles 13 to 
19)
411
. 
In order to effectuate the provided framework and fulfil its objectives, the 
Member States were required to comply with it by promptly and adequately trans-
posing the Directive into their legal orders by 18 June 2016
412
.  
                                                          
408
  Recital No. 7 of Directive 2014/67. 
409
  Recital No. 8, Articles 6 to 8 and 13 to 19 of Directive 2014/67. In particular, Article 6 pro-
vides for «mutual assistance without undue delay», and Article 7 states that «the inspection of 
terms and conditions of employment to be complied with is the responsibility of the authori-
ties of the host Member State». Moreover, Articles 9 and 10 provide Member States with the 
possibility to impose administrative requirements and control measures necessary in order to 
ensure effective monitoring of compliance with the obligations set out in this Directive and 
Directive 96/71, provided that these are justified and proportionate in accordance with Union 
law.  
410
  See Article 5 of Directive 2014/67 and its Recital No. 18.  
411
  On this last articles, see C. PERARO, Artt. 13-24 D.lgs. 17 luglio 2016, n. 136, in R. DE LUCA 
TAMAJO, O. MAZZOTTA (a cura di), Commentario breve alle leggi sul lavoro, Milano, Wol-
ters Kluwer CEDAM, 6ª ed., 2017, pp. 3064-3071. 
412
  See Article 23 of Directive 2014/67. In the Italian legal order, the Enforcement Directive has 
been transposed by Legislative Decree No. 136 of 17 July 2016: Decreto Legislativo 17 luglio 
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The first set of provisions governing the control of the authenticity of the 
posting may be invoked in case of their violation by the undertaking. Wrongful 
actions may be sanctioned by the competent national authorities, and new proce-
dures govern the recognition and enforcement of decisions and sanctions. The 
provided mechanisms reflect the existing systems of cooperation in both the ad-
ministrative and judicial spaces based on the principle of mutual trust. Although, 
in light of the above, it seems that substantial attention has been paid to prevent-
ing and combatting abuse, the 2014 Directive also established a fundamental right 
to act; indeed, in the case of a violation, posted workers shall be ensured judicial 
or administrative remedies.  
Therefore, it is of interest to assess the relevance of posted workers’ protec-
tion in both its individual and collective dimensions. In this regard, according to 
Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Enforcement Directive, in order to fully respect the 
rights granted by Directive 96/71, the Member States should provide «effective 
mechanisms for posted workers to lodge complaints against their employers di-
rectly, as well as the right to institute judicial or administrative proceedings, also 
in the Member State in whose territory the workers are or were posted, where 
such workers consider they have sustained loss or damage as a result of a failure 
to apply the applicable rules, even after the relationship in which the failure is al-
leged to have occurred has ended».  
Paragraph 2 establishes that the jurisdiction of the courts in the Member 
States as laid down in the relevant EU or international instruments should be ob-
served. Amongst them, as to the determination of the jurisdictional competence 
and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial matters, 
                                                                                                                                                               
2016, n. 136, Attuazione della direttiva 2014/67/UE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, 
del 15 maggio 2014, concernente l’applicazione della direttiva 96/71/CE relativa al distacco 
dei lavoratori nell’ambito di una prestazione di servizi e recante modifica del regolamento 
(UE) n. 1024/2012 relativo alla cooperazione amministrativa attraverso il sistema di informa-
zione del mercato interno («regolamento IMI»), in Gazzetta Ufficiale No 169 of 21 July 2016. 
For comments see L. CALAFÀ, A. MATTEI, C. PERARO, M. ROCCA, D.lgs. 17 luglio 2016, n. 
136, in R. DE LUCA TAMAJO, O. MAZZOTTA (a cura di), Commentario breve alle leggi sul la-
voro, cit., p. 3051 ff. 
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including employment issues, is the Brussels I Recast Regulation
413
. The new Ar-
ticle 11 of the Enforcement Directive, if adequately transposed, should enhance 
the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the national legislation; this should 
also occur as a result of the implementation of Article 6 of Directive 96/71, ac-
cording to which posted workers are allowed to bring actions before the courts of 
a host Member State against an employer whose seat is established in another 
Member State.  
In the explanatory statement accompanying the proposal for the Enforcement 
Directive, the Commission observed that Article 11 relates to the defence of rights 
that is itself a fundamental right. Namely, Article 47 of the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights confirms the right to an effective remedy for everyone whose rights 
and freedoms, guaranteed by the law of the European Union, are violated or not 
respected
414
. It follows that the remedies afforded to posted workers need to grant 
effective protection; otherwise, the Member States can be held liable for viola-
tions of EU primary law, i.e. the Charter, and secondary law, i.e. the Directive. 
Against this background, individual claims, more often than collective ac-
tions, are initiated in relation to employment matters, because of the violation of 
rights or work conditions as stated in the national law or collective agreements. In 
cross-border situations, difficulties may be faced by an employee posted tempo-
rarily abroad in terms of the competent authority, the applicable law and the legal 
costs. Moreover, such complaints are very often unlikely to be effective for those 
reasons.  
                                                          
413
  Regulation No. 1215/2012 cit.  
414
  Proposal COM(2012)131 final, cit., at p. 18. Inter alia see M. GOLDONI, The Early Warning 
System and the Monti II Regulation: The Case for a Political Interpretation, in European 
Constitutional Law Review, 2014, Vol. 10, pp. 90-108. On the right to effective remedy, see 
M. CASTELLANETA, Art. 47 Carta, in F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (a cura di), Commentario bre-
ve ai Trattati dell’Unione europea, Padova, CEDAM, 2ª ed., 2014, pp. 1770-1775; G. 
D’AVINO, A. MARTONE, Il diritto ad un ricorso effettivo e ad un giudice imparziale ex art. 47 
della Carta dei diritti fondamentali, in A. DI STASI (a cura di), Spazio europeo e diritti di giu-
stizia. Il Capo IV della Carta dei diritti fondamentali nell’applicazione giurisprudenziale, Pa-
dova, CEDAM, 2014, pp. 139-210. 
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Although the Enforcement Directive implements Directive 96/71 by clearly 
establishing the right to act, it probably could have stated specific rules that cover 
the collective dimension of the protection of posted workers in light of the case 
law of the Court of Justice and the former legislative proposals.  
With respect to that effect, in line with the Court’s findings in the Laval quar-
tet judgments and the withdrawn 2012 proposal on the right to take collective ac-
tion
415
, it is relevant that Article 1, paragraph 2 of Directive 2014/67 provides that 
«the [Enforcement] Directive shall not affect in any way the exercise of funda-
mental rights as recognised in Member States and at Union level, including the 
right or freedom to strike or to take other action covered by the specific industrial 
relations systems in Member States, in accordance with national law and/or prac-
tice. Nor does it affect the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective 
agreements and to take collective action in accordance with national law and/or 
practice»
416
. 
This is the so-called “Monti clause”, which expressly safeguards the exercise 
of fundamental rights as recognised in the Member States and at the European 
                                                          
415
  As observed in Chapter 2, para. 2.4; see Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of 
the right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services, COM(2012)130 final of 21 March 2012 (the so-called ‘Monti II 
Regulation’). It is interesting to note that this proposal was submitted on the same day of the 
proposal for the Enforcement of Posted Workers Directive, COM(2012)131 final, cit.; how-
ever, the former proposal was withdrawn since the yellow card procedure was triggered, be-
cause some national parliaments affirmed its non-compatibility with the subsidiarity princi-
ple.  
416
  This provision is similar to the 2012 proposal on the right to take collective action and to Ar-
ticle 85 suggested within the proposal for a recast of the Regulation No 44/2001 
(COM(2010)748 final of 14 December 2010), this clause is based on the findings of the re-
port A new strategy for the single market – at the service of Europe’s Economy and Society 
presented on 9 May 2010 by Prof Mario Monti. He recommended to: (i) clarify the imple-
mentation of the Posting of Workers Directive and strengthening dissemination of infor-
mation on the rights and obligations of workers and companies, administrative cooperation 
and sanctions in the framework of the free movement of persons and the cross-border provi-
sion of services; (ii) introduce a provision to guarantee the right to strike, modelled on Article 
2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (the so-called ‘Monti Regulation’), and a mecha-
nism for informal resolution of labour disputes concerning the application of the Directive. 
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Union level, such as the right or freedom to strike or to take other action, includ-
ing collective action, covered by the specific industrial relations systems in the 
Member States, in accordance with national law or practice. In contrast to the pre-
vious proposals on the introduction of such a clause, it does not refer to the com-
pliance with EU law
417
, but exclusively to the respect for fundamental rights to 
collective action or agreements as defined in national legal orders
418
. In this re-
gard, the European legislator seems to have admitted a new approach to the bal-
ancing test between the social rights and the fundamental economic freedoms, 
contrary to the assessment carried out by the Court of Justice in the Laval quartet 
judgments. Indeed, the new provision makes it clear that the legitimacy of collec-
tive action needs to be evaluated in accordance with national laws or practice
419
.  
This provision is also innovative in comparison with Directive 96/71, in 
which only Recital No. 22 mentions the observation of the law of the Member 
States concerning collective action to defend the interests of trades and profes-
sions. In any case, the two Directives are complementary and concur to regulate 
the posting of workers. In such context, the respect for fundamental rights, includ-
ing the right to collective action and to an effective remedy, is prescribed by Arti-
cle 1, paragraph 2 cited above, jointly with Recital No. 48 of the Enforcement Di-
rective
420
. 
With a view to offering effective remedies, Article 9 of Directive 2014/67 on 
the monitoring of compliance imposes upon the Member States the «obligation to 
designate a contact person, if necessary, acting as a representative through whom 
the relevant social partners may seek to engage the service provider to enter into 
collective bargaining within the host Member State, in accordance with national 
                                                          
417
  However, see Article 28 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights that grants workers and 
employers, or their respective organisations, in accordance with Union law and national laws 
and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate 
levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, 
including strike action. 
418
  S. GIUBBONI, Libertà economiche fondamentali e diritto del lavoro, cit., pp. 507-509. 
419
  Ibidem, p. 508. 
420
  On this issue see V. KOSTA, Fundamental Rights in EU Internal Market, cit., pp. 194-195 and 
218. 
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law and/or practice, during the period in which the services are provided». This 
means that actions by the social partners that are validly carried out under national 
law may invoke a higher level of minimum protection as provided for in Article 3.  
With the aim of implementing such objectives, remedies should be ensured in 
both judicial and administrative proceedings, including the right of trade unions to 
act. Indeed, associations, organisations or other legal entities, which should be en-
titled to act on behalf or in support of posted workers, may provide better repre-
sentation of posted workers’ rights. 
Recital No. 34 of the Enforcement Directive encourages the Member States to 
offer posted workers effective complaint mechanisms through which they may 
lodge complaints or engage in proceedings either directly or, with their approval, 
through relevant designated third parties, such as trade unions or other associa-
tions, as well as the common institutions of social partners. The national rules of 
procedure concerning representation and defence before the courts, and compe-
tences and rights of trade unions or other employee representatives under national 
law or practice, must be observed
421
, although they may vary widely. 
This is further emphasised by paragraph 3 of Article 11, which regards the 
role of trade unions. It states that the Member States must ensure the right of trade 
unions or other similar associations to be engaged on behalf of or in support of the 
posted workers in any judicial or administrative proceedings with the objective of 
implementing Directive 96/71 and the Enforcement Directive itself. It is undisput-
ed that the social partners have a role in the protection, and thus the enforcement, 
of workers’ rights that may assume significant relevance in cross-border situa-
tions. In general, trade unions can initiate legal proceedings whenever an employ-
er violates the applicable labour legislation or collective agreements, and the re-
lated negotiations have been unsuccessful. However, as a disadvantage, only the 
members of the trade union can benefit.  
In national employment contexts, trade unions, organisations or associations 
are generally entitled to act on behalf of employees within a political dialogue or 
even before the courts to claim the respect for workers’ rights. However, a Euro-
pean framework on the legitimacy of trade unions to defend posted workers and 
                                                          
421
  See Article 11, para. 4, lett. (c). 
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on cross-border collective redress in general (i.e. trade unions of one country rep-
resenting the posted workers from a different State) is lacking
422
. 
In this respect, Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive may constitute a start-
ing point for the establishment of a common regime on collective redress in which 
employees and employers are involved. It clearly recognises the right of trade un-
ions to engage in any judicial or administrative proceedings, although without 
providing any requirements. However, it is important to recall that according to 
paragraph 4 of Article 11, the «national rules of procedure concerning representa-
tion and defence before the courts» shall apply. That is (actually) the crucial point: 
due to the differences between the domestic systems, workers may face difficul-
ties in seeking representatives that could act on their behalf or in support of them 
in the host State
423
.  
The question that arises is therefore whether trade unions, associations or or-
ganisations of the host State are empowered to represent the posted workers in 
that territory in judicial or administrative proceedings instituted before the nation-
al courts. In other words, may posted workers be represented by the trade unions 
of the host State against the sending undertaking, which is established in another 
Member State, before the courts of the host country? National rules, also of pri-
vate international law, become relevant, given the absence of rules determining 
jurisdiction, applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of decisions at 
EU level specifically related to the exercise of collective actions. 
Like Article 6 of Directive 96/71 considered above
424
, Article 11, paragraph 1 
of the Enforcement Directive contemplates an alternative forum for posted work-
ers, other than the State where the sending undertaking is established, that is to 
say the courts of the host Member State where the workers are or were posted, 
                                                          
422
  See infra, Chapter 4. 
423
  Under this aspect, some issues raise as far as the Italian legal order is concerned, because Ar-
ticle 5 of Decree No. 136 of 2016 cit. simply states that workers are entitled to judicial or ad-
ministrative remedies without reproducing the wording of Article 11 of the 2014 Directive, 
nor reflecting its whole content: see C. PERARO, The Enforcement of Posted Workers’ Rights 
Across the European Union, in Freedom, Security & Justice: European Legal Studies, 2017, 
No. 2, pp. 114-130, spec. p. 122 ff. 
424
  See supra, in this Chapter, para. 3.2. 
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when such workers consider that they have sustained loss or damage as a result of 
a failure to apply the applicable rules, even after the relationship in which the fail-
ure is alleged to have occurred has ended. Failing any disposition to that effect, 
this rule on jurisdiction may be applied to trade unions representing posted work-
ers as well. 
It is undisputed that Directive 2014/67 points out the relevant role of collec-
tive action and collective agreements that trade unions may promote on behalf or 
in support of posted workers. Namely, Article 1, paragraph 2, Article 5, paragraph 
2, letter (b), Article 9, paragraph 1, letter (f), and Article 11, paragraphs 3 and 4, 
are based on the fact that «respect for the diversity of national industrial relations 
systems as well as the autonomy of social partners is explicitly recognised by the 
TFEU»
425
. However, it does not establish private international law rules for trans-
national collective mechanism of judicial enforcement.  
Public enforcement procedures are provided in Articles 13 to 19 that require 
the Member States to cooperate at the administrative level to control the posting 
and to recover the penalties or notify requests of enforcement. Such mechanisms 
are aimed at fully protecting workers from abuses and violations of the relevant 
national and EU laws and necessitate undertakings to comply fully with their ob-
ligations under the Directive. Nevertheless, such administrative cooperation is de-
signed for the national authorities and does not appear to directly involve workers, 
as it is not a private remedy of enforcement. 
                                                          
425
  Recital No. 14 of Directive 2014/67. 
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3.4. Concluding considerations. 
The protection and enforcement of workers’ rights in the EU lie on a legal 
framework that consists of substantive provisions relating to the work terms and 
conditions, which must be guaranteed across all the Member States, a specific 
conflict of laws rule on the law applicable to the employment relationship involv-
ing posted workers, an alternative forum for posted workers to bring their claims, 
and the administrative procedures for enforcement. Where appropriate, considera-
tions have been identified regarding the issue of collective remedies, especially 
when the legislative acts make reference to the right to collective action or to en-
joy effective remedies for the protection of workers’ rights. Both Directive 96/71 
and Directive 2014/67 include statements in that regard, but they only harmonise 
the national rules and do not provide for common standards or uniform rules as to 
the procedures.  
Particularly, the 2014 Enforcement Directive intervened in order to impose 
the Member States to adopt effective means for protecting posted workers, having 
considered the difficulties in implementing the existing EU law and the risks of 
abuse. It is, however, undisputed that the Member States are obliged to pursue the 
2014 Directive’s objectives by transposing it into their legal orders through means 
they deem appropriate, and their solutions may vary widely. This could be the 
case for Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive on the defence of rights. Accord-
ing to its provisions, it is expressly suggested that the Member States must offer 
posted workers effective complaint mechanisms; nevertheless, when providing 
such means domestic law and practice need to be respected.  
Its concrete application will demonstrate whether or not EU law is fully ob-
served. In the case of non-compliance, the violation of EU law and fundamental 
rights, namely the 2014 Directive and Article 47 of the Charter on the right to an 
effective remedy, eventually in conjunction with Article 28, may be invoked.  
In light of the foregoing, in relation to the effectiveness of the existing legis-
lation, on the one hand, it may be argued that judicial systems do not fall within 
EU competences in any case, and thus an EU action could not have interfered 
with specific rules. On the other hand, however, uniform standards and common 
private international law rules could have contributed towards pursuing a higher 
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level of rights’ protection. The Enforcement Directive could probably have pro-
vided for uniform standards as to a collective action promoted by posted workers. 
By contrast, the national legislators could have had the possibility to introduce 
specific provisions on such issue when transposing the Directive. What can be 
added is that European and national case law may intervene in order to clarify the 
real scope of the provisions on the defence of rights. In this regard, considering 
the Sähköalojen ammattiliitto judgment and the legislative developments on the 
2016 proposal on the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive, such as the ad-
dition of a new Recital on the right to collective action (as suggested by the Coun-
cil), may be a starting point for determining the rules regarding the workers’ pro-
tection. 
Overall, from both the European and national perspectives, such situation can 
be described as a missed opportunity or a conscious choice. In this context, it is 
suggested that some efforts should be undertaken at the EU level in order to regu-
late transnational litigation in employment matters. What seems to be urgent is the 
ascertainment of the proper grounds for the determination of the jurisdiction and 
the law applicable to collective actions, including strikes, industrial actions and 
collective redress procedures, promoted by representatives of posted workers, tak-
ing into consideration the existing rules set forth in the Brussels I Recast Regula-
tion, the Rome I Regulation and those established in the Directives on the posting 
of workers. 
The effective protection of the social rights is a key concept for the elabora-
tion of a common framework, also in light of the commitments envisaged in the 
European Pillar of Social Rights. This may raise awareness that a legislative re-
sponse to the critical balance between market integration, including the measures 
undertaken due to the economic crisis, and social labour rights is needed.  
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Executive Summary 
 
To fully respect and enforce workers’ rights, effective remedies must be provided 
by the Member States in their legal orders. The Union does not have competence 
over judicial systems, and thus national legislations are called upon to establish 
the means of enforcement. EU civil procedure, in conjunction with civil judicial 
cooperation, pursues the protection of fundamental rights and, as a result, the 
smooth functioning of the internal market. As individual claims are unlikely to be 
effective, collective mechanisms seem to be the appropriate means for weaker 
parties. At the EU level, in the absence of any specific rules, collective redress is 
governed by national laws, whose diversity may cause legal uncertainty in cases 
with cross-border implications. Some legislative acts deal with this procedural 
remedy by providing for harmonising rules in specific areas, such as consumer 
protection and antitrust law; other non-binding initiatives propose horizontal 
common principles. The employment context has not yet been specifically ad-
dressed; however, workers may certainly benefit from collective redress. 
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4.1. Introduction: the role of EU civil procedure. 
In the context of the enforcement of workers’ rights, the existing legislation 
does not provide for specific rules on the remedies for private enforcement or 
rules on the conflict of laws and of jurisdictions in cases with transnational impli-
cations. Rather, it recognises the right to collective action, whose exercise must be 
in compliance with national laws and practice. Consequently, further questions 
arise as to the effectiveness of collective actions in cross-border employment dis-
putes and in relation to private international law issues, particularly when posted 
workers are involved. Before addressing these specific aspects, the role of EU civ-
il procedure and an overview of the status of collective redress as a judicial reme-
dy at the EU level are discussed herein, followed by an assessment of the oppor-
tunity to provide for collective redress procedures in employment disputes. 
EU civil procedure shall be considered in strict connection with the protection 
of fundamental rights, the enforcement of rights, civil judicial cooperation and the 
smooth functioning of the internal market
426
. Thanks to mechanisms of private 
(and public) enforcement, the effective enjoyment of rights can be assured.  
As early as in the Johnston case of 1986
427
 concerning the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women, the Court of Justice had referred to the requirement 
of judicial control as a general principle of law
428
. In interpreting the relevant di-
rective, the Court clarified that the Member States are required to introduce 
measures that enable all persons who consider themselves wronged by discrimina-
                                                          
426
  On this interrelation see L. GORYWODA, N.E. HATZIMIHAIL, A. NUYTS, Introduction: Market 
Regulation, Judicial Cooperation and Collective Redress, in A. NUYTS, N. E. HATZIMIHAIL 
(eds.), Cross-border Class Actions: the European Way, Munich, Sellier European Law Pub-
lishers, 2014, pp. 1-55. On cross-border enforcement see X.E. KRAMER, Cross-border En-
forcement in the EU: Mutual Trust versus Fair Trial? Towards Principles of European Civil 
Procedure, in International Journal of Procedural Law, 2011, Vol. 2, pp. 202-230, spec. p. 
208 ff. 
427
  Court of Justice, judgment of 15 May 1986, Case 222/84, Marguerite Johnston v Chief Con-
stable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, EU:C:1986:206. All Court of Justice case law is 
available at http://curia.europa.eu.  
428
  Ibidem, para. 18, where the Court also recalled that «That principle is also laid down in Arti-
cles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms of 4 November 1950». 
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tion to pursue their claims through the judicial process. Such measures shall be 
«sufficiently effective to achieve the aim of the directive and (…) must ensure that 
the rights thus conferred may be effectively relied upon before the national courts 
by the persons concerned»
429
. 
In European law, civil procedure is sometimes assimilated into the instru-
ments on cross-border litigation or on private international law
430
. However, 
grounded on different legal bases, Union law affects national procedure systems 
in other areas, especially those related to the internal market. The EU legislator 
did not specifically rule on civil procedure, except for sector-specific remedies, 
such as those applicable to consumer and antitrust law
431
 and IP rights protec-
tion
432
. The efficiency of the national judicial systems in the governance of en-
forcement in Europe is a priority for the respect of the rights granted by EU law
433
 
and the proper functioning of the economy in the internal market, especially in the 
present context of the financial crisis
434
. 
Considering that the European Union does not have competence over judicial 
systems, the national laws on enforcement vary widely among the Member States, 
which could lead to difficulties with the implementation and respect for the right 
to an effective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter
435
. In this regard, two 
                                                          
429
  Ibidem, para. 17. 
430
  B. HESS, The State of the Civil Justice Union, in B. HESS, M. BERGSTRӦM, E. STORSKRUBB 
(eds.), EU Civil Justice. Current issues and Future Outlook, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
Hart Publishing, 2016, pp. 1-19, spec. pp. 1-2. 
431
  See further infra in this para. 
432
  B. HESS, The State of the Civil Justice Union, cit., p. 10. See Directive 2004/48/EC of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, in OJ L 157 of 30 April 2004, pp. 45-86. All EU legislation is available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu.  
433
  B. HESS, The Role of Procedural Law in the Governance of Enforcement in Europe, in H-W. 
MICKLITZ, A. WECHSLER (edited by), The Transformation of Enforcement. European Eco-
nomic Law in Global Perspective, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2016, pp. 
343-353. 
434
  B. HESS, The State of the Civil Justice Union, cit., p. 10. 
435
  On this Article, among others, see C. FAVILLI, I ricorsi collettivi nell’Unione europea e la 
tutela antidiscriminatoria: verso un autentico approccio orizzontale, in Il Diritto dell’Unione 
europea, 2014, No. 3, pp. 439-463, spec. p. 440 f. 
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aspects must be considered: the effective application of EU law by the national 
courts and the implementation of the fundamental “procedural” right to an effec-
tive remedy. 
As to the first issue, the national courts, when applying EU legislation, act as 
“Union courts” and must provide effective judicial protection to everyone. How-
ever, pursuant to the principle of the procedural autonomy of the EU Member 
States, which the Court of Justice must observe
436
, the national procedures are 
subject only to restricted control in light of the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence in connection with the principle of cooperation
437
. The courts of the 
Member States, as decentralised European courts
438
, are obliged to implement EU 
law efficiently, even if national procedural systems are outside EU competences. 
                                                          
436
  On national procedural autonomy and loyal cooperation, see M.C. BARUFFI, Art. 4 TUE, in F. 
POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (a cura di), Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione europea, Pa-
dova, CEDAM, 2ª ed., 2014, pp. 13-24, spec. p. 21 ff.; C. FAVILLI, I ricorsi collettivi 
nell’Unione europea, cit., p. 440 ff.; G. TESAURO, Diritto dell’Unione europea, Padova, 
CEDAM, 7ª ed., 2012, p. 112. 
437
  See Court of Justice, judgment of 16 December 1976, Case 45/76, Comet BV v Produktschap 
voor Siergewassen, EU:C:1976:191, paras. 12-13: «12 (…) in application of the principle of 
cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty, the national courts are entrusted with ensur-
ing the legal protection conferred on individuals by the direct effect of the provisions of 
Community law. 13 Consequently, in the absence of any relevant Community rules, it is for 
the national legal order of each Member State to designate the competent courts and to lay 
down the procedural rules for proceedings designed to ensure the protection of the rights 
which individuals acquire through the direct effect of Community law, provided that such 
rules are not less favourable than those governing the same right of action on an internal mat-
ter»; similarly, judgment of 16 December 1976, Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Re-
we-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, EU:C:1976:188, para. 5; judg-
ment of 9 March 1978, Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal 
SpA, EU:C:1978:49, para. 14 ff.; judgment of 19 June 1990, Case C-213/89, The Queen v 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others, EU:C:1990:257, paras. 
18-20; (Grand Chamber), judgment of 13 March 2007, Case C-432/05, Unibet (London) Ltd 
and Unibet (International) Ltd v Justitiekanslern, EU:C:2007:163, para. 37. On these princi-
ples see I. BENÖHR, Collective Redress in the Field of European Consumer Law, in Legal Is-
sues of Economic Integration, 2014, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 243-256, spec. p. 249 ff. 
438
  See among others D.U. GALETTA, L’autonomia procedurale degli Stati membri dell’Unione 
europea: Paradise Lost?, Torino, Giappichelli Editore, 2009, p. 37 ff. 
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It follows that «the diversity of the adjudicative systems of EU Member States 
seems to be a bad starting point for the efficient (and equal) enforcement of EU 
law throughout the whole European Union»
439
. The differences as to procedural 
requirements may concern legal standing, time limits, or the burden of proof, and 
they may cause «potential conflict with the fundamental EU law principle of uni-
form application and equality because the domestic procedural systems form a de 
facto obstacle to the uniform application of substantive EU norms»
440
. 
By contrast, the interference with national judicial systems by European har-
monised rules could breach the principle of subsidiarity. This could lead to much 
more fragmentation and divergences in the implementation at the supranational 
level as a result. The Member States’ resistance, aimed at preserving sovereignty 
over this field, is linked to the need to safeguard their national identity, and their 
private and cultural dimensions
441
. 
Nevertheless, this is an “apparent national procedural autonomy” because the 
Member States may be subject to judicial review in light of the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness
442
. According to the first principle, the national 
rules governing a dispute with a Union dimension may not be less favourable than 
those governing similar domestic actions, that is to say claims based on EU law 
should be dealt with in the same way as similar domestic claims
443
. However, un-
                                                          
439
  B. HESS, The Role of Procedural Law in the Governance of Enforcement in Europe, cit., p. 
344. 
440
  E. STORSKRUBB, Civil Procedure and EU Law. A Policy Area Uncovered, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, p. 2. 
441
  On the respect of national identity, see M.C. BARUFFI, Art. 4 TUE, cit., pp. 13-14. 
442
  Among others see B. HESS, A coherent approach to European collective redress, in D. 
FAIRGRIEVE, E. LEIN (edited by), Extraterritoriality and collective redress, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, pp. 107-118, spec. p. 110. 
443
  M.C. BARUFFI, Art. 4 TUE, cit., p. 19. See Court of Justice, judgment of 21 September 1989, 
Case 68/88, Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic, EU:C:1989:339, 
paras. 22-25: «22 According to the Commission, the Member States are required by virtue of 
Article 5 of the EEC Treaty to penalize any persons who infringe Community law in the same 
way as they penalize those who infringe national law. The Hellenic Republic failed to fulfil 
those obligations by omitting to initiate all the criminal or disciplinary proceedings provided 
for by national law against the perpetrators of the fraud and all those who collaborated in the 
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der the principle of effectiveness, the national rules must not render the exercise 
of rights conferred by the Union legal order virtually impossible or, at the very 
least, excessively difficult
444
. In other words, it does not simply require that rules 
of national law that impede the effective application of EU law be rendered inap-
plicable; rather, the domestic courts also must assess the extent to which the na-
tional rule in question is in fact justifiable in light of the principle of effective-
ness
445
.  
In addition, national procedural autonomy does not exist when domestic pro-
cedural rules are incompatible with the provisions on the free movement of goods 
or on discrimination on the ground of nationality, because they entail a breach of 
EU law
446
. Autonomy is also limited due to the obligation to make a referral to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. These are the reasons why, in the sphere 
of procedural law, there is a refined emanation of the general loyalty principle
447
.  
                                                                                                                                                               
commission and concealment of it. 23 It should be observed that where Community legisla-
tion does not specifically provide any penalty for an infringement or refers for that purpose to 
national laws, regulations and administrative provisions, Article 5 of the Treaty requires the 
Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application and effectiveness 
of Community law. 24 For that purpose, whilst the choice of penalties remains within their 
discretion, they must ensure in particular that infringements of Community law are penalized 
under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to 
infringements of national law of a similar nature and importance and which, in any event, 
make the penalty effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 25 Moreover, the national authori-
ties must proceed, with respect to infringements of Community law, with the same diligence 
as that which they bring to bear in implementing corresponding national laws». 
444
  P. CRAIG, G. DE BÚRCA, EU Law. Text, Cases and Materials, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 6
th 
ed., 2015, pp. 230-232; M.C. BARUFFI, Art. 4 TUE, cit., p. 19; E. STORSKRUBB, Civ-
il Procedure and EU Law. A Policy Area Uncovered, cit., p. 14 f., where the Author also re-
ferred to the Court of Justice’s balancing approach under which the proportionality must be 
assessed between the restrictive impact of the national procedural or remedial rule against the 
legitimate aim that the rules uphold. 
445
  S. PRECHAL, K. CATH, The European acquis of civil procedure: constitutional aspects, in 
Uniform Law Review, 2014, Vol. 19, pp. 179-198, spec. p. 182 ff. 
446
  E. STORSKRUBB, Civil Procedure and EU Law. A Policy Area Uncovered, cit., p. 18. 
447
  Ibidem, p. 20. 
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In the debate on the role of procedural law, the choice between the centralised 
(directly before the Court of Justice) and decentralised (indirectly before the na-
tional courts) enforcement of EU law is important, given that the ultimate goal of 
EU law is its uniform application
448
. 
With regard to the second aspect identified above, that is the implementation 
of the right to an effective remedy, and generally the connection between civil 
procedure and the fundamental rights
449
, considerations concern the fact that, via 
effective remedies, the protection of rights may be assured; and the fundamental 
right to an effective remedy, in conjunction with other procedural rights, such as 
access to justice and fair trial, included under Article 47 of the Charter
450
, which 
reflects Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), be re-
spected
451
. Said Articles must be interpreted on a case-by-case basis. However, 
rules of law must be clear, precise and predictable pursuant to the principle of le-
gal certainty. 
With a view to achieving the effectiveness and correct application of EU law, 
Member States are called upon to provide for effective remedies
452
. The rights 
granted to European citizens need to be protected: even if there is no explicit link 
to procedural law, the civil element of their citizenship encompasses the right to 
justice and due process of law
453
. Indeed, one of the objectives of the EU is to 
strengthen the protection of citizens’ rights. The interaction between citizenship 
and the emergence of an EU civil justice system is based on two directions: citi-
zenship fosters a judicial space, and judicial cooperation in civil matters develops 
and gives substantive meaning to citizenship
454
. Said interrelationship is even 
                                                          
448
  Ibidem, p. 17. 
449
  Ibidem, pp. 86-91. 
450
  For a comment see M. CASTELLANETA, Art. 47 Carta, in F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (a cura di), 
Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione europea, cit., pp. 1770-1775.  
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more clear when a judgment issued in one Member State circulates in others, and 
its enforcement may be refused on the basis of public policy exceptions, which in-
clude the fairness of proceedings by virtue of the fundamental right to an effective 
remedy and fair trial
455
.  
To that effect, in the Krombach judgment of 2000
456
, the Court evaluated the 
public policy concept in the context of the 1968 Brussels Convention, recognising 
that «the observance of the right to a fair hearing is, in all proceedings initiated 
against a person which are liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting 
that person, a fundamental principle of Community law which must be guaranteed 
even in the absence of any rules governing the proceedings in question»
457
. The 
right to a fair hearing, which is also protected by the ECHR, cannot be under-
mined on the ground that the Brussels Convention is aimed at securing the simpli-
fication of the formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of 
judgments
458
. By determining a common European value of procedural fairness, 
the Court addressed the public policy exception and the need to safeguard the 
fundamental rights with judicial cooperation measures and national practices
459
. 
This finding leads to other considerations. Assuming that the relevance of the 
effectiveness of a judicial procedure is a fundamental right in itself and that its 
goal is to protect fundamental rights, transnational judicial cooperation plays an 
essential role against this background. Given the diversities among the Member 
States’ civil procedures, as a decentralised enforcement of EU law, a European ac-
tion based on Article 81 TFEU is welcomed when dealing with cross-border liti-
gation. 
Amongst the EU private international law instruments, some cover aspects of 
international civil procedure, such as international jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments, cross-border service of documents, taking of 
                                                          
455
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evidence abroad, and general issues of international legal cooperation
460
. The co-
ordination of national procedural systems is based on the principle of mutual trust, 
jointly with the principle of mutual recognition, which governs the circulation of 
judgments across the EU
461
. Judicial cooperation is deemed to represent a re-
sponse to the pressures of the intersections between civil procedure and European 
law
462
; in reality, it is situated at the crossroads of procedural law, private interna-
tional law and EU law and as such it is an interdisciplinary endeavour
463
.  
It must be recognised that the legislative solutions adopted by the Union in the 
context of judicial cooperation, which, with the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, be-
came a new EU policy, are aimed at improving the efficiency of the European civ-
il justice system, and thus enforcing substantive law in cross-border situations and 
giving effectiveness to the fundamental rights granted to individuals. Fundamental 
rights may be protected solely via effective enforcement (procedural) means based 
on clear rules, and based on such means individuals may seek for the protection of 
their rights. Otherwise, differences among the Member States will create difficul-
ties in cross-border litigation and disincentivise cross-border trade and the func-
tioning of the internal market
464
. 
EU competence is assured in EU primary law; indeed, the Commission has 
the power to promote legislative initiatives to overcome difficulties and pursue the 
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objective of the Member States to effectively fulfil EU law
465
. The legal basis
466
 
for the adoption of EU civil procedure acts
467
 may be based either on Articles 67 
and 81 TFEU, which confer upon the European legislator the power to adopt acts 
in the field of civil judicial cooperation when situations have transnational impli-
cations
468
, and they are mainly aimed at the approximation of procedural and pri-
vate international law rules, or Article 114 TFEU, which permits the adoption of 
acts aimed at harmonising, in a sectorial and horizontal approach, the national 
procedures for the purpose of safeguarding the functioning of the internal mar-
ket
469
. It is an advantage of acts based on Article 114, independently from their 
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sectorial nature, that they may be used «as a model for reforming more generally 
national systems»
470
. Similarly, the abovementioned provisions may constitute the 
legal bases for a European act on collective redress
471
, implying a combination of 
market principles with judicial systems. 
To conclude, all the conditions and elements identified in said Articles are in 
some way connected: the realisation of a European area of freedom, security and 
justice, where fundamental rights are respected, is pursued by fulfilling the princi-
ples governing judicial cooperation that contribute to the safeguarding of the func-
tioning of the internal market. As a result, civil procedure has proven to be of an 
interdisciplinary nature
472
. 
In the context of EU procedural law, questions may arise with regard to the 
possibility to set common minimum standards to be applied at the EU level, and 
thus to implement them in all national legal systems with the aim of providing an 
EU-wide balance of the fundamental rights of litigants
473
. These may be deemed 
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to be in support of the mutual recognition of judgments in the European judicial 
area and to ensure the principles of access to justice, fair trial, effectiveness and 
equivalence
474
. Whether the application of common minimum standards may also 
apply to internal proceedings, and not only to cross-border cases, is subject to de-
bate. The European Parliament’s own-initiative resolution on common minimum 
standards
475
, in which it proposed the adoption of a directive based on Article 81, 
paragraph 2 TFEU
476
, is relevant to that effect. It also expressed that in order to 
improve efficiency in civil procedure, the Member States may extend the scope of 
application of the common minimum standards «not only to matters falling within 
the scope of Union law, but also to both cross-border and purely domestic cases 
generally»
477
. Procedural standards may also be identified in relation to collective 
redress, which is a viable means for claimants (especially for weaker parties) to 
seek the protection of their rights
478
.  
In connection with the above considerations, the following remarks focus on 
the state of play of collective redress legislation at the EU level, with particular 
regard to the employment context. 
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4.2. The legal framework on collective redress in the EU. 
Collective actions, and in particular collective redress procedures, are per-
ceived as tools for increasing access to justice, especially for weaker parties, and 
thus enhancing the functioning of the internal market, because judicial litigation is 
deemed as a means of enforcement
479
.  
Back in 1993, the Commission addressed the need to assure access to justice 
for consumers and considered the protection of collective interests
480
. In addition 
to the soft law acts on extrajudicial procedures, such as alternative dispute resolu-
tion (ADR) instruments, after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
binding measures to promote access to justice were adopted, including, for in-
stance, the Directive on minimum common rules on legal aid
481
 and the European 
Small Claims Procedure Regulation
482
. Also the first Injunctions Directive
483
 es-
tablished a common procedure to allow consumer bodies to stop unlawful practic-
es that harm the collective interest of consumers anywhere in the EU.  
The debate on effective protection and collective redress mechanisms has in-
tensified since the adoption of the Consumer Policy Strategy for 2007-2013
484
. 
The Directive on injunctions adopted in 2009 does not, however, allow for collec-
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tive redress for damages, which would compensate consumers for the harm or loss 
they have suffered
485
.  
The institutions have engaged in many reflections about the legal context of 
collective actions in the EU, where the need of claimants to access justice and the 
risk of litigation abuse must be balanced
486
. The common starting point is the 
recognition of the fundamental rights, whose protection is an objective that the 
EU law must pursue. Studies related to specific sectors were conducted with a 
view to analysing possible effective means in the field of enforcement.  
The Commission addressed remedies in antitrust law in the Green Paper of 
2005, in which it identified the obstacles to a more efficient system for bringing 
claims and proposed options for problem solving to benefit consumers, as well as 
to improve the enforcement of antitrust law
487
. The Commission indeed recog-
nised that it was unlikely that small claims by consumers or purchasers would be 
initiated, and that collective actions consolidating a large number of smaller 
claims into one action, thereby saving time and money, could better protect their 
interests
488
. As a follow up
489
, the European Parliament, assuming private actions 
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to be complementary to and compatible with public enforcement
490
, stressed that 
«in the interests of justice and for reasons of economy, speed and consistency, 
victims should be able voluntarily to bring collective actions, either directly or via 
organisations whose statutes have this as their object»
491
.  
The findings in the 2005 Green Paper demonstrated that the obstacles to en-
forcement arose from the various legal and procedural rules of the Member States 
governing actions for antitrust damages before the national courts. The main prob-
lem was legal uncertainty. Thus, in the White Paper of 2008 on damages actions 
for breach of the EU antitrust rules, the Commission went further
492
. It indeed 
proposed two collective redress mechanisms that shall be complementary, which 
are (i) representative actions brought by qualified entities, such as consumer asso-
ciations, state bodies or trade associations, on behalf of identified or, in rather re-
stricted cases, identifiable victims; and (ii) opt-in collective actions, in which the 
victims expressly decide to combine their individual claims for the harm they suf-
fered into one single action
493
. Subsequently, in November 2008, the Commission 
adopted the Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress
494
. The 2008 Green Pa-
per sets out four options. They include: (1) no immediate action, (2) co-operation 
between Member States, extending national collective redress systems to consum-
ers from other Member States without a collective redress mechanism, (3) a mix 
of policy instruments to strengthen consumer redress (including collective con-
sumer alternative dispute mechanisms, a power for national enforcement authori-
ties to request traders to compensate consumers and extending small claims to 
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deal with mass claims), and (4) binding or non-binding measures for a collective 
redress judicial procedure to exist in all Member States. 
The European Parliament welcomed the proposals to set up such mechanisms 
aimed at improving collective redress while avoiding excessive litigation
495
, as 
well as the need to identify the members of group actions and the representative 
entities
496
. It deemed that collective redress, as a means to facilitate access to jus-
tice, is an important deterrent
497
.  
Later, based on the Information Note of 2010 on the need for a coherent Eu-
ropean approach to collective redress
498
, the Commission adopted a series of initi-
atives aimed at assessing the opportunity to submit a legislative proposal on col-
lective redress in the EU. 
In 2011, the Commission carried out a horizontal public consultation “To-
wards a coherent European approach to collective redress” with the purpose of 
identifying common legal principles on collective redress and evaluating the fields 
in which the different forms of collective redress could have an added value for 
better protecting the rights of EU citizens and businesses, and for improving the 
enforcement of EU legislation.  
The European Parliament decided to provide its input to the European debate 
by adopting in 2012 a resolution based on a comprehensive own-initiative report 
on collective redress. It specifically determined various aspects of collective re-
dress and clearly recognised that «in the European area of justice, citizens and 
companies must not only enjoy rights but must also be able to enforce those rights 
effectively and efficiently»
499
.  
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Effectiveness was also emphasised in the 2013 Communication of the Com-
mission, which reported the main findings of the public consultation and ad-
dressed some central issues regarding collective redress
500
. Jointly with this 
Communication, the Commission called upon the Member States to follow its 
2013 Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms concerning violations of rights granted under EU 
law
501
. The reason for this was that the aim of collective redress is «to facilitate 
access to justice in relation to violations of rights under Union law and to that end 
to recommend that all Member States should have collective redress systems at 
[the] national level that follow the same basic principles throughout the Union, 
taking into account the legal traditions of the Member States and safeguarding 
against abuse»
502
.  
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As to the definition, in the Recommendation, under point 3, collective redress 
means «(i) a legal mechanism that ensures a possibility to claim cessation of ille-
gal behaviour collectively by two or more natural or legal persons or by an entity 
entitled to bring a representative action (injunctive collective redress); (ii) a legal 
mechanism that ensures a possibility to claim compensation collectively by two or 
more natural or legal persons claiming to have been harmed in a mass harm situa-
tion or by an entity entitled to bring a representative action (compensatory collec-
tive redress)». Then, in point 4, collective redress is conceived as a representative 
action, because standing to sue is granted only to the “representative entities” 
identified in advance by Member States or to the public authorities: both shall act 
on behalf of a group of individuals (or legal persons) equally affected by unlawful 
acts performed by the same defendant.  
In the accompanying Communication, the Commission specified that collec-
tive redress is «a procedural mechanism that allows, for reasons of procedural 
economy and/or efficiency of enforcement, many similar legal claims to be bun-
dled into a single court action. Collective redress facilitates access to justice in 
particular in cases where the individual damage is so low that potential claimants 
would not think it worth pursuing an individual claim. It also strengthens the ne-
gotiating power of potential claimants and contributes to the efficient administra-
tion of justice, by avoiding numerous proceedings concerning claims resulting 
from the same infringement of law»
503
.  
Collective redress is thus considered as an instrumental means of furthering 
economic and social objectives
504
. It constitutes a procedural tool that encourages 
injured individuals to stand up for their rights and ensures that courts will be able 
                                                                                                                                                               
HATZIMIHAIL (eds.), Cross-border Class Actions: the European Way, cit., pp. 59-68, spec. pp. 
67-68; A. STADLER, The Commission’s Recommendation on common principles of collective 
redress and private international law issues, in Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, 
2013, No. 4, pp. 483-488. 
503
  Commission Communication COM(2013)401 final of 11 June 2013, cit., para. 1.2.  
504
  R. MONEY-KYRLE, Legal Standing in Collective Redress Actions for Breach of EU Rights: 
Facilitating or Frustrating Common Standards and Access to Justice?, in B. HESS, M. 
BERGSTRӦM, E. STORSKRUBB (eds.), EU Civil Justice. Current issues and Future Outlook, 
cit., pp. 223-253, spec. p. 231. 
155 
 
to manage mass actions effectively and in a reasonable time. The terminology 
may vary among jurisdictions; thus, for the purposes of the present study, collec-
tive redress is used in line with the Commission’s definition505.  
Focusing on the Recommendation, the fact that it is a non-binding act based 
on Article 292 TFEU, containing common principles and guidelines for injunctive 
and compensatory collective mechanisms
506
, has been criticised due to its limited 
practical influence in improving effectiveness
507
 and thus concretely interfering 
with the national justice systems. Even if it is not legislative, on the one hand, it is 
a first (welcome) initiative suggesting a horizontal harmonisation of a selected ar-
ea of civil procedure, i.e. collective mechanisms, for private enforcement in vari-
ous EU fields. On the other hand, the Member States may, however, violate other 
duties enshrined in the Treaties, such as under Article 19 TEU and Article 47 of 
the Charter, which require them to provide access to justice
508
. To that effect, col-
lective redress is deemed to be a viable means.  
The Recommendation lays down principles common to injunctive and com-
pensatory collective redress, followed by more principles applicable specifically 
to each individual category. These principles are supposed to represent the “min-
imum standards” that Member States are encouraged to apply in the national leg-
islation governing collective procedures. In the Commission’s opinion, compli-
ance with these standards would improve the judicial protection offered to group 
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rights, that is included under the category of collective actions. For comments on the termi-
nology, see, in relation to the 2013 Recommendation, C. FAVILLI, I ricorsi collettivi 
nell’Unione europea, cit., p. 448 f.; and also R. MONEY-KYRLE, C. HODGES, European Col-
lective Action: Towards Coherence?, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law, 2012, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 477-504, spec. p. 479 ff. 
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  «Neither minimum procedural standards of collective actions, nor a maximum harmonisation 
have been proposed. The Recommendation and the Communication of the Commission ap-
pear as a kind of ‘position paper’ in an on-going political discussion»: B. HESS, The Role of 
Procedural Law, cit., p. 350.  
507
  I. BENÖHR, Collective Redress in the Field of European Consumer Law, in Legal Issues of 
EconomicIntegration, 2014, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 243-256, spec. p. 252 ff. 
508
  C. FAVILLI, I ricorsi collettivi nell’Unione europea, cit., spec. p. 453 f. 
156 
 
rights by means of procedures that are «fair, equitable, timely, and not prohibi-
tively expensive»
509
. 
The first set of common principles applicable to injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress deals with issues such as standing, the admissibility of actions, 
adequate information for potential claimants, funding of collective actions, and 
the application of the “loser pays” principle to the costs of lawsuits510. In relation 
to the injunctive procedure, it is recommended that the Member States ensure ex-
pedient procedures and appropriate sanctions
511
. For compensatory redress, other 
features are proposed, such as the constitution of the claimant party on the basis of 
express consent (opt-in principle), the recourse to alternative dispute resolution 
and settlements, limits on lawyers’ fees, the prohibition of overcompensation and 
punitive damages, and the coordination with public enforcement proceedings
512
.  
The suggested opt-in model has been animatedly debated and is still an issue 
under discussion. According to the Commission, the claimant party should be 
formed on the basis of the opt-in principle, which requires the express consent of 
the natural or legal persons claiming to have been harmed. Only reasons of sound 
administration of justice may justify exceptions to this principle, by law or by 
court order. In the Commission Communication, such topic is thoroughly ad-
dressed and is also based on a strict comparison with the US class action
513
. The 
applicability of the decisions to persons who joined the action (opt-in) or who did 
not join the action, but, however, can benefit from the judgment effects (opt-out), 
is one of the major differences between the national collective mechanisms
514
. In 
                                                          
509
  Commission Recommendation (2013/396/EU) of 11 June 2013, cit., point 2. 
510
  Ibidem, points 4 to 18. 
511
  Ibidem, points 19-20. 
512
  Ibidem, points 21 to 34. 
513
  Commission Communication COM(2013)401 final of 11 June 2013, cit., para. 2.2.2. 
514
  On national collective procedures and opt-in or opt-out models, see Commission Communi-
cation COM(2013)401 final of 11 June 2013, cit., para. 1.3; L. ERVO, ‘Opt-In is Out and Opt-
Out is In’: Dimensions Based on Nordic Options and the Commission’s Recommendation, in 
B. HESS, M. BERGSTRӦM, E. STORSKRUBB (eds.), EU Civil Justice. Current issues and Future 
Outlook, cit., pp. 185-221, spec. p. 186 ff.; R. MONEY-KYRLE, Legal Standing in Collective 
Redress Actions for Breach of EU Rights, cit., p. 228 ff.; J. KODEK, Class Actions – Some Re-
flections from a European Perspectives, in E. LEIN, D. FAIRGRIEVE, M. OTERO CRESPO, V. 
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the first case, an express intention to be part of the action is necessary, while in 
the second, it is not necessary, because it applies in any case. Other relevant fea-
tures pointed out with the aim of underlining the need to adopt the opt-in mecha-
nism are related to the risk of abusive litigation
515
. Furthermore, the opt-in system 
is in compliance with the autonomy of the parties to decide to participate or not in 
the litigation
516
. It thus guarantees that collective judgments do not have a binding 
preclusive effect on the claimants who did not join. On the contrary, the opt-out 
system compromises the freedom of potential claimants to decide whether they 
want to litigate and contrasts with the right to an effective remedy, which requires 
the express consent to the possibility of joining litigation. In cases in which the 
claimants are not identified, it will be difficult to distribute the potential compen-
sation obtained
517
.  
                                                                                                                                                               
SMITH (edited by), Collective Redress in Europe: Why and How?, cit., pp. 117-132, spec. p. 
121 ff.; A. JOHNSON, To ‘Opt-in’ or To ‘Opt-out? – That is the Question, in E. LEIN, D. 
FAIRGRIEVE, M. OTERO CRESPO, V. SMITH (edited by), Collective Redress in Europe: Why 
and How?, cit., pp. 61-65; J. CRAMERS, M. BULLA, Collective redress and workers’ rights in 
the EU, AIAS Working Paper 118, March 2012, p. 37 ff., available at www.uva-aias.net; D. 
FAIRGRIEVE, G. HOWELLS, Collective redress procedures: European debates, in D. 
FAIRGRIEVE, E. LEIN (edited by), Extraterritoriality and collective redress, cit., pp. 19-33; A. 
LAYTON, Collective redress: policy objectives and practical problems, in D. FAIRGRIEVE, E. 
LEIN (edited by), Extraterritoriality and collective redress, cit., pp. 93-104, spec. pp. 94-95; 
R. MONEY-KYRLE, C. HODGES, European Collective Action: Towards Coherence?, cit., pp. 
477-504; C. HODGES, The Reform of Class and Representative Actions in European Legal 
Systems, cit., p. 117 ff. 
515
  Commission Communication COM(2013)401 final of 11 June 2013, cit., para. 2.2.2. 
516
  On legal standing issues see R. MONEY-KYRLE, Legal Standing in Collective Redress Actions 
for Breach of EU Rights, cit., pp. 223-253. 
517
  Ibidem, para. 3.4. See also European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012, cit., which 
stressed that «the European approach to collective redress must be founded on the opt-in 
principle, whereby victims are clearly identified and take part in the procedure only if they 
have expressly indicated their wish to do so, in order to avoid potential abuses». In the Ex-
planatory Statement of the Report of 12 January 2012 on “Towards a Coherent European Ap-
proach to Collective Redress” (2011/2089(INI)), A7-0012/2012, «The rapporteur calls for on-
ly a clearly identified group of people to be able to take part in a representative action and 
identification must be complete when the claim is brought. The Constitutions of several 
Member States prohibit opt-out actions where a claim is brought on behalf of unknown vic-
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As these methods are elements of national procedural systems, the appropri-
ateness of a European action in this regard may be questioned. On the basis of the 
aforementioned principle of procedural autonomy, the Member States shall freely 
provide procedural requirements and, with respect to collective mechanisms, 
adopt opt-in or opt-out procedures
518
. It is not, however, the purpose of the present 
study to support one model or the other. Certainly, a future European legislative 
framework on collective redress shall be accurately justified on this point in light 
of the subsidiarity principle. 
In any case, this collective procedure is deemed to be a means of protection 
favouring (mostly) the weaker parties to disputes, although no express reference 
(to categories of weaker parties) is made in the Communication or in the Recom-
mendation of the Commission. The determination of the scope of application of 
the common principles enshrined in the Recommendation stems from its Recital 
No. 7. It specifies that the «areas where the supplementary private enforcement of 
rights granted under Union law in the form of collective redress is of value, are 
consumer protection, competition, environment protection, protection of personal 
data, financial services legislation and investor protection». Nonetheless, the hori-
zontal application of the common principles may cover «any other areas where 
collective claims for injunctions or damages in respect of violations of the rights 
granted under Union law would be relevant»
519
. Cases involving differences be-
tween the victims and the actor, such as a violation of human rights, and in partic-
ular social rights, may thus be governed
520
. 
                                                                                                                                                               
tims as victims would not be free not to bring an action. An opt-out action would also be 
problematic in light of Article 6 ECHR». 
518
  M. DANOV, The Brussels I Regulation: cross-border collective redress proceedings and 
judgments, in Journal of Private International Law, 2010, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 359-393, spec. p. 
363. 
519
  Recital No. 7, cit. See also X.E. KRAMER, Cross-border Enforcement in the EU, cit., p. 228, 
where the Author noted that «The recent legislative action in the area of collective redress 
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cross-border) claims». 
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  C. FAVILLI, I ricorsi collettivi nell’Unione europea, cit., spec. p. 446. On employment collec-
tive redress see in this Chapter, para. 4.3. 
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Further difficulties may be encountered when collective redress has cross-
border implications. In the Recommendation, under point 17, the Commission 
called upon the Member States to ensure that foreign claimants are not excluded 
by the national rules on admissibility or standing
521
. These cases may occur when 
claimants are from several Member States, or foreign groups of claimants or rep-
resentative entities originate from other national legal systems. In other words, the 
courts shall recognise procedural standing of foreign entities under the law of their 
State of origin. This rule is consistent with the fact that, otherwise, due to a differ-
ent legislation on locus standi for representative organisations in the State where 
the claim is initiated, the entity may not have legal standing because of restrictive 
criteria provided by the lex fori
522
. When a diversity of requirements occurs, the 
public policy exception may be invoked against the recognition of decisions is-
sued within a collective procedure. Under the following point 18, the Commission 
required that any officially designated representative entity shall be permitted to 
seise the court in the Member State having jurisdiction to consider the mass harm 
situation. This means that the procedural requirements set forth in the lex fori can-
not limit the power of a foreign representative entity to act before the courts of a 
different Member State. 
In so far as the present analysis is concerned, the fact that the Commission on-
ly referred to mass harm claims leaves doubts as to the applicability of the princi-
ples under points 17 and 18 to different situations, such as violations of employ-
ment terms and conditions. In general, the principles at stake do not sufficiently 
address the implications of private international law. For instance, this gap may 
lead to forum shopping or to a conflict of laws applicable to the constitution of the 
collective redress and the merits, given that the competent court should assess dif-
ferent laws, whether on contractual or extra-contractual obligations.  
                                                          
521
  On this issue see T. BOSTERS, Collective Redress and Private International Law in the EU, 
cit., spec. p. 244 ff.; A. STADLER, The Commission’s Recommendation on Common Princi-
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These crucial issues about jurisdiction and applicable law were indeed pointed 
out by the European Parliament in its 2012 Resolution
523
, but no response was 
found in the Commission’s text. As to the first aspect, it stressed that the horizon-
tal framework should have laid down rules to prevent a rush to the courts (forum 
shopping) and that rules for determining jurisdiction should have taken into ac-
count the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation
524
. It then suggested the applica-
tion of the law of the place where the majority of the victims are domiciled, with-
out prejudice to individual claims
525
. 
From the procedural and private international law perspectives, it is indeed 
necessary to provide for specific rules on cross-border collective redress; nonethe-
less, common principles to be fulfilled in the legal orders of all EU Member States 
may support collective litigation by eliminating some substantive differences and 
thus facilitating, at a second stage, the circulation of judgments. This optimistic 
approach is based on the assumption that the Member States involved did imple-
ment the Recommendation’s principles, thus having national legal systems with 
similar rules on collective redress. On the contrary, if the Member States did not 
fulfil such guidelines, problems may arise as to the certification of the collective 
redress, the resolution of the case, and finally the recognition and enforcement of 
collective judgments.  
Thanks to the forthcoming assessment of the implementation of the Recom-
mendation, as planned under its point 41, it will be of interest to evaluate the na-
tional measures adopted within the collective redress systems. Based on such find-
ings and on possible case law at national and European levels, substantive and 
procedural aspects may be outlined in order to define a future European legisla-
tion on cross-border collective redress. With specific regard to employment mat-
ters, the Court of Justice case law might, however, not suffice when industrial ac-
tions are concerned, because there is a lack of any legislative provisions, common 
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  European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012, cit. 
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  Ibidem, para. 26. 
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rules or private international law rules, as noted by the 2013 Parliament’s Resolu-
tion on jurisdiction in employment matters
526
.  
To conclude, considering the non-binding nature of those common principles, 
one may likely imagine that the EU Member States still provide for different col-
lective mechanisms. In this scenario, EU private international law rules could thus 
help to manage cross-border cases.  
Furthermore, from a procedural point of view, it is interesting to question 
whether a European collective redress procedure could be established based either 
on a comprehensive approach, thus resulting in a general procedural remedy, or 
on a sector-specific approach applicable to a single policy area. No answers have 
been found in the Commission’s initiatives, and scholars have rarely discussed it. 
In line with the EU competences on procedural law, Articles 67 and 81 TFEU 
may constitute the appropriate legal basis
527
; otherwise, the adoption of a legisla-
tive act providing for a horizontal approach may be based on Article 114 TFEU 
aimed at approximating the national provisions on collective procedures. This last 
option is most advisable, with the view, on the one hand, to safeguarding national 
priorities and sovereignty and, on the other, coordinating the different legal sys-
tems
528
.  
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  European Parliament resolution of 8 October 2013 on improving private international law: 
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4.3. Collective redress in the employment context. 
Workers’ rights may be protected and enforced through collective actions, 
which include judicial means and out-of-court actions. The latter may consist of 
strike actions such as forms of protest or demonstrations
529
, whereas the notion of 
collective redress as a judicial procedure promoted by workers is defined in ac-
cordance with the Commission’s explanation in its 2013 Communication530. 
Workers may invoke the protection of their rights by initiating legal proceed-
ings against their employer; however, the success of individual claims is hard to 
achieve. It is common for the Member States’ legal orders to authorise the repre-
sentation of workers by trade unions, associations, organisations or other similar 
entities that promote their interests (mainly at the stage of the negotiation of col-
lective agreements) and to act on their behalf or in support of them before the 
courts. 
The case law of the Court of Justice appears not to fully promote the role of 
trade unions. When referring to the fundamental rights to collective action or col-
lective bargaining, the precedence of the economic freedoms has been stated
531
, 
except for a few interpretations aimed at recognising the social dimension of the 
Union. The Viking and Laval cases addressed collective actions exercised in one 
Member State to seek respect for the work terms and conditions
532
. Namely, the 
Viking case concerned a collective action relating to the reflagging of a vessel 
from the Finnish to the Estonian flag. In the Laval case, a Swedish trade union, by 
                                                          
529
  With regard to collective actions against austerity measures see F. DORSSEMONT, Collective 
Action Against Austerity Measures, in N. BRUUN, K. LÖRCHER, I. SCHÖMANN (eds.), The 
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means of collective action, tried to force a Latvian provider of services to sign a 
collective agreement when performing services in Sweden. According to the 
Court’s judgments, as trade unions are subject to the Treaty provisions on eco-
nomic freedoms, even if the protection of workers amounts to a justifiable re-
striction, the economic freedoms prevailed
533
. Needless to say, these were cases 
concerning strikes or industrial actions.  
As to the collective proceedings before the courts involving workers, the 
Sähköalojen ammattiliitto (a Finnish trade union) case
534
 could be recalled. It con-
cerned claims brought before a Finnish court against a Polish undertaking to re-
quest the minimum pay in accordance with a collective agreement and with the 
Directive on the posting of workers, because the Finnish collective agreement 
provided for more favourable conditions than those under Polish law. Here, the 
dispute focused on the legal standing of the Finnish trade union and its power to 
represent the posted (Polish) workers. The fact that a collective redress was 
brought before the courts to claim respect for the work terms and conditions is 
remarkable. The Polish undertaking asserted the application of the law of the State 
of origin of the posting undertaking (Polish law), which required different condi-
tions on the trade unions’ legal standing, and it asked for the dismissal of the ac-
tion. At the end, the Court did not uphold this argument and applied the lex fori 
(Finnish law), that is to say that the judicial proceedings are governed by the law 
of the court seised. 
As this case shows, it is undisputed that the diversity between the (procedural) 
national laws or regulations causes difficulties with initiating proceedings and, in 
general, with granting access to justice and effective remedies in situations with 
cross-border implications. However, on the one hand, the recognition of the right 
to take collective action is always accompanied by the need to comply not only 
with EU law but also national legislation and practice (pursuant to Article 28 of 
the Charter). This is likely to be the main reason for legal uncertainty regarding 
the possibility to act in transnational litigation. On the other hand, the European 
                                                          
533
  See in Chapter 2, para. 2.2. 
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Union does not have competence over this matter and finding a common Europe-
an solution could entail political debate
535
. 
Against this background, the focus must be on collective redress as a means 
of private enforcement of workers’ rights based on the assumption that workers 
may benefit from such judicial procedures in terms of their access to justice and 
the success of their claims. Individual legal actions may concern low damage or 
may be similar to others resulting from the same infringement of law. Therefore, 
bundling claims into a single court action facilitates access to justice and strength-
ens the claimants’ power. Even though public enforcement procedures have been 
established in some EU directives applicable to employment matters
536
, the oppor-
tunity to seek compensation through private remedies must be ensured by the na-
tional legal systems.  
According to some national legislations, trade unions or other entities
537
 are 
entitled to act on behalf or in support of workers in cross-border disputes
538
, and 
thus are able to represent, in their countries, victims from other Member States, 
who are domiciled in different countries
539
. The recognition of the representative 
role of trade unions in labour law could indeed contribute to enhancing the effec-
tiveness of the enforcement of rights in the EU.  
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Moreover, as to the effectiveness of collective redress, especially in cases 
concerning posted workers, access to justice is often arduous for individual work-
ers due to their difficulties in promoting litigation, legal costs and their unfamili-
arity with foreign legislation. It follows that workers who have moved abroad 
temporarily could also benefit from a collective procedure, when the representa-
tive organisation has the power to represent foreign members or when a foreign 
organisation may act before foreign courts.  
Taking into account the legal framework in the Member States’ and EU legal 
orders, the resort to collective procedures is mainly regulated with regard to dam-
ages claims based on consumer or antitrust law, and developments have been reg-
istered, for instance, in environmental law. In this context, it is advisable that the 
horizontal approach provided by the Commission with the 2013 Recommendation 
on common principles will apply to various policy areas. Employment matters are 
not mentioned, although not explicitly excluded; therefore, they may fall within 
its scope of application. 
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4.4. Concluding considerations. 
Civil procedure, effective remedies, access to justice, enforcement of law and 
the protection of rights are correlated. While Member States are required to pro-
vide for measures available to individuals to seek the protection of their rights, the 
European Union has the power to promote judicial cooperation and to harmonise 
procedural systems when this is aimed at providing better solutions for European 
situations. An undisputed effective means of private enforcement is collective re-
dress: on the one hand, it facilitates access to justice and, on the other, it contrib-
utes to the sound administration of justice, its economy and efficiency.  
The latest legislative developments are of a non-binding nature, but neverthe-
less may serve as a starting point. The 2013 Communication and Recommenda-
tion were aimed at a convergence of national collective redress remedies through 
the establishment of common principles. Whether such principles are to be ap-
plied only in domestic or also in cross-border cases is not clear. The proposals 
pursue the harmonisation of procedural law at the European level and «can be re-
garded as a typical example for the application of the concept of integration: the 
growing Europeanisation of the substantive laws in Europe triggers a parallel need 
for a better enforcement in specific sectors»
540
. 
It is sufficient to note here that alongside public enforcement, private means 
are to be offered to individuals to enable them to seek the protection of the rights 
enshrined in EU law. Collective redress can mostly contribute to defending the 
rights of weaker parties. Collective redress may represent an effective enforce-
ment remedy not only for consumers and victims of damages for the violation of 
antitrust law or environmental law, but also for workers in employment disputes. 
The aim of collective claims is indeed to assist and provide a remedy to individu-
als who otherwise would have been unable to bring an action.  
Combining the EU instruments, some resistance from the EU has resulted in 
the submission of legislation for private enforcement; whereas in specific areas in 
which the public interest is involved, legislative acts have been adopted, such as 
those applicable to consumer protection. As long as the public interest corre-
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sponds to subjective individual rights, the two concepts will correlate
541
. Howev-
er, for consumer protection and insolvency law, the Commission also started with 
recommendations before submitting a legislative proposal
542
. This is a way to 
raise awareness about a particular issue deemed relevant within the law-making 
programme of the EU institutions. 
Questions regarding the political usefulness of collective redress, which ap-
pears to be a crucial issue in cases in which a legislative act is proposed, may limit 
the possibility to concretely address the opportunity to establish a European legal 
framework on collective redress. In this regard, the last yellow card procedure 
triggered in relation to the 2016 proposal for the amendment of the Posting of 
Workers Directive is significant. When sensitive matters are under discussion, in 
order to safeguard national priorities the Member States rarely support European 
action. 
From a systematic procedural point of view, Union actions have been sectori-
al, and the choices of legislative activities have not been comprehensive but rather 
incidental. A more systematic approach is thus needed, including better coordina-
tion of the EU instruments at the horizontal and vertical levels
543
.  
In the existing scenario, issues related to the competent authority, the deter-
mination of the applicable law to the institution of collective redress as well as the 
merits of the case, and subsequently the recognition and enforcement of collective 
decisions, may arise. There are indeed a few rules on multiple party litigation, but 
they do not specifically address collective redress. During the waiting for the 
submission of legislative proposals, common rules or harmonising provisions, 
private international law issues are arising and require answers. Against this back-
ground, addressing employment matters is related to the issue of increasing labour 
mobility, and providing for a clear framework related to effective enforcement 
may be useful in practice, as well as for future legislative developments.  
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Executive Summary 
 
Private international law issues arise in relation to collective redress in the em-
ployment context with transnational implications. The present analysis covers the 
existing criteria for the determination of the jurisdiction and applicable law in em-
ployment matters and collective proceedings, distinguishing between collective 
redress procedures and industrial actions, and including remarks on cases involv-
ing posted workers. Consequently, the opportunity to set up specific grounds for 
jurisdiction and conflict of laws rules to be applied to cross-border collective re-
dress in the employment context is examined. 
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5.1. Introduction: the role of private international law. 
EU private international law rules pursue the objectives of certainty and pre-
dictability, comity and reciprocity (trust and confidence) in the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments from other sovereign States
544
. The cornerstone of the 
area of freedom, security and justice is the principle of mutual recognition of the 
Member States’ laws and procedures by virtue of Article 81 TFEU. Mutual trust, 
as a precondition of mutual recognition, is the confidence that Member States 
shall afford to each other to facilitate the circulation of judgments across Eu-
rope
545
.  
Mutual recognition, however, cannot be applied at the expense of fundamen-
tal rights derived either from the Charter or the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR). Particularly relevant are Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 
ECHR on the right to effective remedies, access to justice and fair trial
546
. As 
mentioned above, the close connection in the European judicial area between the 
protection of fundamental rights and judicial cooperation contributes to achieving 
the realisation of a Union of rights and not only the economic integration. 
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the Court of Justice on the Brussels I regulation 2009-2014, in S. MORANO-FOADI, L. 
VICKERS (eds.), Fundamental Rights in EU. A matter for two courts, Oxford and Portland, 
Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2015, pp. 219-238, spec. p. 223. 
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  F. MOSCONI, C. CAMPIGLIO, Diritto internazionale privato e processuale, Volume I, Parte 
generale e obbligazioni, Milano, UTET Giuridica, 8ª ed., 2017, p. 290 ff.; M. WELLER, Mu-
tual trust within judicial cooperation in civil matters: a normative cornerstone – a factual 
chimera – a constitutional challenge, in Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht, 2017, No. 1, 
pp. 1-21; R. MAŃKO, Europeanisation of civil procedure. Towards common minimum stan-
dards?, PE 559.499, June 2015, spec. p. 3, available at www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank; R. 
CLERICI, Art. 81 TFUE, in F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (a cura di), Commentario breve ai Trat-
tati dell’Unione europea, Padova, CEDAM, 2ª ed., 2014, pp. 500-505, spec. p. 502 f.; X.E. 
KRAMER, Cross-border Enforcement in the EU: Mutual Trust versus Fair Trial? Towards 
Principles of European Civil Procedure, in International Journal of Procedural Law, 2011, 
Vol. 2, pp. 202-230, spec. p. 218; M. TULIBACKA, Europeanization of Civil Procedures: In 
Search of a Coherent Approach, in Common Market Law Review, 2009, Vol. 46, No. 5, pp. 
1527-1565, spec. p. 1542. 
546
  J.-J. KUIPERS, The Right to a Fair Trial and the Free Movement of Civil Judgments, in Croa-
tian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, 2010, Vol. 6, pp. 23-51. 
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The circulation of decisions across Member States may be hampered when the 
violation of fundamental rights is invoked as a ground for the refusal of recogni-
tion or enforcement. In cases concerning collective redress, the grounds for non-
recognition may relate to the procedural requirements imposed by the law of the 
requested State on collective mechanisms. The lack of common European proce-
dural provisions leads to divergences and legal uncertainty in terms of recognition 
and enforcement
547
.  
The harmony of decisions in the European judicial area is preliminarily 
achieved when the grounds for jurisdiction ensure or facilitate the allocation of ju-
risdiction upon the courts of one Member State
548
. Then, with a view to allowing 
the coincidence between forum and ius, the application of the lex fori shall be en-
sured by establishing identical connecting factors for both private international 
law aspects. 
When dealing with cross-border collective redress, a first assessment exam-
ines the opportunity to join individual claims in one forum and to constitute col-
lective proceedings, and then the subsequent probability that the final judgment 
will be recognised and enforced across Member States
549
, as well as the preclusive 
effect of such judgments against other actions initiated in a foreign country
550
.  
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  E. STORSKRUBB, Civil Procedure and EU Law. A Policy Area Uncovered, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008, pp. 28-29. For a first appraisal on the need to regulate collective 
mechanisms, see C. PERARO, Right to collective action in cross-border employment contexts: 
a fundamental social right not yet covered by EU private international law, in UNIO – EU 
Law Journal, 2016, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 20-38, spec. p. 34 ff. 
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  P. FRANZINA, Armonia decisoria e competenza giurisdizionale nel regolamento “Bruxelles I-
bis”, in G. BIAGIONI (a cura di), Il principio dell’armonia delle decisioni civili e commerciali 
nello spazio giudiziario europeo, Torino, Giappichelli Editore, 2015, pp. 99-122, spec. p. 99. 
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  On transnational class actions, see F. BENATTI, Note in tema di class actions transfrontaliere, 
in Danno e responsabilità, 2012, No. 1, pp. 5-11, spec. p. 6 ff. 
550
  Although not falling within the scope of the present work, interesting debates on private in-
ternational law issues have been conducted in relation to US class actions in terms of extrater-
ritoriality, jurisdiction and applicable law over non-US residents, that served as parameters 
for the elaboration of a European collective redress procedure. For comments on US class ac-
tions see, inter alia, T.J. MONESTIER, Transnational Class Actions and the Illusory Search for 
Res Judicata, in Tulane Law Review, 2011, Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 1-79; L. SILBERMAN, Morri-
son v. National Australia Bank: Implications for Global Securities Class Actions (June 14, 
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In light of the foregoing analysis concerning the right to collective action as a 
fundamental social right, the protection of workers under EU law, including post-
ed workers’ rights, and the role of civil procedure, notably the effectiveness of 
collective redress in the context of enforcement, EU private international law has 
become relevant in addressing transnational issues. Certainly, the common princi-
ples on collective redress, pursuing a horizontal approach to be applied in all the 
EU Member States, as suggested by the Commission in 2013
551
, at least constitute 
a basis for further legislative developments. Nevertheless, currently, the relevant 
EU private international law instruments are to be applied to cross-border collec-
tive redress, even if they do not specifically cover this procedural means, thus also 
raising questions about the opportunity to identify specific rules. It is even more 
interesting to focus on the employment context due to its special nature, which is 
conferred by the regulations on civil and commercial matters that provide for pro-
tective rules when weaker parties are concerned. The necessity to determine a le-
gal framework on collective redress in the transnational employment context is al-
so relevant in cases involving posted workers, for whom the legislation offers an 
alternative ground of jurisdiction and a special conflict of laws rule. 
In this context, the analysis focuses on private international law issues with 
regard to employment matters, notably jurisdiction, applicable law and recogni-
tion and enforcement of collective judgments. Under the first two aspects, distinc-
tions are made between individual employment contracts and posted workers’ 
employment contracts, which are covered by specific legislation (respectively in 
paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3), and between collective redress procedures and industrial 
actions, given that these two kinds of actions relate to contractual or extra-
                                                                                                                                                               
2011), in Swiss Yearbook of Private International Law 2010, NYU School of Law, Public Law 
Research Paper No. 11-41; T.J. MONESTIER, Personal Jurisdiction over Non-resident Class 
Members: Have We Gone Down the Wrong Road?, in Texas International Law Journal, 
2010, Vol. 45, pp. 537-572; G.G. YORK-ERWIN, The choice of law problem(s) in the class ac-
tion context, in New York University Law Review, 2009, Vol. 84, pp. 1793-1830; S.J. CHOI, L. 
SILBERMAN, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class Actions (January 13, 
2009), in NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 09-06.  
551
  See supra in Chapter 4, para. 4.2. 
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contractual matters (respectively in paragraphs 5.2.1 and 5.3.1); finally, peculiari-
ties related to posted workers are identified where appropriate.  
The connecting factors considered in conflict of jurisdictions and conflict of 
laws provisions are examined for the purpose of supporting the attempt to define 
grounds for the determination of the most appropriate forum and law applicable to 
cross-border collective redress in the European employment context.  
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5.2. Jurisdiction over employment matters. 
 
a) Individual employment contracts. 
The relevant EU private international law instrument on jurisdiction over em-
ployment matters is Regulation No. 1215/2012 (the Brussels I bis or Recast Regu-
lation)
552
. As a general principle, employees are deemed to be in need of protec-
tion as weaker contractual parties
553
. Similar to the Rome Regulations
554
, specific 
relevance is given to parties considered to be weaker from a socio-economic per-
spective, which include employees.  
Looking at the former Brussels Convention of 1968
555
, employment contracts 
were not governed by particular provisions, but by the general rules
556
. However, 
the Court of Justice developed a special approach for employment contracts by re-
                                                          
552
  Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 Decem-
ber 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and 
commercial matters (recast), in OJ L 351 of 20 December 2012, pp. 1-32, that entered into 
force on 10 January 2015 and replaced Regulation No. 44/2001 (Brussels I Regulation). All 
EU legislation is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu.  
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  For a deep analysis of EU private international law on employment, see U. GRUŠIĆ, The Eu-
ropean Private International Law of Employment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2015, spec. 7 ff.; L. MERRETT, Employment Contracts in Private International Law, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 79 ff. 
554
  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), in OJ L 177 of 4 July 2008, pp. 6-
16; and Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), in OJ L 199 of 31 
July 2007, pp. 40-49. 
555
  1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, in OJ L 299 of 31 December 1972, pp. 32-42. 
556
  See the Explanatory Report by Professor Fausto Pocar to the Convention on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed in Lu-
gano on 30 October 2007, at para. 85, where the Author specified that «individual contracts 
of employment were completely ignored in the original Brussels Convention, and were con-
sequently subject to the general rules and to the special rule on contractual obligations in Ar-
ticle 5(1), without any special restriction on the choice of forum (…)». The rules of jurisdic-
tion in employment matters of the 2007 Lugano Convention are identical to those of the Brus-
sels I Regulation. 
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ferring to the Rome Convention of 1980
557
, namely Article 6 thereof, which pro-
vides that a contract of employment is to be governed, in the absence of choice of 
the applicable law, by the law of the country in which the employee habitually 
carries out his work in performance of the contract, unless it appears from the cir-
cumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another 
country. According to the Report on the Convention
558
 «the adopting of a special 
conflict rule in relation to contracts of employment was intended to provide an 
appropriate arrangement for matters in which the interests of one of the contract-
ing parties were not the same as those of the other and to secure thereby adequate 
protection for the party who from the socio-economic point of view was to be re-
garded as the weaker in the contractual relationship»
559
. In the absence of any 
special rules on employment contracts under the 1968 Convention, the Court had 
to verify the obligation characterising the contract, i.e. the obligation to carry out 
work, and then establish the country with the closest connection, because that 
country’s courts are best suited to resolve disputes to which one or more obliga-
tions under such contracts may give rise
560
. 
Therefore, a specific section was inserted into the Brussels I Regulation
561
 and 
other adjustments were provided within the Recast Regulation to enhance the pro-
tection of the weaker parties. The provisions therein deal with jurisdictional issues 
                                                          
557
  Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations opened for signature in Rome on 
19 June 1980 (80/934/EEC), in OJ L 266 of 9 October 1980, pp. 1-19. 
558
  Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by Professor Mario 
Giuliano and Professor Paul Lagarde, in OJ C 282 of 31 October 1980. 
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  See Court of Justice, judgment of 26 May 1982, Case 133/81, Roger Ivenel v Helmut Schwab, 
EU:C:1982:199, paras. 13-14. 
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 15 February 1989, Case 32/88, Six Constructions Ltd v Paul 
Humbert, EU:C:1989:68, para. 12 ff.; judgment of 15 January 1987, Case 266/85, Hassan 
Shenavai v Klaus Kreischer, EU:C:1987:11, para. 11 ff.; see L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over 
Individual Contracts of Employment, in A. DICKINSON, E. LEIN (eds.), The Brussels I Regula-
tion Recast, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 239-253, spec. p. 240. 
561
  The creation of a specific section on employment contracts was envisaged in the Proposal for 
a Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters, COM(99)348 final of 14 July 1999. 
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over individual contracts of employment and do not refer to the collective dimen-
sion of disputes or contracts.  
In particular, Recital No. 18 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation states that the 
weaker party to an employment contract should be protected by rules that are 
more favourable than the general rules on jurisdiction thereof in terms of the pro-
tection of workers’ interests562. These rules shall pursue the objective of protect-
ing the position of the weaker party in legal proceedings
563
. In the Brussels sys-
tem, these provisions prevail over both the general rule under Article 4 and the al-
ternative jurisdictional grounds contained in Section 2, Articles 7 to 9. By con-
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  See also Recital No. 14 of the Brussels I bis Regulation that specifies that «in order to ensure 
the protection of consumers and employees, to safeguard the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Member States in situations where they have exclusive jurisdiction and to respect the auton-
omy of the parties, certain rules of jurisdiction in this Regulation should apply regardless of 
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  F. MOSCONI, C. CAMPIGLIO, Diritto internazionale privato e processuale, Volume I, cit., p. 
95; S.M. CARBONE, C.E. TUO, Il nuovo spazio giudiziario europeo in materia civile e com-
merciale. Il Regolamento UE n. 1215/2012, Torino, Giappichelli Editore, 2016, pp. 175-177 
on special fora; V. LAZIĆ, Procedural Justice for ‘Weaker Parties’ in Cross-Border Litiga-
tion under the EU Regulatory Scheme, in Utrecht Law Review, 2014, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 100-
117, spec. p. 100; A. MALATESTA, Regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001, in F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI 
(a cura di), Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione europea, cit., pp. 517-535, spec. p. 
524 ff. See, in relation to Regulation No. 44/2011, Court of Justice, judgment of 14 Septem-
ber 2017, Joined Cases C-168/16 and C-169/16, Sandra Nogueira and Others v Crewlink Ire-
land Ltd and Miguel José Moreno Osacar v Ryanair Designated Activity Company, 
EU:C:2017:688, para. 49; judgment of 10 September 2015, Case C-47/14, Holterman Ferho 
Exploitatie BV and Others v F.L.F. Spies von Büllesheim, EU:C:2015:574, para. 43: «as is 
clear from the thirteenth recital, the regulation aims to provide the weaker parties to contracts, 
including contracts of employment, with enhanced protection by derogating from the general 
rules of jurisdiction»; (Grand Chamber), judgment of 19 July 2012, Case C-154/11, Ahmed 
Mahamdia v République algérienne démocratique et populaire, EU:C:2012:491, para. 44; 
judgment of 22 May 2008, Case C-462/06, Glaxosmithkline and Laboratoires Glax-
osmithkline v Jean-Pierre Rouard, EU:C:2008:299, para. 17: «In the Regulation, jurisdiction 
over individual contracts of employment is the subject of a specific section, namely Section 5 
of Chapter II. That section, which contains Articles 18 to 21 of the Regulation, seeks to en-
sure that employees are afforded the protection referred to in recital 13 of the preamble there-
to». 
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trast, the rules on exclusive jurisdiction under Section 6, Article 24, have prece-
dence over the jurisdictional rules in Sections 3, 4 and 5 concerning insurance, 
consumer contracts and individual contracts of employment, respectively. Thus, 
such provisions set forth a specific and complete regime that is autonomous and 
sufficient in relation to the general provisions. Indeed, with regard to the Brussels 
I Regulation, the Court of Justice held that the Regulation aims to provide the 
weaker parties to contracts, including contracts of employment, with enhanced 
protection by derogating from the general rules of jurisdiction, which stems from 
the wording of «the provisions of Section 5 that they are not only specific but also 
exhaustive»
564
. It follows that the provisions under Sections 1 and 2 of the Brus-
sels I Recast Regulation are applicable to employment contracts in so far as they 
are recalled by Section 5. 
In summary, the provisions on jurisdictional issues establish that an employee 
may only be sued in the Member State of his/her domicile, whereas the action 
against an employer may be brought alternatively in the courts of the country of 
its domicile (forum rei), in the country where the employee habitually carries out 
or has carried out his/her work or, failing that, in the courts where the business 
which engaged the employee is or was situated, if the employee does not carry out 
his/her work in any one country (forum laboris)
565
.  
A preliminary remark concerns the scope of application of Section 5. It ap-
plies to individual employment contracts and matters relating to such contracts
566
. 
In any case, the use of the adjective individual clearly excludes all kinds of collec-
tive contracts, including collective agreements. National courts have faced diffi-
culties in defining the variety of forms which employment relationships may take. 
The Member States’ legislation varies as to the definitions of workers and em-
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 10 September 2015, Holterman, cit., para. 44; judgment of 22 
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  See L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., pp. 247-249. 
566
  On this concept see, among others, C. ESPLUGUES MOTA, G. PALAO MORENO, Articles 20 to 
23, in U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI (edited by), European Commentaries on Private Interna-
tional Law. Brussels Ibis Regulation, Köln, Sellier European Law Publishers, Ottoschmidt, 
2016, pp. 534-558, spec. p. 537 f. 
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ployees that may be used in different contexts
567
. According to the Report on the 
application of the Brussels I Regulation
568
, «as in domestic law, the facts of a case 
do not always easily permit to qualify a relationship as an employment matter. In 
the Member States, even some sociological divergences have emerged. German 
law is concerned with [persons comparable to employees]. French law is mindful 
to protect commercial agents who do not really carry out independent work»
569
.  
In providing a definition, two approaches are possible. On the one hand, the 
definition could be determined on the basis of the lex causae, which means on na-
tional law. On the other hand, the resort to an autonomous European definition 
seems to be more appropriate, regardless of any national substantive law. Such au-
tonomous interpretation should be preferred because it furthers the uniformity that 
the Regulation seeks to achieve
570
. 
In the Shenavai judgment of 1987
571
, the Court of Justice held that «contracts 
of employment, like other contracts for work other than on a self-employed basis, 
differ from other contracts - even those for the provision of services - by virtue of 
certain particularities: they create a lasting bond which brings the worker to some 
extent within the organizational framework of the business of the undertaking or 
employer, and they are linked to the place where the activities are pursued, which 
determines the application of mandatory rules and collective agreements. It is on 
account of those particularities that the court of the place in which the characteris-
tic obligation of such contracts is to be performed is considered best suited to re-
solving the disputes to which one or more obligations under such contracts may 
give rise»
572
. The Court seems to adopt a strict interpretation of employment con-
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  L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., p. 241. 
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  Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States, presented by Prof. 
Dr. Burkhard Hess, Prof. Dr. Thomas Pfeiffer and Prof. Dr. Peter Schlosser, 2007 (Heidel-
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  Ibidem, para. 152. 
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  L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., spec. p. 241. 
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 15 January 1987, Shenavai, cit. 
572
  Ibidem, para. 16; see also judgment of 13 July 1993, Case C-125/92, Mulox IBC Ltd v Hen-
drick Geels, EU:C:1993:306, para. 15.  
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tracts, thus reflecting the distinction between employees and the self-employed as 
provided for in some national legislation
573
. However, in line with the provisions 
contained in the Regulation, considering the special rules over employment con-
tracts aimed at protecting the weaker party, a wider interpretation is preferred. In 
this sense, atypical contracts may also be included, and workers may be entitled to 
seek the protection of those rights granted by the national legislation to broader 
categories of workers
574
. 
Closely linked to the definition of employment contracts and related matters, 
the identification of which claims or disputes may fall within the scope of applica-
tion of Section 5 has been subject to debate. A distinction may be determined as to 
matters arising out of an employment contract (e.g. breach of contract), on the one 
hand, and matters that may be closely connected to it, on the other hand. Indeed, 
matters may be closely connected to the contract, but not arising (directly) out of 
the contract, and may be of a non-contractual nature
575
. Also, with regard to dis-
putes, a broader approach is preferred for the purpose of granting wide protection 
to workers. 
The first set of relevant provisions fulfilling the objective of protecting the 
weaker party to an employment contract is contained in Article 21, paragraph 1 of 
the Brussels I Recast Regulation. According to this, the employer who is domi-
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  L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., p. 241 f. 
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  Ibidem, p. 242. 
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  As Heidelberg Report pointed out (paras. 352-356) difficulties arise due to the inconsistency 
in different language versions of the Regulation. The German text is more detailed in its for-
mulation than the French and English language versions. Its wording advocates against an ex-
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Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., pp. 242-243, reports English in-
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where the judge considered that the Regulation does not cover conspiracy claim based on the 
assessment whether the acts complained of constituted breaches of the contract of employ-
ment and whether such breaches were relied on as the basis for the proceedings or not. In an-
other case on ancillary bonus agreement the seised court declared the Regulation to be ap-
plied because it was related to the employment contract even if included in a separate docu-
ment and concluded in a different time. 
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ciled in a Member State may be sued (a) in the courts of the Member State of his 
domicile; or (b) in another Member State, which may be (i) the place where or 
from where the employee habitually carries out his work or in the courts for the 
last place where he did so; or, failing that, (ii) the place where the business which 
engaged the employee is or was situated. The option (between the general forum 
rei and the alternative grounds) to choose the forum is up to the employee, in line 
with the aim of offering him a broader protection.  
The employee may thus bring claims before the court for the place where he 
is habitually working or in the place where he last did so. In practice, this means 
that where an employer attempted to use a mobility clause to transfer an employee 
to a different jurisdiction, and then dismisses him, the employee could bring his 
claim in the place where he has habitually worked before his transfer
576
. 
To ground jurisdiction, the habitual place of work is established as the con-
necting factor. Its definition has been addressed by courts and scholars relying on 
national or European concepts. 
In relation to Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Brussels Convention, according to 
the Mulox judgment of 1993, the habitual place of work is the place where the 
employee spends most of his working time, where he has an office, where he or-
ganises his activities for his employer and to which he returns after each business 
trip abroad
577
. That place must be deemed to be the place of performance of the 
obligation on which a claim relating to a contract of employment is based
578
. In 
other words, it is the place where or from which the employee principally dis-
charges his obligations towards his employer
579
. 
In the Rutten case of 1997, the Court stated that its previous case law must be 
taken into account when determining the place with which the dispute has the 
most significant link, while taking due account of the concern to affording proper 
protection to the employee as the weaker party to the contract
580
. It then held that 
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 13 July 1993, Mulox, cit., paras. 24-25. 
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where a contract of employment is performed in several Contracting States, the 
habitual place of work refers to the place where «the employee has established the 
effective centre of his working activities and where, or from which, he in fact per-
forms the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer»
581
.  
Given the similar concepts used in the Brussels I Recast and the Rome I Reg-
ulations, and also taking into account the former texts, the interpretation of these 
instruments has been based on a similar approach. Consequently, the explanation 
of each instrument may follow that of the other one. From a systematic perspec-
tive, this consistency may lead to the uniformity of employment rules and effec-
tively grant protection for employees
582
. 
In this regard, in the Koelzsch judgment of 2011
583
, the Court of Justice af-
firmed that in order to determine the applicable law, the interpretation of the con-
necting factor of the place in which the work is habitually carried out must take 
into account case law in which similar concepts have been interpreted in the con-
text of the Brussels Convention of 1968 and the Brussels I Regulation
584
. In line 
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national privé, 2011, No. 2, pp. 455-461. 
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  On the interpretation of the concept of habitual place of work and the interchangeability of 
the instruments, see L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., 
p. 248; A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment: re-
flections from the European Union, in A. BLACKETT, A. TREBILCOCK (edited by), Research 
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with this, the interpretation of the provisions of the Rome Convention, given that 
they set out similar concepts, should take into account the explanation of the rules 
on jurisdiction for the same matters
585
. In relation to employment matters, the 
purpose of the specific provisions relies on the need to protect the weaker of the 
contracting parties. It follows that Article 6 of the Rome Convention pursues the 
objective of guaranteeing the applicability of the law of the State in which the 
employee carries out his working activities, rather than that of the State in which 
the employer is established, because it is in the former State that the worker per-
forms his economic and social duties, and it is there that the business and political 
environment affects the employment activities
586
.  
This reasoning, however, creates an obstacle as noted by Advocate General 
Trstenjak in the Koelzsch case
587
, according to which the parallel interpretation of 
identical or similar terms arising from conflict rules and rules for determining in-
ternational jurisdiction must take into consideration the different aims of the two 
private international law instruments. On the one hand, the conflict rules are 
aimed at determining one law applicable to a contract of employment. On the oth-
er hand, the purpose of the rules for determining international jurisdiction is to 
identify the court having jurisdiction by offering options to the claimant. This 
means that the uniformity of interpretations must be tested with reference to each 
individual case, and it cannot be held, as a presumption, that identical or similar 
expressions must be interpreted in a uniform manner
588
. 
In addition, contrary to the Brussels I bis Regulation, it should be noted that 
the last place of habitual work is not mentioned in Article 8, paragraph 2 of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Handbook on Transnational Labour law, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2015, pp. 438-454, spec. pp. 440-443. 
585
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 15 March 2011, Koelzsch, cit., para. 33. See 
F. JAULT-SESEKE, De la loi applicable à un contrat de travail, cit., pp. 456-458; on the aris-
ing of parallel issues under both Brussels and Rome regimes, see L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction 
over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., spec. p. 240. 
586
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 15 March 2011, Koelzsch, cit., para. 42.  
587
  Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak delivered on 16 December 2010, Case C-29/10, Ko-
elzsch, cit., EU:C:2010:789. 
588
  Ibidem, paras. 82-83. 
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Rome I Regulation
589
. It stems from this consideration that to reach a uniform in-
terpretation among European private international law instruments on analogous 
matters, but which have different functions, the legislator should submit amend-
ments in order to align the texts or relevant provisions. Uniformity may thus be 
ensured by providing similar rules in both instruments. This is the case of Article 
21, paragraph 1 (b)(i) of the Brussels I Recast Regulation and the abovementioned 
Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Rome I Regulation: In the former Article, the place 
«from where the employee habitually carries out his work» was introduced as al-
ready established as a criterion in the Rome system
590
. This means that this factor 
of territorial connection will be relevant in practice when the working activity is 
carried out in or from more than one country where it has no habitual character, or 
when the habitual place of work is located outside the European Union (or the 
Lugano Convention)
591
. 
However, the criteria of legislative and jurisdictional competence fulfil differ-
ent functions
592
. The place where the employee habitually carries out his work 
may be utilised as the grounds for jurisdiction because it is the place where it is 
least expensive for the employee to defend himself
593
, but this concern has no 
weight in relation to legislative competence. Similar technical-legal concepts can 
frequently be interpreted in a similar way, but «this resemblance does not rest on a 
                                                          
589
  It only states that the contract shall be governed by the law of the country in which or, failing 
that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract. 
See L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., p. 247. 
590
  S.M. CARBONE, C.E. TUO, Il nuovo spazio giudiziario europeo in materia civile e commer-
ciale, cit., p. 196; L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., 
pp. 247-249. 
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  S.M. CARBONE, C.E. TUO, Il nuovo spazio giudiziario europeo in materia civile e commer-
ciale, cit., p. 198. 
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  A. ZANOBETTI, Employment Contracts and the Rome Convention: the Koelzsch Ruling of the 
European Court of Justice, in Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional, Octubre 2011, Vol. 3, 
No. 2, pp. 338-358, spec. p. 355, available at www.uc3m.es/cdt; see also F. JAULT-SESEKE, De 
la loi applicable à un contrat de travail, cit., spec. p. 457. 
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  Court of Justice, 27 February 2002, Case C-37/00, Herbert Weber v Universal Odgen Ser-
vices Ltd, EU:C:2002:122, para. 40; judgment of 13 July 1993, Mulox, cit., para. 19. 
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link of necessity»
594
. It follows that the term “habitual place of work” has been in-
terpreted narrowly by the Court in certain respects and widely in others
595
. The 
narrow interpretation considers that there cannot be more than one habitual place 
of work; on the contrary, the term is interpreted widely
596
 when the determination 
of the habitual place of work is essentially a search for the place that is the most 
closely connected with the employment dispute
597
. In this regard, the wide inter-
pretation considers the habitual place of work as the principal place of work, 
which remains unchanged when the employee temporarily works abroad within 
the posting in the transnational provision of services framework
598
. 
As to this last consideration, indeed, Article 21, paragraph 1 (b)(i) does not 
expressly include posted workers, thus referring to the non-changing of the habit-
ual place of work when temporarily moved abroad. However, it seems undisputed 
that the courts of the place where the employee habitually carries out the work 
remain competent, even though the employee is temporarily posted in another 
Member State. This is confirmed by the provision under Article 6 of Directive 
96/71, which provides for an alternative forum, that is the courts for the place 
where the worker is or was posted
599
.  
Various situations related to work performance have been considered. The 
Court has also emphasised the need to guarantee adequate protection to the em-
ployee as the weaker of the contracting parties from the socio-economic point of 
view when the employee carries out his work in more than one Contracting State. 
To identify the place of work, the factors with a closer connection with the dispute 
shall be taken into account; otherwise, all courts of the Member States where the 
                                                          
594
  A. ZANOBETTI, Employment Contracts and the Rome Convention, cit., p. 357. 
595
  R. CAFARI PANICO, Enhancing protection for weaker parties, cit., pp. 61-62. 
596
  F. JAULT-SESEKE, De la loi applicable à un contrat de travail, cit., p. 458. 
597
  U. GRUŠIĆ, Jurisdiction in employment matters under Brussels I: a reassessment, in Interna-
tional Comparative Law Quarterly, 2012, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 91-126, spec. p. 108. 
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  R. CAFARI PANICO, Enhancing protection for weaker parties, cit., p. 62. 
599
  See further infra in this para. 
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employee carried out his working activity shall be deemed competent. In this way, 
however, the ultimate aim of effectiveness will be controverted
600
.  
In this regard, in the Weber case of 2002
601
, the Court established that in case 
«there are two or more places of work of equal importance or because none of the 
various places where the employee carries on his work activity has a sufficiently 
permanent and close connection with the work done to be regarded as the main 
link for the purposes of determining the courts with jurisdiction, it is necessary to 
avoid a multiplication of the courts having jurisdiction over a single legal relation-
ship. Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention cannot, therefore, be interpreted as 
conferring concurrent jurisdiction on the courts of each Contracting State in 
whose territory the employee carries on some of his work»
602
. The factors deter-
mining the closest connection with one place must be considered to ground juris-
diction in order to avoid many courts from being deemed competent because the 
employee performed working activities in all the States concerned. In conclusion, 
the Court ruled (in relation to Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Brussels Convention) 
that in cases in which a worker performs the obligations in more than one State, 
the habitual place of work must be the place where he in fact performs the essen-
tial part of his duties vis-à-vis his employer. When the employee performs the 
same activities in more than one State the duration of the employment relationship 
must be considered. Thus, failing other criteria, the courts for the place where the 
employee has worked the longest shall be competent. Exceptions are possible 
when, in light of the circumstances of the case, a different place is more closely 
connected with the dispute. Otherwise, the employee may choose among the al-
ternative fora
603
. In this judgment, the Court deemed irrelevant any qualitative cri-
                                                          
600
  S.M. CARBONE, C.E. TUO, Il nuovo spazio giudiziario europeo in materia civile e commer-
ciale, cit., p. 198. 
601
  Court of Justice, judgment of 27 February 2002, Weber, cit. 
602
  Ibidem, para. 55. 
603
  Ibidem, para. 58: «where an employee performs the obligations arising under his contract of 
employment in several Contracting States the place where he habitually works, within the 
meaning of that provision, is the place where, or from which, taking account of all the cir-
cumstances of the case, he in fact performs the essential part of his duties vis-à-vis his em-
ployer. In the case of a contract of employment under which an employee performs for his 
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teria relating to the nature and importance of the work done in various places
604
, 
except for the whole of the duration of the employment relationship and the facts 
that may determine the closest connection. In this way, the interpretation of the 
connecting factor is subject to the aim of effectively protecting the rights of the 
employee, who in the case of more than one place of work may choose the one 
that better corresponds to his interests
605
. 
This statement was criticised by Advocate General Jacobs in his opinion in 
the Weber case
606
. He held that in cases in which the employee performs working 
activities in more than one State, he shall not have discretion in choosing his fo-
rum, and that such cases do not imply that the forum should be determined on the 
basis of what is most convenient for him. By contrast, this situation may lead to 
legal uncertainty. Thus, uniformity of criteria and avoiding a multiplicity of juris-
dictions may be pursued by establishing a more abstract concern (to afford proper 
protection to the employee as the weaker party to the contract) not linked to the 
circumstances of the individual employee. To that effect, «the necessary link be-
tween the dispute and the court hearing it will not always mean that a court of the 
country whose law is applicable to the contract will have jurisdiction, desirable 
                                                                                                                                                               
employer the same activities in more than one Contracting State, it is necessary, in principle, 
to take account of the whole of the duration of the employment relationship in order to identi-
fy the place where the employee habitually works, within the meaning of Article 5(1). Failing 
other criteria, that will be the place where the employee has worked the longest. It will only 
be otherwise if, in light of the facts of the case, the subject-matter of the dispute is more 
closely connected with a different place of work, which would, in that case, be the relevant 
place for the purposes of applying Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention. In the event that 
the criteria laid down by the Court of Justice do not enable the national court to identify the 
habitual place of work, as referred to in Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention, the employee 
will have the choice of suing his employer either in the courts for the place where the busi-
ness which engaged him is situated, or in the courts of the Contracting State in whose territo-
ry the employer is domiciled». 
604
  L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., p. 248. 
605
  E. PATAUT, Note Affaire C-384/10, in Revue critique de droit international privé, 2012, No. 
2, pp. 648-666, spec. p. 661. 
606
  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 18 October 2001, Case C-37/00, Weber, 
cit., EU:C:2001:554. 
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though such a result undoubtedly is»
607
. It stems from this that the coincidence be-
tween forum and ius is not always the result of the proper application of the crite-
ria, and thus the intrinsic objectives of the instruments are not pursued. 
The Court addressed the question of the identification of the place of habitual 
work in a case involving two employers (double employment) in the Giulia 
Pugliese judgment of 2003
608
. It ruled that the dispute against the first employer 
may be brought before the courts of the second State where the employee habitu-
ally works provided that there is a sufficiently close connection between the two 
employment contracts. To verify such connection, it is required that the first em-
ployer has shown an interest in the work activity the employee conducts for the 
second employer. The Court clarified the elements to be considered in determin-
ing the place where the employee is entitled to bring an action against the first 
employer on the basis of the closest connection
609
, i.e. the employer must have an 
interest in the employee’s performance of the service for the other employer. The 
so-determined link between the two contracts allows the employee to sue the first 
employer before the courts of the second place of work. In case it is not possible 
to establish any connection, the temporal element should be considered as stated 
in the Weber case. 
As to the residual criterion of the place where the business which engaged the 
employee is or was situated, its function has been argued
610
. This last head of ju-
risdiction is rarely relevant, and recourse to it will only be appropriate in excep-
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  Ibidem, para. 47. 
608
  Court of Justice, judgment of 10 April 2003, Case C-437/00, Giulia Pugliese v Finmeccanica 
SpA, Betriebsteil Alenia Aerospazio, EU:C:2003:219; see L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over In-
dividual Contracts of Employment, cit., p. 249. 
609
  Court of Justice, judgment of 10 April 2003, Giulia Pugliese, cit., para. 24: «The relevant fac-
tors may include: the fact that the conclusion of the second contract was envisaged when the 
first was being concluded, the fact that the first contract was amended on account of the con-
clusion of the second contract, the fact that there is an organisational or economic link be-
tween the two employers, the fact that there is an agreement between the two employers 
providing a framework for the coexistence of the two contracts, the fact that the first employ-
er retains management powers in respect of the employee, the fact that the first employer is 
able to decide the duration of the employee's work for the second employer». 
610
  See L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., pp. 249-250. 
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tional cases, as normally a stable base at which the employee carried out his work 
can be identified. According to the Court of Justice case law, the term “habitual 
place of work” shall be determined widely, and thus the rule of the engaging place 
of business, which is to be applied at a second instance, is deprived of any im-
portance
611
. It may also lead to legal uncertainty and prejudice the protection of 
workers by creating a lack of predictability in the competent courts
612
.  
In the Voogsgeerd case of 2011
613
, with regard to Article 6, paragraph 2 of the 
Rome Convention, the Court held that factors relating to the way in which the 
employee’s actual employment is operated were not relevant to the determination 
of where the place of business at which the employee was engaged is situated, be-
cause it is related to the linking factor of the habitual place of work
614
. «The use 
of the term ‘engaged’ in Article 6(2)(b) of the Rome Convention, clearly refers 
purely to the conclusion of the contract or, in the case of a de facto employment 
relationship, to the creation of the employment relationship and not to the way in 
                                                          
611
  Referring to Article 6 of the Rome Convention, the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judg-
ment of 15 March 2011, Koelzsch, cit., at para. 43, stated that «it must be held that the criteri-
on of the country in which the employee ‘habitually carries out his work’, set out in Article 
6(2)(a) thereof, must be given a broad interpretation, while the criterion of ‘the place of busi-
ness through which [the employee] was engaged’, set out in Article 6(2)(b) thereof, ought to 
apply in cases where the court dealing with the case is not in a position to determine the coun-
try in which the work is habitually carried out». Also S.M. CARBONE, C.E. TUO, Il nuovo 
spazio giudiziario europeo in materia civile e commerciale, cit., spec. at p. 201, explain that 
the place of engagement is relevant when the work activity is carried out in more than one 
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to determine the law applicable, the individual assessment of circumstances is requested: see 
A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment, cit., pp. 
445-446. 
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  See R. CAFARI PANICO, Enhancing protection for weaker parties, cit., at p. 59, where the Au-
thor refers to the Voogsgeered case (Court of Justice, judgment of 15 December 2011, Case 
C-384/10, Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA, EU:C:2011:842) that took ten years to determine 
the court having jurisdiction over employee’s claim. 
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 15 December 2011, Voogsgeerd, cit.; see L. MERRETT, Juris-
diction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., p. 250 ff. 
614
  Court of Justice, judgment of 15 December 2011, Voogsgeerd, cit., para. 44. 
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which the employee’s actual employment is carried out»615. The place of business 
may correspond to any stable structure of an undertaking, so not only subsidiaries 
and branches, but also other units such as offices
616
. A degree of permanence is 
nonetheless required for such unit, as the purely transitory presence of an agent is 
not sufficient
617
. Moreover, the place of business must belong to the undertaking 
that engaged the employee in that it forms an integral part of its structure
618
. Thus, 
to classify a unit as the place of business of an undertaking, objective factors must 
demonstrate that «there exists a real situation different from that which appears 
from the terms of the contract, even though the authority of the employer has not 
been formally transferred to that other undertaking»
619
.  
The case in the Voogsgeerd judgment concerned the maritime sector and in-
deed revealed significant problems in identifying the linking factor. In general, 
difficulties are related to the international transport sector, which involves, for in-
stance, airline staff, truck drivers, and maritime transport. In these cases, it is often 
difficult to establish the place where the employee worked, because the company 
and means of transport may be registered in different Member States, the relevant 
management may be seated in a third Member State and the employee’s domicile 
is in a fourth State.  
Jurisdictional issues related to the airline sector are addressed in the Nogueira 
case of 2017
620
. The Court interpreted the concept of the place where the employ-
ee habitually carries out his work in the case in which an employment contract is 
performed in the territory of several States and in which there is no effective cen-
tre of professional activities from which an employee performs the essential part 
of his duties vis-à-vis his employer. When disputes involve workers whose habit-
ual place of work is difficult to ascertain, the courts must identify the place from 
which the employees principally discharged their obligations towards their em-
                                                          
615
  Ibidem, para. 46. 
616
  Ibidem, para. 54. 
617
  Ibidem, para. 55. 
618
  Ibidem, para. 57. 
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  Ibidem, para. 65. 
620
  Court of Justice, judgment of 14 September 2017, Nogueira, cit. 
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ployer
621
. To do this, a circumstantial method implies an assessment of the nature 
of the legal relationships by taking into account all the factors which characterise 
the working activity. Such a factual approach may also limit the possibility to ex-
ploit or contribute to the achievement of circumvention strategies
622
. Specific in-
dicia have been indicated by the Court of Justice case law as regards work rela-
tionships in the transport sector, which are aimed at determining «in which Mem-
ber State is situated (i) the place from which the employee carries out his 
transport-related tasks, (ii) the place where he returns after his tasks, receives in-
structions concerning his tasks and organises his work, and (iii) the place where 
his work tools are to be found»
623
. According to the judgment, referring to other 
instruments may be useful, but the determination of the habitual place of work 
may not rely only on comparable concepts
624
. Thus, «in the event of proceedings 
being brought by a member of the air crew, assigned to or employed by an airline, 
and in order to establish the jurisdiction of the court seised, the concept of ‘place 
where the employee habitually carries out his work’, within the meaning of that 
provision, cannot be equated with that of ‘home base’, within the meaning of An-
nex III to Regulation No 3922/91. The concept of ‘home base’ constitutes never-
theless a significant indicium for the purposes of determining the ‘place where the 
employee habitually carries out his work’»625. 
Overall, the interpretation of the linking factors of the habitual place of work 
or the engaging place of business has raised difficulties in their practical applica-
tion to disputes arising under individual employment contracts. In any case, the 
specific circumstances of the claims must be considered, in light of the interpreta-
tion the Court of Justice has delivered in similar cases (addressing similar con-
cepts), though without undermining the functions of the jurisdictional provisions. 
As a further provision enhancing workers’ protection, Article 21, paragraph 2 
of the Brussels I bis Regulation provides that an employer not domiciled in a 
Member State may be sued in the courts for the place of habitual work (or the last 
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  Ibidem, para. 60. 
622
  Ibidem, para. 62. 
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  Ibidem, para. 63. 
624
  Ibidem, para. 66 ff. 
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  Ibidem, para. 77. 
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place), or, failing that, of the place where the business which engaged the employ-
ee is or was situated. Thus, employees are entitled to bring proceedings against a 
non-European employer before the courts for the place where they habitually 
work
626
. In general, the extension of jurisdiction rules to third country defendants 
is aimed at ensuring that the protective jurisdiction rules available for employees 
will also apply if the defendant is domiciled outside the EU
627
.  
Such provision is recalled under Article 6, which applies to employment con-
tracts pursuant to Article 20, paragraph 1. This means that a court of a Member 
State may establish its jurisdiction on the basis of the jurisdictional rules of the 
Brussels I bis Regulation in all disputes involving an employee, regardless of the 
domicile of the other party.  
Article 20, paragraph 1 also refers to the applicability of the special jurisdic-
tion rule under which in disputes arising out of the operations of a branch, agency 
or other establishment, the defendant domiciled in an EU Member State may be 
sued in the courts for the place where the branch, agency or other establishment is 
situated. Moreover, paragraph 2 extends it to cases in which the employer is not 
domiciled in an EU Member State, but has a branch, agency or other establish-
ment in one of the Member States
628
. The employer is thus deemed to be domi-
ciled in that Member State. In other words, the place where the secondary seat of 
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  On the application to non-EU-domiciled defendants see S.M. CARBONE, C.E. TUO, Il nuovo 
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  On the case of an embassy, see Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 19 July 2012, 
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Argelia, in Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Marzo 2013), Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 254-272, 
available at www.uc3m.es/cdt. 
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the employer is situated has relevance to determining jurisdiction only when the 
employer is not domiciled in an EU Member State.  
Lastly, Article 20, paragraph 1 introduces the possibility for an employee to 
bring actions against multiple defendants in the employment area by virtue of Ar-
ticle 8, point 1. An employer domiciled in a Member State may also be sued in the 
courts for the place where any one of the co-defendants is domiciled, provided 
that the close connection among the claims at the procedural as well as substan-
tive levels
629
 renders hearing and determining them together expedient, thus 
avoiding the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings. 
Such mechanism is aimed at the proper administration of justice and procedural 
economy
630
. This possibility existed under the 1968 Brussels Convention, and its 
reinsertion
631
 into the Brussels I bis Regulation contributes towards benefiting the 
employee who wishes to bring proceedings against joint employers established in 
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  M.E. ANCELP, Derived special jurisdiction (Art. 8), in A. DICKINSON, E. LEIN (eds.), The 
Brussels I Regulation Recast, cit., pp. 183-194, spec. p. 187 ff.; J.-J. KUIPERS, Schemes of Ar-
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allow for a consolidation of actions pursuant to Article 6(1). With respect to employment con-
tracts, it should be reflected to what extent it might be appropriate to allow for a consolidation 
of actions pursuant to Article 6(1)». 
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different Member States
632
. The collective dimension is, however, referred only to 
the defendant party
633
.  
This reference was argued to be in contrast to what the Court of Justice held 
in the Glaxosmithkline case of 2008
634
, where it adopted a literal interpretation of 
the wording of the provision under Article 18 of the Brussels I Regulation, which 
did not mention Article 6, point 1 (now Article 8, point 1)
635
, and that, otherwise, 
it would have been contrary to the strict interpretation that must be afforded to 
derogation rules
636
. Thus, the Court stated that an employee could not rely on that 
provision to join a second defendant to the proceedings. Differently, the same aim 
of sound administration of justice would imply that both employees and employ-
ers could rely on that Article
637
. However, in the Court’s opinion, the consequenc-
es of such an application would affect the objective of the protection of the weak-
er party to an employment contract
638
, even if, based on a teleological approach 
and in light of the Brussels regime, it should have been granted
639
. 
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ers, see R. CAFARI PANICO, Enhancing protection for weaker parties, cit., pp. 49-50. An em-
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  Ibidem, para. 28. 
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  Ibidem, para. 29. 
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In relation to the Brussels Convention, as stated in the Kalfelis judgment of 
1987
640
, the Court added the important condition that all claims should be so 
closely connected that it is expedient to determine them together in order to avoid 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings
641
. This requirement 
was then incorporated within the text of the 2001 Regulation, but has caused diffi-
culty in the case law ever since. The criterion of the claims being closely connect-
ed is purpose-related with the aim of preventing the irreconcilability of judgments 
if the claims were determined separately
642
.  
In the Roche case of 2006 the Court pointed out that to affirm that decisions 
may be regarded as contradictory, it is not sufficient that there is a divergence in 
the outcome of the dispute: that divergence must also arise in the context of the 
same situation of law and fact
643
. 
The Court intervened to clarify whether this rule applies when actions brought 
against a number of defendants before the courts for the place where any one of 
them is domiciled have different legal bases, that is to say when one is contractual 
in nature, while the other is based on tort. In the Freeport case of 2007
644
, the 
Court ruled that from the wording of Article 6, point 1 of Regulation No. 44/2001 
(now Article 8, point 1 of the Brussels I bis Regulation), it is not apparent that the 
                                                                                                                                                               
ular protection to an employee in a situation such as Mr Rouard’s since, as a claimant before 
the national courts, there is no rule of jurisdiction available to him that is more favourable 
than the general rule laid down in Article 2, point 1, of the Regulation». See M.E. ANCELP, 
Derived special jurisdiction (Art. 8), cit., pp. 186-187.  
639
  In favour of the extension of Article 6, point 1 of the Brussels I Regulation was Advocate 
General Poiares Maduro, see its opinion delivered on 17 January 2008, Case C-462/06, Glax-
osmithkline, cit., EU:C:2008:22. 
640
  Court of Justice, judgment of 27 September 1988, Case 189/87, Athanasios Kalfelis v 
Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst and Co. and others, EU:C:1988:459. 
641
  Ibidem, para. 13.  
642
  M.E. ANCELP, Derived special jurisdiction (Art. 8), cit., pp. 187-188. 
643
  Court of Justice, judgment of 13 July 2006, Case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV and Others 
v Frederick Primus and Milton Goldenberg, EU:C:2006:458, spec. para. 26. 
644
  Court of Justice, judgment of 11 October 2007, Case C-98/06, Freeport plc v Olle Ar-
noldsson, EU:C:2007:595. On this case see M.E. ANCELP, Derived special jurisdiction (Art. 
8), cit., p. 191. 
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conditions thereof include a requirement that the actions brought against different 
defendants should have identical legal bases
645
. The assessment should focus on 
the existence of a connection between the various claims brought by the same 
plaintiff against different defendants, and on whether such connection implies that 
it is expedient to determine those actions together in order to avoid the risk of ir-
reconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings
646
. The legal bases of 
said actions may be considered among the factors that the national courts must as-
sess for the opportunity to join various claims, if appropriate, although this is not 
necessary
647
. 
As specified by the Court in the Painer case of 2011
648
, assuming that a dif-
ference in the legal basis of the actions brought against the various defendants 
does not in itself preclude joining the claims against multiple defendants, this is 
even more true when the national laws on which the actions against the various 
defendants are based are substantially identical
649
.  
The provision of Article 8, point 1 is to be interpreted narrowly, given that it 
provides for a derogation from the general rule. In any case, the recourse to such 
provision is evaluated by the national courts case by case. So, Member States 
have a measure of autonomy in determining whether claims are sufficiently con-
nected for the purposes of Article 8, point 1
650
.  
Moreover, the disadvantages of its application to the co-defendant may be put 
forward whenever this proves that the claimant has brought the anchor claim in a 
                                                          
645
  Court of Justice, judgment of 11 October 2007, Freeport, cit., para. 38. 
646
  Ibidem, para. 39. 
647
  Ibidem, para. 41. 
648
  Court of Justice, judgment of 1 December 2011, Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v Stand-
ard VerlagsGmbH and Others, EU:C:2011:798. 
649
  Ibidem, para. 82 and para. 83, where the Court concluded that «In the light of the foregoing 
considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 6(1) of Regulation No 44/2001 
must be interpreted as not precluding its application solely because actions against several de-
fendants for substantially identical copyright infringements are brought on national legal 
grounds which vary according to the Member States concerned. It is for the referring court to 
assess, in the light of all the elements of the case, whether there is a risk of irreconcilable 
judgments if those actions were determined separately». 
650
  M.E. ANCELP, Derived special jurisdiction (Art. 8), cit., p. 190. 
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country with the sole object of depriving him of his natural forum by demonstrat-
ing clear evidence of collusion or abuse. National courts may investigate the good 
faith of the claimant and interpret the close connection differently
651
. 
The purpose of safeguarding the position of the weaker party in the employ-
ment contract is fulfilled by the following provision under Article 22, paragraph 1, 
according to which an employer may bring proceedings only before the courts of 
the Member State where the employee is domiciled
652
. As an exception, paragraph 
2 thereof specifies that a counter-claim promoted by the employer may be brought 
before the courts of the State where the original claim is instituted under Section 5 
(either in the habitual place of work or in the place of business)
653
. 
In line with the objective pursued by the protective provisions in favour of 
employees, Article 23 provides for the possibility to conclude an agreement on the 
choice of the forum. The conditions required therein clearly benefit the weaker 
party by establishing that such agreement may be entered into after the dispute has 
arisen or, if it was concluded beforehand, may allow the employee to sue the em-
ployer before the courts of a State other than those on which the rules under Sec-
tion 5 confer jurisdiction. «The effect of the agreement is thus not to exclude the 
jurisdiction of the latter courts but to extend the employee’s possibility of choos-
ing between several courts with jurisdiction»
654
. This is again based on the favor 
lavoratoris principle
655
. As affirmed in Recital No. 19, the autonomy of the par-
ties to an employment contract to determine the courts having jurisdiction is lim-
ited. It is clearly aimed at protecting the employee against contractual clauses es-
tablishing the jurisdiction of the courts of a Member State other than those deter-
mined under Section 5. As the Court of Justice held in the Mahamdia case of 
                                                          
651
  Ibidem, p. 191. 
652
  S.M. CARBONE, C.E. TUO, Il nuovo spazio giudiziario europeo in materia civile e commercia-
le, cit., p. 176. Employees may be sued before the courts of their domicile solely if it is locat-
ed in one EU Member State. 
653
  Similar to Article 8(3), but wider because no requirement for the counterclaim to be related to 
the same contract or facts is provided. On this aspect see L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Indi-
vidual Contracts of Employment, cit., p. 251. 
654
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 19 July 2012, Mahamdia, cit., para. 62. 
655
  See L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of Employment, cit., pp. 252-253. 
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2012, «it does not follow either from the wording or from the purpose of Article 
21 of Regulation No 44/2001 that such an agreement may not confer jurisdiction 
on the courts of a third State, provided that it does not exclude the jurisdiction 
conferred on the basis of the articles of the regulation»
656
. Thus, an agreement on 
jurisdiction concluded before a dispute arises is effective «in so far as it gives the 
employee the possibility of bringing proceedings, not only before the courts ordi-
narily having jurisdiction under the special rules in Articles 18 and 19 of that reg-
ulation, but also before other courts, which may include courts outside the Euro-
pean Union»
657
. Indeed, in order to protect the employee as the weaker party to 
the contract, the jurisdiction of the courts determined under the special rules, even 
if alternative, could not be ousted by a choice of court agreement
658
. 
As to the prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, its paragraph 4 states 
that agreements or provisions of a trust instrument conferring jurisdiction do not 
have legal force if they are contrary to Article 23, or if the courts whose jurisdic-
tion they purport to exclude have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 24. To 
assess the substantive validity of the agreement, Article 25, paragraph 1 refers to 
the national conflict of laws rules of the Member State whose court has been cho-
sen. Thus, there is no uniform conflict of laws rule within the EU regarding the 
law applicable to the substantive validity of jurisdiction agreements. Forum-
selection agreements providing for the jurisdiction of a court of a third State are 
accordingly governed by national rules. 
Measures of protection applicable to employees enshrined in the Brussels I 
Recast Regulation also relate to tacit prorogation (Article 26, paragraph 2), lis 
pendens (Article 31, paragraph 4), and the violation of special grounds of jurisdic-
tion (Article 45, paragraph 1(e))
659
.  
When the employee is the defendant, the court shall, before assuming jurisdic-
tion under paragraph 1 of Article 26, which states that the courts before which a 
defendant enters an appearance have jurisdiction, ensure that the defendant is in-
                                                          
656
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 19 July 2012, Mahamdia, cit., para. 65. 
657
  Ibidem, para. 66. 
658
  Ibidem, para. 64. On this point see L. MERRETT, Jurisdiction over Individual Contracts of 
Employment, cit., p. 253. 
659
  That is further analysed in this Chapter, para. 5.4. 
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formed of his right to contest the jurisdiction of the court and of the consequences 
of entering or not entering an appearance. This is an obligation upon the courts to 
inform the employee in order to avoid abuse or strategies prejudicing his rights. 
Under Article 31, paragraph 4, within the lis pendens mechanism, the priority 
rule in favour of the chosen court does not apply when a weaker party is a claim-
ant, and the choice of court agreement is invalid under the provisions of the Regu-
lation. Indeed, as a general rule, in case the court chosen pursuant to an agreement 
is seised, any court of another Member State shall stay the proceedings until the 
court seised on the basis of the agreement declares its lack of jurisdiction under 
that agreement. To the contrary, if it grounds jurisdiction, the other court shall de-
cline jurisdiction in favour of that court. However, when weaker parties are con-
cerned, for the operability of said Article 31, it is required that the claimant is the 
weaker party (e.g. the employee) and the agreement is not valid under Article 23. 
In light of the above considerations, the rules on jurisdiction over individual 
employment contracts are established to protect the weaker position of the em-
ployee against the employer. In any case, the interpretation of the connecting fac-
tors requires a relative approach on the basis of a circumstantial method, taking 
into account the scheme and aims pursued by the Regulation.  
Jurisdictional rules’ function and practical operability have been questioned, 
and suggestions for amendments have been put forward. 
Based on the practical application of the residual criterion of the engaging 
place of business, it has been argued that it is «generally neither logical nor in the 
interest of the employee, as there will often be no real connection between that 
engaging place of business and the day-to-day work»
660
. Such ground shall be re-
placed with the place of business which gives the employee daily instructions on 
the work to be carried out, thus ensuring the connection between the courts having 
jurisdiction and the actual employment relationship, whenever the habitual place 
of work cannot be determined
661
. In this way, the proposed head of jurisdiction 
fulfils the principles of predictability, certainty and proximity. 
                                                          
660
  On this issue see U. GRUŠIĆ, Jurisdiction in employment matters under Brussels I: a reas-
sessment, cit., spec. p. 108 ff. 
661
  R. CAFARI PANICO, Enhancing protection for weaker parties, cit., p. 44 ff. and p. 57. 
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The coincidence between forum and ius may also be questioned in so far as it 
does not grant a high level of protection. In light of the entry into force of the 
Brussels I Recast Regulation, observations have been raised by the Committee on 
Legal Affairs of the European Parliament, which presented a motion for a Resolu-
tion in September 2013
662
 that was then adopted in October 2013. It pointed out 
the necessity of ensuring coherence between the rules governing jurisdiction and 
the law applicable to a dispute in employment matters
663
. According to the Ex-
planatory Statement accompanying the above-mentioned motion for a European 
Parliament resolution
664
, the principle of effectively protecting employees in-
volved both in a collective and individual dimension needs to be pursued by 
providing that «a Member State should have jurisdiction over disputes in which its 
own employment law is applicable. Jurisdiction and applicable law should be that 
of the same Member State, in so far as possible». To improve the current system a 
«link between jurisdiction over employment disputes and the legal system appli-
cable to the employment contract» must be ensured. 
In that respect, the European Parliament thus called on the Commission to as-
sess whether the existing legal framework takes sufficient account of the speciali-
ties of employment relationships
665
. In particular, it underlined that with regard to 
disputes arising under individual employment contracts, the court with the closest 
connection to the case should have jurisdiction
666
. To that effect, in its opinion, 
the courts for the place of business from which the employee receives day-to-day 
instructions should be competent rather than the courts of the place where the 
business which engaged the employee is or was situated
667
.  
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  See Committee on Legal Affairs, Rapporteur: Evelyn Regner, Report of 20 September 2013 
on improving private international law: jurisdiction rules applicable to employment, 
(2013/2023(INI)), A7-0291/2013. All EP documents are available at 
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  European Parliament Resolution of 8 October 2013 on improving private international law: 
jurisdiction rules applicable to employment (P7_TA(2013)0396). For a comment see R. 
CAFARI PANICO, Enhancing protection for weaker parties, cit., spec. p. 55 ff. 
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  Report of 20 September 2013, cit. 
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  European Parliament Resolution of 8 October 2013, cit., point 5. 
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  Ibidem, letters D, F, H and L. 
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  Ibidem, point 6(b). 
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As a follow up
668
 to the European Parliament’s initiative, the Commission 
stated that the need to improve jurisdictional rules will be assessed only on the ba-
sis of the practical application of the Regulation in employment matters
669
.  
 
b) Posted workers’ employment contracts. 
Alongside the protective rules provided in the Brussels I bis Regulation in re-
lation to individual employment contracts, pursuant to its Article 67, provisions 
on specific matters contained in instruments of the Union or in national legislation 
harmonised pursuant to such instruments may apply as lex specialis.  
In cases involving workers posted temporarily abroad, an alternative forum is 
provided by Article 6 of Directive 96/71 on the posting of workers
670
. In order to 
enforce the right to the terms and conditions of employment guaranteed in Article 
3 of the Directive, in addition to the grounds of jurisdiction set out in Section 5 of 
the Brussels I bis Regulation
671
, a posted worker may bring proceedings before 
the courts of the Member State in whose territory he is or was posted. Therefore, 
disputes arising out of the employment relationship between the employee moved 
abroad and his employer, which is seated in the home State, may be heard by the 
                                                          
668
  Follow up to the European Parliament Resolution on improving private international law: ju-
risdiction rules applicable to employment, adopted by the Commission on 29 January 2014, 
SP(2014)61, in Procedure file No. 2013/2023(INI), available at www.europarl.europa.eu.  
669
  Other issues were touch upon, notably industrial actions, described below. 
670
  Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, in OJ L 18 
of 21 January 1997, pp. 1-6; see C. BARNARD, EU Employment Law, Oxford, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012, pp. 235-237; see further supra Chapter 3, para. 3.2. According to Article 2, 
para. 1 «‘posted worker’ means a worker who, for a limited period, carries out his work in the 
territory of a Member State other than the State in which he normally works», that must be 
read jointly with Article 3, para. 6 that specifies that «the length of the posting shall be calcu-
lated on the basis of a reference period of one year from the beginning of the posting» (em-
phasis added). 
671
  Article 6 provides that «In order to enforce the right to the terms and conditions of employ-
ment guaranteed in Article 3, judicial proceedings may be instituted in the Member State in 
whose territory the worker is or was posted, without prejudice, where applicable, to the right, 
under existing international conventions on jurisdiction, to institute proceedings in another 
State». 
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courts of the host State where the worker carries or carried out work activities 
temporarily. Such disputes could concern the employer with which the employ-
ment contract is concluded, or the hosting employer with which no contract is 
concluded, but which is in any case obliged to observe its own national legislation 
applicable to the work.  
The question is on which basis the employee can choose the most suitable, 
and the most favourable, courts for litigation. This decision is based on the fact 
that the worker must seek the higher level of protection depending on the alleged 
violations. In case of violations of work terms and conditions, as established by 
Directive 96/71, the most appropriate court could be that for the place where the 
employee is posted, because this court knows its own national legislation better 
and may therefore enforce such rights. Differently, with a view to enforcing the 
judgment in the State of origin, the courts of this State may be chosen by the post-
ed worker. However, concerns may regard the law applicable to the merits, be-
cause this is likely to be the law of the host State
672
. 
The alternative provided for posted workers is aimed at offering an option to 
choose the most favourable courts, thus facilitating access to justice in favour of 
the weaker party.  
Similar to that ground, Article 11, paragraph 1 of Directive 2014/67 on the en-
forcement of the Directive on the posting of workers
673
, allows posted workers to 
bring proceedings in the courts of the host State, even though they moved there 
only temporarily. In particular, this Article on the defence of rights requires the 
Member States to ensure that there are effective mechanisms for posted workers 
to lodge complaints against their employers directly, as well as the right to insti-
tute judicial or administrative proceedings. It then specifies that such actions may 
be brought «also in the Member State in whose territory the workers are or were 
posted, where such workers consider they have sustained loss or damage as a re-
                                                          
672
  In accordance with Article 3 of Directive 96/71; see further in this Chapter, para. 5.3. 
673
  Directive 2014/67/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the 
enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of 
the provision of services and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative co-
operation through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’), in OJ L 
159 of 28 May 2014, pp. 11-31. 
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sult of a failure to apply the applicable rules, even after the relationship in which 
the failure is alleged to have occurred has ended». 
The situation of posted workers has been addressed in view of the increasing 
labour mobility. The general connecting factor of the habitual place of work estab-
lished in the Brussels system is also applicable in the determination of the compe-
tent courts over posted workers’ employment contracts. Indeed, according to a 
wide interpretation, this is the principal place of work, which remains unchanged 
when the employee temporarily works abroad within the posting in the transna-
tional provision of services framework
674
. This is true because posted workers are 
not included under Article 21, paragraph 1 (b)(i) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. 
It seems undisputed that the courts of the place where the employee habitually 
carries out the work remain competent, even though the employee is temporarily 
posted in another Member State
675
. This is confirmed by the provision under Arti-
cle 6 of Directive 96/71, which provides for an (additional) alternative forum, that 
is the courts for the place where the worker is or was posted, in cases of disputes 
and claims for respect of work terms and conditions provided by the law of the 
host State.  
As noticed above
676
, the jurisdictional rule contained in the framework on 
posted workers has been interpreted as the consequence of the duty to apply the 
mandatory employment provisions of the host State, that is imposed only upon the 
host State itself. Nevertheless, in practice, difficulties in instituting legal proceed-
ings in the host country may be faced by posted workers, such as language barri-
ers and unfamiliarity with the legal system. Looking at other available fora, they 
may bring actions before the courts of their home State where the employer is 
domiciled in accordance with Article 21 of the Brussels I bis Regulation. The 
home State, however, does not have the duty to apply the protective standards 
provided by the host State law
677
. 
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  R. CAFARI PANICO, Enhancing protection for weaker parties, cit., p. 62. 
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  Ibidem. 
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  See supra in Chapter 3, para. 3.2. 
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  M. FORNASIER, Employment, Posting of Workers, in J. BASEDOW, G. RÜHL, F. FERRARI, P. DE 
MIGUEL ASENSIO (edited by), Encyclopedia of Private International Law, Cheltenham, UK, 
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5.2.1. Heads of jurisdiction for cross-border collective redress. 
 
c) Collective redress. 
The Brussels I Recast Regulation does not provide specific rules concerning 
jurisdiction over cross-border collective redress in general
678
 or for specific mat-
ters such as employment. As argued, given the nature of collective redress proce-
dures, which represent collective strength and assemble individuals to act more 
effectively, they do not feature a typically weaker party in a natural person’s indi-
vidual capacity, and they do fundamentally change the inequality of litigation 
power between the contracting parties
679
. This is likely to be the reason why col-
lective procedures are not covered by the Regulation, which was conceived only 
for individual disputes.  
Currently, the absence of any special provision in the Brussels I bis Regula-
tion for collective redress procedures implies that related claims should be treated 
(by analogy) in the same way as the actions falling within its scope of application. 
Nevertheless, the peculiar features characterising collective proceedings will give 
                                                          
678
  P. MANKOWSKI, P. NIELSEN, Introduction to Articles 17-19, in U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI 
(edited by), European Commentaries on Private International Law. Brussels Ibis Regulation, 
cit., pp. 450-451, spec. p. 450; on private international law issues, mainly with regard to con-
sumers’ protection, see S. BARIATTI, Le azioni collettive dell’art. 140-bis del codice del con-
sumo: aspetti di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, in Rivista di diritto internazio-
nale privato e processuale, 2011, No. 1, pp. 19-54; L. CARBALLO PIÑEIRO, Las acciones co-
lectivas y su eficacia extraterritorial. Problemas de recepción y transplante de las class ac-
tions en europa, Santiago de Compostela, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, 2009, pp. 
105-113. European Parliament resolution of 7 September 2010 on the implementation and re-
view of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and en-
forcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (2009/2140(INI)), 
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redress instruments may need to contemplate special jurisdiction rules for collective actions». 
Collective redress proceedings were taken into account within the Proposal for a Regulation, 
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further in this Chapter, para. 5.4. 
679
  Z.S. TANG, Consumer Collective Redress in European Private International Law, in Journal 
of Private International Law, 2011, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 101-147, spec. p. 107, who pointed out 
that «collective redress has not obtained the blessing of a special rule». 
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rise to some specific jurisdictional issues in the European context
680
. Whether the 
Brussels regime is suitable and thus adequately allocates jurisdiction for collective 
redress has been questioned. 
As a preliminary remark, it should be recalled that collective redress presents 
different requirements among EU Member States, which may vary widely as to 
substantive as well as procedural aspects, e.g. the constitution of the collective 
procedures, and the effect of collective judgments, which may have consequences 
in terms of protection of fundamental rights, such as access to justice and fair trial. 
When dealing with collective proceedings, transnational implications may occur 
when the group consists of members coming from different Member States, or 
when the home State of some class members is different from the one in which 
the defendant is domiciled.  
On the basis of the Brussels regime, the general rule and the special rules of-
fer the claimants various available fora. In practice, to institute collective proceed-
ings (in a broader sense, thus comprising representative actions or group actions), 
the plaintiff would have to consider the legal costs, the possible amount that could 
be awarded, as well as the legal issues related to the applicable procedural and 
substantive laws. 
First, the general rule of the forum rei under Article 4 of the Brussels I bis 
Regulation may be applied to collective proceedings
681
. Regardless of the Mem-
ber States from which the claimants come, the action may be brought before the 
courts of the State where the defendant is domiciled. In this way, however, the 
members of different States may encounter problems because of higher costs, 
                                                          
680
  M. DANOV, The Brussels I Regulation: cross-border collective redress proceedings and 
judgments, in Journal of Private International Law, 2010, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 359-393, spec. p. 
364 ff. 
681
  For an analysis see E. LEIN, Cross-border collective redress and jurisdiction under Brussels 
I: a mismatch, cit., spec. p. 133 f.; M. DANOV, The Brussels I Regulation: cross-border col-
lective redress proceedings and judgments, cit., p. 365.  
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complex and lengthy procedures, unfamiliarity with foreign proceedings and leg-
islation, that disincentivise participation in the collective procedure
682
. 
Second, the resort to special or protective grounds for jurisdiction may also be 
considered
683
. The rules related to contracts, torts, branches and multi-defendants 
may be relevant in respect of collective redress actions brought by a plaintiff class 
under the Brussels system. 
With exclusive regard to disputes arising out of employment contracts, in the 
case of no choice of courts agreement, under Section 5 of the Brussels I bis Regu-
lation, the available fora may be the place of the employer’s domicile, the place of 
habitual work, the last place of habitual work or, failing that, the engaging place 
of business. From a practical perspective, claimants prefer to bring proceedings in 
the State where they carry out their working activities, as the employment contract 
is often governed by the law of that State. In this way, the coincidence between 
forum and ius is achieved.  
Even if the peculiarities of collective redress are not governed by the Brussels 
system, the idea of collective litigation is not new
684
. Indeed, as described above, 
certain provisions address the case of multiple defendants (Article 8, point 1, ap-
plicable in employment matters pursuant to Article 20, paragraph 1) and the pos-
sibility of joining related actions under Article 30.  
The last provision allows the consolidation of related actions that are pending 
in the courts of different Member States
685
. Under paragraph 3 of Article 30, ac-
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  In relation to consumers collective litigation, see the problems outlined by the Commission in 
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  M. DANOV, The Brussels I Regulation: cross-border collective redress proceedings and 
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684
  B. HESS, A coherent approach to European collective redress, in D. FAIRGRIEVE, E. LEIN (ed-
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tions are related when «they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear 
and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments result-
ing from separate proceedings». In the Tatry judgment of 1994
686
, related actions 
under Article 22 of the Brussels Convention (now Article 30 of the Brussels I Re-
cast Regulation) were interpreted by affirming that in order to achieve the proper 
administration of justice, the interpretation of that Article «must be broad and 
cover all cases where there is a risk of conflicting decisions, even if the judgments 
can be separately enforced and their legal consequences are not mutually exclu-
sive»
687
. In such cases, the court second seised may stay its proceedings. When 
the court first seised has jurisdiction over the actions in question and its law per-
mits the consolidation thereof, any other court may also decline its jurisdiction. 
This mechanism is aimed at preventing contradictory judgments in case all the ac-
tions may be brought before the same courts having jurisdiction over all of them.  
In light of the foregoing, in the absence of any specific provisions, it may be 
deemed appropriate to determine the courts having jurisdiction on the grounds es-
tablished in the Brussels I bis Regulation, depending on the merits of the disputes. 
Therefore, when a group of workers wish to sue their employer, they may rely on 
the general rule under Article 4, as well as on the protective grounds under Sec-
tion 5. Given the alternative nature of those heads of jurisdiction, the most favour-
able option should be in line with the connecting factor provided for the determi-
nation of the law applicable to the merits of the litigation. In any case, such argu-
ment may be acceptable at a practical level, but not from an interpretative per-
spective based on the aims and functions of the Regulation itself. 
An important question arising in relation to collective redress proceedings re-
gards the opportunity of the association, organisation, trade union or other similar 
                                                                                                                                                               
STEFANELLI, Parallel litigation and cross-border collective actions under the Brussels I 
framework: lessons from abroad, in D. FAIRGRIEVE, E. LEIN (edited by), Extraterritoriality 
and collective redress, cit., pp. 143-170, spec. p. 162 ff. 
686
  Court of Justice, judgment of 6 December 1994, Case C-406/92, The owners of the cargo 
lately laden on board the ship “Tatry” v the owners of the ship “Maciej Rataj”, 
EU:C:1994:400. 
687
  Ibidem, para. 53. Similarly, see Court of Justice, judgment of 13 July 2006, Roche, cit., para. 
20 ff. 
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entity to rely on the special grounds of jurisdiction established for individuals in 
matters related to an employment contract.  
In support of the identification of the proper fora available for collective re-
dress promoted by a group of (represented) workers with transnational implica-
tions, considerations and interpretations pointed out in relation to consumer pro-
tection and the related special fora provided in the Regulation may prove useful. 
It has been argued that associations acting on behalf of consumers are not nat-
ural persons because they have their own locus standi, and thus actions promoted 
by them do not fall within the scope of the Brussels I bis Regulation since this 
mainly concerns individual disputes. Consequently, the consumer fora are not 
open to associations or other entities acting in support of them or on their be-
half
688
. 
A representative action instituted on behalf of other consumers (by a repre-
sentative that is a consumer itself) has been considered to be a kind of intermedi-
ate role between truly individual claims and collective redress. The representative 
claimant may rely on the special fora, provided that the other consumers on whose 
behalf the representative is acting, are identified or identifiable
689
.  
The Henkel case of 2002
690
 is significant in relation to this issue. The Court 
affirmed that «a legal person which acts as assignee of the rights of a private final 
consumer, without itself being party to a contract between a professional and a 
private individual, cannot be regarded as a consumer within the meaning of the 
Brussels Convention and therefore cannot invoke Articles 13 to 15 of that Con-
vention. That interpretation must also apply in respect of a consumer protection 
organisation such as the VKI which has brought an action as an association on be-
                                                          
688
  P. MANKOWSKI, P. NIELSEN, Introduction to Articles 17-19, cit., p. 451. 
689
  M. DANOV, The Brussels I Regulation: cross-border collective redress proceedings and 
judgments, cit., pp. 359, 376-377; Z.S. TANG, Consumer Collective Redress in European Pri-
vate International Law, cit., p. 115 ff. 
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 1 October 2002, Case C-167/00, Verein für Konsumenteninfor-
mation v Karl Heinz Henkel, EU:C:2002:555. 
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half of consumers»
691
. If a contract between the parties of the dispute does not ex-
ist
692, consumers’ special rules of jurisdiction may not be invoked.  
This finding was upheld by Advocate General Bobek in the Schrems case of 
2017
693
. In his opinion, he addressed the question of whether the forum actoris of 
the consumer under Article 16 of the Brussels I Regulation is applicable to as-
signees of consumer claims that are not themselves parties to a contract
694
. The 
exclusion of such a possibility is based on the following arguments. The wording 
of Articles 15 and 16 thereof clearly refer to the other party to a contract, and thus 
the special forum is always limited to the concrete and specific parties to the con-
tract
695
. Interpreting Article 16 as including claims made by a consumer (assignee) 
on the basis of consumer contracts concluded by other consumers would cut the 
logical link and enlarge the scope of the special head of jurisdiction beyond the 
cases explicitly provided for by those Articles
696
. The aim of the special head of 
jurisdiction relating to consumers is to protect a person in his capacity as a con-
sumer to a given contract. Conferring the special consumer forum on the basis of a 
claim emanating from a contract concluded by another person would weaken the 
link between the consumer status and a given contract, thus producing a paradoxi-
cal result
697
. Then, since Articles 15 and 16 are derogations from the general rule 
and the special rules for contracts, their interpretation must be narrow and should 
not be extended to include other situations
698
. 
As stated by the Court in the abovementioned Henkel judgment and in the 
former Shearson Lehman Hutton judgment
699
, the Advocate General pointed out 
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  Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 14 November 2017, Case C-498/16, Maxi-
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that the special consumer jurisdiction was not applicable to legal persons acting as 
assignees of the rights of a consumer because those legal persons (a private com-
pany and a consumers’ association) were not weaker parties and because those 
persons were not themselves parties to the contract
700
. Furthermore, he referred to 
the ruling in the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide case of 2015
701
, according to which the 
Court declared that in relation to Article 5, point 3 of Regulation No. 44/2001 «the 
transfer of claims by the initial creditor cannot, by itself, have an impact on the 
determination of the court having jurisdiction. As a consequence, (…) the re-
quirement for the application of that head of jurisdiction (the location of the harm-
ful event) must be assessed for each claim for damages independently of any sub-
sequent assignment or consolidation»
702
. With regard to the Schrems case, he then 
argued that in the absence of any contractual relationship between the assignee 
and the other party to the original contract, the special consumer fora could not be 
invoked, nor could the creation of a new forum for the assignee-consumer be 
sought
703
. As to the application of the consumer forum to the assignee, contrary to 
what the Commission argued in its opinion with a view to protecting consumers 
residing within the same State, the Advocate General held that the local (internal) 
jurisdiction under Regulation No. 44/2001 (the competent courts are those of the 
place where the consumer is domiciled) may not be disregarded
704
 and that it even 
excludes the consolidation of claims of other consumers domiciled in the same 
country. Notwithstanding, a new special jurisdiction may be internally provided 
for by the national law
705
. It was then recognised that the Brussels I Regulation 
does not provide for specific provisions on the assignment of claims or collective 
redress procedures, and that judicial legislation would be inappropriate
706
.  
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The Court delivered its judgment on 25 January 2018
707
 and upheld the find-
ings of the Advocate General. First, it agreed with the interpretation given to the 
notion of consumer for the purposes of social media platforms
708
. Consequently, it 
acknowledged the derogative nature of the special provisions related to individual 
contracts of employment, that must be interpreted narrowly
709
 and that the neces-
sary existence of a contractual link between the parties in the disputes serves to 
ensure the predictability of the forum actoris
710
. Second, as to the assignment of 
claims, in line with its previous case law, the Court held that the consumer cannot 
bring the assigned claims within the jurisdiction of the courts of the place of his 
domicile. Situations other than those provided by the Regulation cannot be in-
cluded in its scope of application. Thus, «an assignment of claims cannot provide 
the basis for a new specific forum for a consumer to whom those claims have been 
assigned»
711
, regardless the other consumers are domiciled in the same Member 
State, in another EU Member State or in a third country
712
. Finally, the Court did 
not refer to any possible forum for assigned claims that may be established under 
national law and that may nevertheless be in compliance with the objectives of the 
Regulation. It might have assumed that it is for the national procedural law of the 
courts having jurisdiction on the basis of a general (defendant’s domicile) or spe-
cial (consumer’s domicile) ground to allow the consolidation of claims or the es-
tablishment of a collective redress procedure. From a first appraisal, the European 
judges seem to have limited their ruling to the referred questions by strictly inter-
preting the Brussels provisions, without addressing the issue of collective litiga-
tion, in particular the collective redress procedure and the related jurisdictional is-
sues. This presumably relies on the fact that, in accordance with the lex fori, the 
case in the main proceedings was not regarded as a collective redress, but as an 
assignment of claims, which has already been defined by the Court.  
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To sum up, the Regulation does not cover collective redress, nor may the pro-
vided heads of jurisdiction be extended to situations other than those to which it 
refers. In cases of the assignment of claims, the special provisions may not be in-
voked because they are not covered by the Regulation.  
Could it be different when a representative, an organisation or another entity 
is engaged to lodge a collective complaint on the basis of a mandate? Within EU 
law, Regulation No. 2016/679 on consumer data protection provides for the right 
to bring an action of organisations or other similar entities (not-for-profit) on be-
half of other members when it is based on the data subject’s mandate713.  
In light of these considerations, moving to the employment field, the determi-
nation of the forum for a European collective redress may not be based on Section 
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  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
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95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protec-
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such data, in OJ L 281 of 23 November 1995, pp. 31-50, whose Article 22 provides that 
«Member States shall provide for the right of every person to a judicial remedy for any 
breach of the rights guaranteed him by the national law applicable to the processing in ques-
tion». The question on whether this provision (jointly with Articles 23 and 24 thereof) allows 
public-service associations to take action against the infringer in the event of an infringement 
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Request for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf (Germany) lodged on 
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5. In cases in which, under national laws, the associations of workers are empow-
ered to act on their behalf or in support of them, including foreign members, a 
workers’ collective redress may be legitimately instituted. However, in the ab-
sence of a choice of forum, those associations may not rely on the special grounds 
of jurisdiction for disputes arising out of the employment contract.  
Under a systematic and teleological interpretation of the Regulation, the ex-
tension of jurisdiction grounds that are identified only in relation to the individual 
dimension of civil and commercial disputes is prevented. It may not suffice to in-
terpret the existing fora in order to determine the courts having jurisdiction over 
cross-border collective redress falling within the respective field
714
. This context 
underpins the need to identify uniform European rules on jurisdiction governing 
the collective dimension, when national laws do not provide otherwise.  
 
d) Collective redress involving posted workers. 
With a view to addressing all the different scenarios concerning labour dis-
putes, due to the increasing and actual implications arising from labour mobility, 
collective redress procedures may involve employees who are or were posted in 
one Member State. Disputes may regard claims against the posting employer 
brought by posted workers in the host country or in the Member State of origin.  
According to the legal framework on the posting of workers, the head of ju-
risdiction available to posted employees is the alternative ground established un-
der Article 6 of Directive 96/71. As already noted, the collective dimension has 
not been taken into account, except for the provision in Article 11, paragraph 3 of 
the Enforcement Directive 2014/67, which requires the Member States to ensure 
that trade unions and other third parties, such as associations, organisations and 
other legal entities, may engage, on behalf or in support of the posted workers or 
their employer, with their approval, in any judicial or administrative proceedings. 
This is indeed significant for the promotion of collective mechanisms of protec-
tion and enforcement of workers’ rights. Though no requirements are provided 
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apart from compliance with the national rules of procedure, this may cause diffi-
culties from the point of view of the worker who wishes to promote or join a col-
lective redress.  
The question of whether the actions of trade unions (or other entities) on be-
half or in support of posted workers against the posting employer fall within the 
scope of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, specifically under its Section 5, has 
been argued
715
. In light of the considerations reported above as to actions promot-
ed by consumers’ associations, workers’ unions similarly may not rely on protec-
tive grounds set forth in the Brussels regime, because such reliance would require 
an extension of their scope of application.  
A particular situation may occur when a representative who is one of the indi-
vidual claimants (posted workers) himself is governed by the Brussels I Recast 
Regulation
716
. In this case, there is an employment relationship between the repre-
sentative and the defendant employer. The protective provisions shall thus apply 
to him. The question remains as to whether such a collective situation is legitimate 
under the applicable national law, or whether the claims shall be treated separate-
ly. This instance seems to be qualified differently from an assignment of claims, 
where lacking any contractual relationship between the assignee and the other par-
ty to the original contract, the protective grounds cannot be invoked, as stated in 
the Schrems case concerning consumers. 
In the absence of any European provision, the problems are related to differ-
ences in the national procedural legislations on organisations and collective pro-
cedures, which may or may not grant the possibility to act in support or on behalf 
of a group.  
 
e) Industrial actions. 
Not falling within the contractual area, in the employment context, forms of 
collective action include protests, demonstrations, strikes or industrial actions. 
Such actions are mainly aimed at giving voice to workers’ requests to respect the 
employment terms and conditions, to initiate collective negotiations or to con-
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clude collective agreements. The relevant aspect for the purposes of the present 
study is that these types of collective actions may be an issue closely connected to 
the contract, although not directly arising out of the contract or its individual 
clauses. A transnational collective action may affect the employment relationship 
due to the potential consequences regarding the regular exercise of work activities 
(because protests or strikes commonly imply the non-regular conduct of activi-
ties). As a result, the employer may face economic difficulties (damages and loss) 
that afflict its market economy. In this scenario, not only do questions related to 
contractual matters arise, but also extra-contractual issues related to the liability of 
the trade union, association or organisation involved, which imply solutions in 
terms of private international law
717
, although strike actions are primarily dealt 
with under national law. 
The competent authority shall be determined under Article 4 of the Brussels I 
bis Regulation on the basis of the general rule of the forum rei. However, a sup-
plementary head of jurisdiction is established by Article 7, point 2 in favour of the 
courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur
718
. In this re-
gard, the locus delicti commissi may concern the place of the harmful event (locus 
actus) or the place where the harmful event caused damages (locus damni)
719
. 
There is no specific conflict of jurisdictions provision concerning industrial ac-
tions, and thus the jurisdictional issues shall be assessed with regard to the related 
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disputes arising out of this kind of action, whether they are of contractual or extra-
contractual nature.  
As far as extra-contractual issues are concerned, in its Resolution of October 
2013
720
, the European Parliament underlined that the courts of the State where the 
industrial action is to be or has been taken shall have jurisdiction
721
. In particular, 
it requested the Commission to consider whether it is necessary to clarify, within 
the provision of Article 7, point 2 of the Brussels I bis Regulation, that in the 
event of an industrial action, the courts for the place where it is to be or has been 
taken are competent in accordance with Article 9 of the Rome II Regulation on 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations
722
.  
To that effect, the European Parliament referred to the Torline case of 2004
723
 
concerning the legality of a notice of industrial action given by SEKO (a Swedish 
trade union) against DFDS Torline A/S (a Danish shipowner), with the objective 
of securing a collective agreement for the Polish crew of the cargo ship Tor Cale-
donia, which was owned by DFDS and served the route between Göteberg (Swe-
den) and Harwich (United Kingdom). The Court was requested to interpret Article 
5, point 3 of the Brussels Convention. According to the Danish legal system, the 
jurisdiction to determine the legality of an industrial action and the jurisdiction to 
hear actions for damages for any consequential loss do not belong to the same na-
tional courts. Given that the object of the Brussels Convention is not the unifica-
tion of national procedural rules, but the determination of rules to identify which 
court has jurisdiction in disputes concerning civil and commercial matters in intra-
Community relations, and thus to facilitate the enforcement of judgments, such a 
distinction is accepted
724
. Maintaining that to obtain compensation for losses aris-
ing from industrial action which took place in one State, and for which a party 
                                                          
720
  European Parliament Resolution of 8 October 2013 on improving private international law: 
jurisdiction rules applicable to employment, cit. 
721
  Ibidem, letter K. 
722
  Ibidem, point 6(a). 
723
  Court of Justice, judgment of 5 February 2004, Case C-18/02, Danmarks Rederiforening, act-
ing on behalf of DFDS Torline A/S v LO Landsorganisationen i Sverige, acting on behalf of 
SEKO Sjöfolk Facket för Service och Kommunikation, EU:C:2004:74. 
724
  Ibidem, para. 23. 
216 
 
domiciled in another State is liable, a plaintiff would, first, have to bring proceed-
ings before a court of the State of the defendant’s domicile on the legality of the 
industrial action, and second, bring an action for damages before the courts of the 
place where the industrial actions occurred or should have occurred. This contra-
venes the principles of sound administration of justice, legal certainty and the 
avoidance of the multiplication of bases of jurisdiction as regards the same legal 
relationship, which the Court has repeatedly held to be objectives of the Brussels 
Convention
725
. In this regard, moreover, the Court affirmed that the application of 
Article 5, point 3 is not conditional on the actual occurrence of damage
726
. As al-
ready held in the Henkel case
727
, «the courts for the place where the harmful event 
occurred are usually the most appropriate for deciding the case, in particular on 
the grounds of proximity and ease of taking evidence, is equally relevant whether 
the dispute concerns compensation for damage which has already occurred or re-
lates to an action seeking to prevent the occurrence of damage»
728
. In conclusion, 
the definition of tort, delict or quasi-delict as grounds for a special jurisdiction 
may well comprise a case on the legality of an industrial action
729
. This rule is al-
so applicable whenever national rules of procedure provide that the competent 
court is a court other than the one having jurisdiction to try claims for compensa-
tion for the damage caused by that industrial action
730
. In the present case, the 
Danish court had validly grounded its jurisdiction on the legality of the industrial 
action taking place in Sweden. 
In light of this finding, the European Parliament noted that according to the 
then adopted Rome II Regulation, Swedish law would be applicable, and thus the 
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Danish court has jurisdiction, but it must apply Swedish law that is the law of the 
country where the action is to be, or has been, taken
731
. This paradoxical situation 
does seem to result in prejudice to the effective protection of workers’ rights. On 
the one hand, their constitutional right to act collectively may be limited and, on 
the other hand, the quality of justice may be reduced because the courts taking de-
cisions on the industrial action will have to apply a foreign law with which they 
are less familiar
732
. 
In the abovementioned follow-up of 2014
733
, the Commission acknowledged 
that the need for intervention on jurisdictional issues over industrial actions had 
not been pointed out within the preparatory work of the Draft Proposal. Difficul-
ties in interpretation may be resolved by the Court of Justice, and the suggestions 
of the Rapporteur could be a (supportive) element in the assessment.  
To be more precise, however, in the Draft Proposal, collective actions have 
been addressed by a recommendation for the introduction of Article 85 on the re-
spect for «the right of workers and employers, or their respective organisations, to 
engage in collective action to protect their interests, in particular the right or free-
dom to strike or to take other actions, in accordance with Union law and national 
law and practices». Though, this did not cover any private international law is-
sue
734
. 
In another case concerning an industrial action with transnational implica-
tions, the main proceedings were brought before the courts of the place where the 
defendant was domiciled. This occurred in the Viking case of 2007
735
. Viking, a 
company under Finnish law, brought an action before the High Court of Justice of 
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England and Wales, Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) (United King-
dom), requesting it to declare that the action taken by ITF, an international trade 
union seated in London, and FSU, a Finnish trade union, was contrary to Article 
43 of the EC Treaty, to order the withdrawal of the ITF circular and to order FSU 
not to infringe the rights which Viking enjoys under Community law. The deci-
sion granting those requests was then appealed before the Court of Appeal (Eng-
land and Wales) (Civil Division) (United Kingdom), that later referred to the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling on issues related to fundamental rights 
and economic freedoms. Jurisdiction was not challenged; however, considerations 
have been pointed out in the English judgments
736
.  
In the first instance, the English court noted that it had to adjudicate the case 
because «where jurisdiction is founded on the Brussels Regulation (or on its pre-
decessor, the Brussels Convention) the Court has no power to decline to exercise 
that jurisdiction on the ground that it would be more suitable for the dispute be-
tween the parties to be litigated before the courts of another state»
737
. Indeed, the 
forum non conveniens rule has no place in the Regulation, whose principles at-
tribute paramount importance to the certainty and predictability of jurisdictional 
rules
738
. It was then assumed that a conflict of jurisdictions would have arisen if 
the proceedings were instituted both in England and in Finland, on the basis of 
Article 2 of Brussels Regulation, as the ITF was seated in London, and on the ba-
sis of Article 6, point 1, because the Finnish trade union was one of a number of 
defendants to the same proceedings, respectively
739
. The solution should have 
been found in Article 27 concerning the lis pendens mechanism. Otherwise, irrec-
oncilable judgments could not have been enforced in either of the States. In the 
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second instance, the judge wondered about the decision not to stay the proceed-
ings, as the Finnish courts were the natural forum of the dispute
740
.  
This case was considered in the opinion of the Committee on Employment 
and Social Affairs of the European Parliament on the proposal for the recast of the 
Brussels I Regulation
741
. Indeed, it acknowledged that there was some scope for 
forum shopping for court jurisdictions due to the lack of a jurisdiction for indus-
trial actions as demonstrated in the Viking case. However, in the Rapporteur’s 
view, this is against the spirit and the objectives of the Regulation and the courts 
of the Member State with the closest connection to the industrial action (which are 
naturally the courts for the place where the action is to be or has been taken) 
should have the competence to decide in those cases.  
In light of the above considerations, putting aside the idea of applying the fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine or the comity principle, the advisable solution is to 
provide for a specific head of jurisdiction under which the courts of the place 
where the industrial action is to be or has been taken shall be competent
742
. Fur-
thermore, this is in line with the criterion provided for the determination of the 
applicable law to the matter under the Rome II Regulation. It will thus concentrate 
the dispute in one Member State
743
. From a more practical point of view, such a 
reference should also be included in the provision on the choice of court agree-
ments. 
It is indeed clear that there is a discrepancy between the provisions at stake, 
which may lead to a situation in which a court has to apply the law of another 
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Member State, giving rise to the risk that the most favourable solution will not be 
fully guaranteed
744
.  
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regard to posted workers, see A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private International Law: An Appropriate 
Means to Regulate Transnational Employment in the European Union?, in Erasmus Law Re-
view, 2014, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 157-169. 
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5.3. Law applicable to employment matters.  
 
a) Individual employment contracts. 
Rules for the determination of the law applicable to individual employment 
contracts are contained in the Rome I Regulation which, in case of no choice of 
law, establishes in Article 8 that the law of the country in which or, failing that, 
from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the 
contract shall apply. In the case of temporary employment activities carried out in 
another country, the country where the work is habitually carried out shall not be 
deemed to have changed (paragraph 2). If no habitual place is identified, the con-
tract shall be governed by the law of the country where the place of business 
through which the employee was engaged is situated (paragraph 3). Whether, 
from the circumstances as a whole, the contract is more closely connected with a 
country other than that determined through the above criteria, the law of that other 
country shall apply (paragraph 4). The choice of law is regulated by paragraph 1 
of Article 8 that refers to Article 3, under which party autonomy is limited, be-
cause it imposes respect for the provisions that cannot be derogated by agreement 
under the law that would have been applicable according to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 
(that is the objectively applicable law)
745
. Furthermore, under Article 9, the appli-
cation of overriding mandatory provisions of the forum is established, and the 
overriding mandatory provisions of the country of performance shall apply when-
ever they render the performance of the contract unlawful taking into account 
their nature and purpose, and the consequences of their application or non-
application. 
Like to the criteria laid down in the Brussels I bis Regulation, these conflict of 
laws rules are aimed at protecting the weaker party to a contract, since they are 
                                                          
745
  See also Recital No. 35 of Rome I Regulation. For comments see U. GRUŠIĆ, The European 
Private International Law of Employment, cit., p. 38 ff.; C. HONORATI, Regolamento (CE) n. 
593/2008, in F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (a cura di), Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione 
europea, cit., pp. 613-627, spec. pp. 625-626; P. MANKOWSKI, Employment Contracts under 
Article 8 of the Rome I Regulation, in F. FERRARI, S. LEIBLE (eds.), Rome I Regulation. The 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe, Munich, Sellier European Law Pub-
lishers, 2009, pp. 171-216. 
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considered more favourable to their interests than the general rules, as recognised 
by Recital No. 23 of the Rome I Regulation. The specific protection technique 
(combining protective connecting factors and the obligation to observe mandatory 
rules) is used with the aim of ensuring that the choice of law in the contract can 
only benefit the weaker party
746
. The favor lavoratoris principle is therein en-
hanced.  
The connecting factors under Article 8 (i.e. the habitual place of work as a 
primary connecting factor and the engaging place of business as a secondary con-
necting factor) have been interpreted in light of the protection principle or the 
functional allocation of regulatory authority principle
747
.  
Indeed, in the Koelzsch
748
 and Voogsgeerd
749
 cases, referred to above in the 
assessment of the concept of the habitual place of work within jurisdictional 
rules
750
, the Court held that the contract of employment is governed by the law of 
the State where the employee carries out his or her work activity, because it is in 
that State that the employee performs his or her economic and social duties, and it 
is there that the business and political environment affects employment activi-
ties
751
. This means that the weaker parties are protected when the law of their so-
cial and economic environment applies. In other words, the conflict of laws mech-
anism is based on the socio-economic purpose of the provisions set forth in Arti-
                                                          
746
  U. GRUŠIĆ, The European Private International Law of Employment, cit., p. 137 ff.; A.A.H. 
VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment, cit., spec. p. 439. 
747
  A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment, cit., p. 443. 
748
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 15 March 2011, Koelzsch, cit. 
749
  Court of Justice, judgment of 15 December 2011, Voogsgeerd, cit. 
750
  On the interplay between Rome and Brussels systems for the interpretation of similar con-
cepts, see supra in this Chapter, para. 5.2; see also Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and the Council on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), 
COM(2005)650 final of 15 December 2005, para. 4.2, where it explained that «The basic rule 
in paragraph 2(a) has been amplified and the reference is now to the “country in or from 
which…” to take account of the law as stated by the Court of Justice in relation to Article 18 
of the Brussels I Regulation and its broad interpretation of the habitual place of work»; U. 
GRUŠIĆ, The European Private International Law of Employment, cit., p. 155 ff. 
751
  Court of Justice (Grand Chamber), judgment of 15 March 2011, Koelzsch, cit., para. 42. 
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cle 8. In this way, the criteria established for the determination of the applicable 
law lead to the application of the law with which the worker is most familiar
752
. 
In addition to the protective grounds and the limitation on party autonomy, an 
escape clause based on a closer connection between the contract and one country 
is provided (Article 8, paragraph 4). The Court interpreted this provision in the 
Schlecker judgment of 2013
753
 that regarded the situation of a German employee 
who worked in Germany for a German employer for fifteen years. The parties 
then concluded a new contract under which the employee was appointed as the 
manager of the employer’s Dutch branch; she then worked in the Netherlands for 
eleven years, while retaining her German residence. Later on, the employer in-
formed the employee that the Dutch position would be abolished and invited her 
to move back to Germany. The worker initiated a proceedings seeking damages 
before the Dutch courts against the unilateral decision of the employer to change 
her place of work.  
This case falls within the provision of Article 8, paragraph 2, second sentence, 
which prescribes that the country where the work is habitually carried out will not 
be deemed to have changed if the employee is temporarily employed in another 
country. A reference could also be found in Recital No. 36, which clarifies that 
«the conclusion of a new contract of employment with the original employer or an 
employer belonging to the same group of companies as the original employer 
should not preclude the employee from being regarded as carrying out his work in 
another country temporarily». In conjunction with the first sentence that explains 
that a posting is temporary when the employee is expected to resume working in 
the country of origin, this means that the applicable law does not change in these 
cases. This is because the intentions of the parties are relevant in determining the 
habitual place of work. Nevertheless, other elements must be considered. 
To identify the applicable law, a hierarchical order of the connecting factors 
shall be followed. First, the nexus between the employment contract at issue and 
                                                          
752
  A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment, cit., p. 444. 
753
  Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2013, Case C-64/12, Anton Schlecker v Melitta 
Josefa Boedeker, EU:C:2013:551; see U. GRUŠIĆ, The European Private International Law of 
Employment, cit., p. 157 ff. 
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the country where the employee habitually carries out his work must prevail
754
; 
therefore, its application precludes the secondary criterion of the engaging place 
of business.  
In the present judgment, the Court held that Article 6, paragraph 2 of the 
Rome Convention «must be interpreted as meaning that, even where an employee 
carries out the work in performance of the contract habitually, for a lengthy period 
and without interruption in the same country, the national court may, under the 
concluding part of that provision, disregard the law of the country where the work 
is habitually carried out, if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the 
contract is more closely connected with another country»
755
. To fulfil the objec-
tive of the provision, it is important that the law applicable to the contract is the 
law of the State with which that contract is most closely connected. The identifi-
cation of the applicable law should be based on a factual approach that considers 
all the relevant elements of the case. As an outcome, the applicable law may «not 
automatically result in the application, in all cases, of the law most favourable to 
the worker»
756
.  
Advocate General Wahl indeed recognised that to guarantee the higher level 
of protection by applying the conflict of laws rules set forth in the Rome Conven-
tion, a wide interpretative approach should prevail. Indeed, in the absence of a 
choice of law, the law of the place of performance of the contract applies and this 
                                                          
754
  Court of Justice, judgment of 12 September 2013, Schlecker, cit., para. 32. 
755
  Ibidem, para. 42. 
756
  See Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 16 April 2013, Schlecker, cit., para. 36: 
«although the rules for determining the law applicable to the contract take into account the 
specific nature of the employment relationship, those rules must not, in my opinion, result - in 
all cases and regardless of the nature of the dispute - in the worker being granted the benefit 
of the national law which appears, from among all the conflicting laws and in the particular 
circumstances of the case, to be the most favourable to him. Contrary to what might be in-
ferred, at first sight, from the facts giving rise to Koelzsch and Voogsgeerd, it is with a clearly 
expressed concern for ‘adequate’, and not necessarily optimal or ‘favourable’, protection for 
the employee and guided by considerations which had already been identified by the Court in 
interpreting the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Brussels Convention, that the Court held 
that ‘compliance with the employment protection rules provided for by the law of that coun-
try must, so far as is possible, be guaranteed’». 
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does not imply, as a corollary, that the safeguard clause of the closest connection 
may be applied only in exceptional circumstances, and to the contrary where the 
habitual place of performance of the work is clear, that clause may not be applied 
at all
757
. 
In respect to overriding mandatory provisions, it has been questioned whether 
Article 8, paragraph 1 refers to all the national provisions that cannot be derogated 
or only to those concerning the protection of employees
758
. According to a wide 
approach, the first interpretation could be upheld, thus including all the provisions 
that may grant a higher level of protection. Similarly, the Report on the Rome 
Convention also referred to provisions concerning employment in the widest 
sense
759
. On the contrary, from the interpretation of the wording, the only manda-
tory rules are those concerning employees
760
. The overriding mandatory provi-
sions of the forum are at stake by virtue of Article 9 of the Rome I Regulation
761
 
because they serve as a limit to the application of foreign law in order to safe-
guard the public interest of that State.  
                                                          
757
  Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 16 April 2013, Schlecker, cit., para. 45. See 
also P. STONE, EU Private International law, Cheltenham, UK, Northampton, MA, USA, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 3
rd
 ed., 2014, p. 353 ff., where he suggests a discriminatory reading 
of Article 8(4) in which the escape clause is used liberally when European employees are 
posted to non-EU countries but sparingly in case of posting within the EU. 
758
  Recital No. 37 defines the concepts used therein: «Considerations of public interest justify 
giving the courts of the Member States the possibility, in exceptional circumstances, of apply-
ing exceptions based on public policy and overriding mandatory provisions. The concept of 
‘overriding mandatory provisions’ should be distinguished from the expression ‘provisions 
which cannot be derogated from by agreement’ and should be construed more restrictively». 
759
  Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations by Professor Mario 
Giuliano and Professor Paul Lagarde, cit., p. 25: «the [relevant mandatory provisions] consist 
not only of provisions relating to the contract of employment itself but also provisions such as 
those concerning industrial safety and hygiene». 
760
  See also Recital No. 35: «Employees should not be deprived of the protection afforded to 
them by provisions which cannot be derogated from by agreement or which can only be dero-
gated from to their benefit»; U. GRUŠIĆ, The European Private International Law of Em-
ployment, cit., p. 145 f. 
761
  A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment, cit., p. 447. 
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In this context, the Court ruled in the Unamar case of 2013
762
 that national 
public order legislations, however, are not «exempt from compliance with the 
provisions of the Treaty; if it did, the primacy and uniform application of Europe-
an Union law would be undermined. The considerations underlying such national 
legislation can be taken into account by European Union law only in terms of the 
exceptions to European Union freedoms expressly provided for by the Treaty and, 
where appropriate, on the ground that they constitute overriding reasons relating 
to the public interest»
763
. Thus, the application of overriding mandatory provisions 
must also be in compliance with the EU rules on free movement. 
From the above, the underlying logic of the Rome system is to single out the 
law (or provisions) that offers more adequate and favourable protection to work-
ers. Even when different scenarios are at issue, the national courts shall determine 
the applicable law based on the objective of fulfilling the principles of certainty, 
predictability and protection on which the conflict of laws rules are built. 
 
b) Posted workers’ employment contracts. 
In the framework of the free cross-border provision of services, pursuant to 
Article 3 of Directive 96/71, posted workers’ employment terms and conditions 
are subject to the law of the country where they moved to carry out working activ-
ities in accordance with the contract concluded with the employer located in their 
home State
764
. Thus, the law of the host State applies whenever violations by the 
posting employer of work terms and conditions provided therein occur. It is in-
deed stated that the minimum standards provided in the host country shall be re-
spected independently of the law governing the contract (lex causae), regardless 
of whether they provide the most favourable protection. This is further empha-
sised under Article 3, paragraph 7. 
As analysed above in Chapter 3 within the legal framework on posted work-
ers, the specific provision of Article 3 takes precedence over the rules in the Rome 
                                                          
762
  Court of Justice, judgment of 17 October 2013, Case C-184/12, United Antwerp Maritime 
Agencies (Unamar) NV v Navigation Maritime Bulgare, EU:C:2013:663. 
763
  Ibidem, para. 46. 
764
  See supra in Chapter 3, para. 3.2. 
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I Regulation
765
. It follows that when the host State law is applicable under Article 
8 of the Rome I Regulation (by choice or as the objectively applicable law), the 
restrictions imposed by the Directive do not apply. On the contrary, the Directive 
restricts the operation of Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Regulation and the applica-
bility of the country of origin principle
766
. The assumption under the Regulation 
that, in cases of temporary work in another country, the habitual place of work 
shall not be deemed to have changed is controverted whenever the posting lasts 
one year pursuant to Article 3, paragraph 6 of the Directive.  
Taking into account a systematic point of view by referring to the background 
of the legislation on the posting of workers, it may be noted that the conflict of 
laws rule pursues the objective of avoiding discrimination amongst local and 
posted workers. The adopted solution is aimed at guaranteeing, for posted work-
ers, employment minimum standards under the host State law (i.e. the nucleus of 
mandatory rules for minimum protection or the hard core of protective rules)
767
 
regardless of whether they are more favourable. The employment contract itself is, 
however, still governed by the home State law (in the case of absence of a con-
tractual choice of law) pursuant to the Rome I Regulation. In this context, manda-
tory provisions may also apply.  
Directive 96/71 refers to the 1980 Rome Convention, and in particular to the 
application of the mandatory rules of the objectively applicable law
768
 and those 
of the law of the Member State within whose territory the worker is temporarily 
posted
769
. While the Rome I Regulation specifies that «the rule on individual em-
ployment contracts should not prejudice the application of the overriding manda-
                                                          
765
  See Article 23 of the Rome I Regulation; Recital No. 11 of Directive 96/71. On the relation 
among the instruments see F. VAN OVERBEEKE, The Commission’s proposal to amend the 
Posting of Workers Directive and private international law implications, in Nederlands In-
ternationaal Privaatrecht, 2017, No. 2, pp. 178-194, spec. p. 181 ff.; A. DEFOSSEZ, Les rap-
ports entre la directive détachement et le Règlement Rome I: on efface tout et on recom-
mence?, in J-S. BERGÉ, S. FRANCQ, M. GARDEÑES SANTIAGO (eds.), Boundaries of European 
Private International Law, Brussels, Bruylant, 2015, pp. 483-504. 
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  M. FORNASIER, Employment, Posting of Workers, cit., pp. 119-120. 
767
  See Recitals No. 13 and 14 of Directive 96/71.  
768
  Recital No. 9 of Directive 96/71. 
769
  Recital No. 10 of Directive 96/71. 
228 
 
tory provisions of the country to which a worker is posted in accordance with Di-
rective 96/71/EC»
770
. 
In addition, Recital No. 11 of the Enforcement Directive 2014/67 declares that 
in the case of no genuine posting situation and conflict of laws, the rules of the 
Rome I Regulation, which are aimed at ensuring that employees should not be de-
prived of the protection afforded to them by provisions (of the home State) which 
cannot be derogated by an agreement or which can only be derogated to their ben-
efit, shall be considered in order to combat abuse.  
Article 3, paragraph 10 of Directive 96/71 provides that public policy provi-
sions of the host State law may extend to posted workers employment conditions 
on matters other than the hard nucleus by virtue of the equal treatment principle 
and in compliance with the Treaty. Public policy may be relied on only if there is 
a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of the society. 
This concept, which is to be interpreted narrowly, includes the protection of 
workers.  
The interpretation of the aforementioned provisions leads to doubts with re-
spect to the interrelationship between the Posting of Workers Directive and the 
Rome I Regulation, Articles 8 and 9. On the one hand, when the Directive does 
apply, there is no conflict of laws issue, and therefore the Rome rules do not come 
at stake. On the other hand, the reference to mandatory protection is linked to the 
limitation on party autonomy under Article 8, paragraph 1. Moreover, the duty to 
apply the core minimum standards to posted workers is up to the host State
771
. 
In line with the posting of workers legislation, a temporary transfer (currently 
fixed as one year) allows the application of more favourable work terms and con-
ditions in comparison with the law of the home State, which is most often the law 
applicable to the employment contract under the Rome I Regulation determined 
(in the absence of a contractual choice of law) through the primary criterion of the 
habitual place of work. As pointed out by the case law, all the elements are to be 
                                                          
770
  Recital No. 34 of Rome I Regulation. 
771
  And this is the reason why Article 6 provides for the alternative head of jurisdiction. See also 
A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Private international law rules for transnational employment, cit., p. 455, 
spec. fn. 73; S. EVJU, Cross-border services, posting of workers, and jurisdictional alterna-
tion, in European Labour Law Journal, 2010, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 89-98, spec. p. 90. 
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considered to identify the applicable law. In doing so, the principles governing the 
(relevant) conflict of laws system shall not be undermined.  
230 
 
5.3.1. Law applicable to cross-border collective redress.  
 
c) Collective redress. 
Within the Rome regime, there are no specific rules applicable to collective 
redress as a procedural means; whilst for industrial actions, a specific provision is 
included under the Rome II Regulation, as described below. Under the first cate-
gory, therefore, the operability of the existing conflict of laws rules over cross-
border collective redress in the employment context must be assessed. According-
ly, the specific criteria set forth in relation to individual employment contracts 
may be adapted in cases involving a series of similar claims concerning disputes 
arising out of employment contracts concluded between a number of employees 
and the same employer where transnational implications may lead to the applica-
tion of different laws because of different home countries or habitual places of 
work. Other cross-border situations may occur when a representative organisation 
initiates proceedings before the courts of its Member State of origin, while also 
acting on behalf of members that reside or are domiciled in another Member State, 
or when a representative organisation brings actions before the courts of a Mem-
ber State other than its home State and acts on behalf of residents of its home 
State as well as residents of other States
772
. 
First, the constitution and admission of the actor in the collective redress pro-
cedures must be preliminarily assessed. For instance, the lex causae applies to the 
constitution of the representative organisation, because it is the law of the place 
where that organisation has been legally constituted. The domestic law determines 
the legitimacy of this type of group, which may be represented by the organisation 
in question, and thus whether foreign members may also be included. Differently, 
the collective redress procedure is governed by the lex fori, under which the legit-
imacy ad processum of that organisation must be controlled
773
. This means that 
the law of the courts seised applies to identify the possible entities that may bring 
                                                          
772
  Similarly, on consumers’ collective actions, see L. CARBALLO PIÑEIRO, Acciones colectivas 
transfronterizas, cit., spec. p. 590. 
773
  On class certification, see R. MICHAELS, European Class Actions and Applicable Law, in A. 
NUYTS, N.E. HATZIMIHAIL (eds.), Cross-Border Class Action. The European Way, cit., pp. 
111-141. 
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actions in that State, including foreign organisations. The lex fori also regulates 
the possibility to bring group actions in which the collective aspect lies in the fact 
that individual claims are procedurally brought and heard together. In general, the 
constitution and legitimacy to act of representative organisations, trade unions or 
other similar entities are matters for national legislation.  
As previously mentioned, a case concerning the assignment of claims related 
to consumer protection alleged to form a class action has been recently addressed 
by the Court of Justice
774
. In line with the arguments of the Advocate General, but 
without further assessing the issue, the Court of Justice answered to the questions 
by recalling its earlier case law on the assignment of claims and on the opportuni-
ty to extend the existing jurisdictional criteria provided for by the Brussels sys-
tem, and finally excluded such a possibility. Whilst, in its opinion
775
, Advocate 
General Bobek specifically considered the preliminary issue of the definition of a 
class action (as referred to in the application). He indeed resorted to the lex fori 
(Austrian law) to verify whether the action in the main proceedings could be qual-
ified as a class action. In his view, the relevant provision of the Austrian civil pro-
cedure code concerning the case at hand could not be referred to as an instrument 
for instituting a class action, rather it concerns the assignment of claims. He added 
that, in practice, it served as a «useful tool to develop a sui generis mechanism for 
collective redress through the assignment of similar claims appertaining to multi-
ple persons to a third party who will consolidate and pursue them in a single set of 
proceedings. Even though this system is commonly used through assignment to 
consumer organisations, claims can also be assigned to individuals»
776
. Advocate 
General specified that the national (Austrian) rule allows different claims of one 
applicant against the same defendant to be heard together in the same proceedings, 
provided that the court seised should have jurisdiction over each of the individual 
claims, including its territorial competence, and it must be possible to subject each 
claim to the same type of proceeding
777
.  
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 25 January 2018, Schrems, cit. See supra, para. 5.2.1. 
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  Opinion of Advocate General Bobek delivered on 14 November 2017, Schrems, cit. 
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  Ibidem, para. 69 and fn. 15. 
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  Ibidem, para. 70. 
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Assuming that a collective redress procedure is validly initiated, the relevant 
question is then which law is applicable to the dispute
778
. If different laws are 
deemed to be applicable, there may difficulties in managing collective actions 
from the point of view of the claimants, and ultimately from the perspectives of 
the defendant and the judge as well. One possibility may be to exclude non-
residents and to apply the lex fori to the homogenous group in order to avoid di-
vergences among national laws.  
In relation to consumer protection, the Commission addressed the problem of 
multiple laws applicable to collective redress court procedures in the Green Paper 
of 2008
779
. It recognised that in mass litigation in which consumers come from 
different Member States, the court would have to apply the different national laws 
of the various consumers to contractual obligations in accordance with Article 6 
of the Rome I Regulation. To resolve this problem, it suggested the introduction 
of an amendment to the rules by imposing the application of the law of the trader 
(namely, the law of the place where the trader is seated) in collective redress cas-
es, or of the law of the market most affected (i.e. where most of the consumers af-
fected reside) or of the Member State where the representative entity is estab-
lished
780
. In so far as extra-contractual consequences are concerned, e.g. in the ar-
ea of product liability, where Article 5 of the Rome II Regulation should apply, 
the Commission affirmed that a choice of law agreement after the damaging event 
occurred by virtue of Article 14, paragraph 1, letter a of the same Regulation 
would help
781
. 
Accordingly, one specific conflict of laws rule that takes into consideration 
the overall situation should be appropriate to determine one single law that is ap-
plicable to cross-border collective redress. However, whether the application of 
one single law will suffice and, in relation to weaker parties, whether this is ap-
propriate to grant protection, is debatable. From the claimants’ perspective, the 
law applicable to the dispute cannot be predicted before the proceedings are initi-
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  R. MICHAELS, European Class Actions and Applicable Law, cit., p. 128 ff. 
779
  Green Paper on Consumer Collective Redress, COM(2008)794 final of 27 November 2008. 
780
  Ibidem, para. 59.  
781
  Ibidem, para. 60. On the applicable law on actions in the field of consumers’ protection see 
also S. BARIATTI, Le azioni collettive, cit., pp. 44-47. 
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ated, thus causing problems related to legal certainty. From the defendant’s per-
spective, different laws may be applicable in cases involving individual or collec-
tive proceedings, which may lead to forum shopping.  
With respect to employment contexts, in an extreme scenario, there may be 
employment contracts concluded with the same employer that are covered by dif-
ferent laws because the workers might be based in different Member States. The 
protection of workers’ interests in a collective manner may be hampered as a re-
sult of this fragmentation
782
.  
The determination of the applicable law on the basis of an individual ap-
proach by examining the circumstances of each case creates problems in terms of 
certainty, because it may not lead to the most favourable solution for the workers’ 
collective redress. Although there may be points in common for all the workers 
employed by the same company, the legal and social environment of each indi-
vidual worker might vary, and this should be taken into account
783
.  
As to employment collective litigation related to contractual matters, in de-
termining the law applicable to a dispute involving a number of workers, the crite-
ria under the Rome I Regulation may not be appropriate. The identification of a 
connecting criterion specific for collective redress proceedings appears to be the 
ideal solution. One suggestion could be to maintain the existing connecting factors 
and to refer to the majority of workers, e.g. to consider the place where the ma-
jority of workers habitually carry out their working activities. In addition, conflict 
of laws rules may be based on criteria similar to the grounds for jurisdiction, thus 
achieving the coincidence between forum and ius. 
 
d) Collective redress involving posted workers. 
Cross-border collective redress may concern posted workers, who only tem-
porarily carry out their work activities in a State other than their State of origin. 
As noted above, Directive 96/71 imposes the observation of work terms and con-
ditions as laid down by the laws or regulations in force in the host State, thus 
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guaranteeing minimum standards
784
. Recital No. 22 thereof prescribes that the law 
of the Member States concerning collective actions to defend the interests of 
trades and professions shall not be prejudiced. The right to collective action is also 
ensured by Directive 2014/67 in its Article 1, paragraph 2 on the exercise of fun-
damental rights, including the right or freedom to strike or to take other action 
covered by the specific national industrial relations systems as recognised in the 
Member States and at the Union level. Collective actions are nonetheless to be ex-
ercised in accordance with national law and/or practice. The following Article 11, 
paragraph 3 requires the Member States to ensure that trade unions and other third 
parties, such as associations, organisations and other legal entities, may engage, 
on behalf or in support of the posted workers, in any judicial or administrative 
proceedings to claim respect for the rights granted in the two Directives. 
This obligation consists of a harmonising rule that all the Member States shall 
adequately transpose into their legal order. The national provisions are called up-
on to regulate the possibility for posted workers to be represented by national 
trade unions or other entities in the host State. Not only does collective action in-
clude strike, but also collective redress procedures as the Article refers to «any ju-
dicial or administrative proceedings». Given that no other requirement is pre-
scribed, the question of whether trade unions can represent posted workers in the 
context of cross-border litigation depends on national laws. 
As to collective proceedings involving posted workers, the Court addressed 
the question of the law applicable to the locus standi of a trade union in the 
abovementioned Sähköalojen ammattiliitto (a Finnish trade union) case of 
2015
785
. A Polish undertaking was sued before a Finnish court by the Finnish 
trade union that claimed the minimum pay in accordance with the Finnish collec-
tive agreement and with the Directive on the posting of workers, because that col-
lective agreement provided for more favourable conditions than under Polish law. 
The dispute focused on the legal standing of the Finnish trade union and its power 
to represent posted (Polish) workers. The fact that a collective redress was 
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  See supra in Chapter 3, para. 3.2. 
785
  Court of Justice, judgment of 12 February 2015, Case C-396/13, Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry 
v Elektrobudowa Spolka Akcyjna, EU:C:2015:86. See also supra in Chapter 4, para. 4.3. 
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brought before the courts to claim respect for work terms and conditions is re-
markable. As to the union’s locus standi, the Polish undertaking claimed the ap-
plication of the law of the State of origin of the posting undertaking (Polish law), 
which required different conditions for the trade unions’ legal standing, and asked 
for the dismissal of the action. Ultimately, the Court did not uphold this argument 
and applied the lex fori (Finnish law), as it was a matter for the national legislation 
of the court seised. Indeed, in light of Article 47 of the Charter, the law of the 
posting undertaking must not prevent a trade union from bringing an action before 
a court of the host Member State in which the workers are posted in order to re-
cover pay claims which relate to the minimum wage and have been assigned to 
the trade union in accordance with the law of the second Member State
786
. 
As this case shows, the differences in the national laws or regulations cause 
difficulties in initiating proceedings, and in general regarding access to justice and 
effective remedies in situations with cross-border implications. However, in light 
of the Enforcement Directive, all the Member States must ensure the possibility 
for posted workers to be represented before the courts of the State where they are 
or were posted. Similar to individual claims on employment contracts involving 
posted workers, the special conflict of laws rule under Article 3 must be taken into 
account. Thus, related disputes may be governed by the law of the host State in so 
far as the (allegedly violated) work terms and conditions under litigation are cov-
ered by the relevant Directives. 
 
e) Industrial actions. 
Industrial actions are considered in the Rome II Regulation on the law appli-
cable to non-contractual obligations, in its Article 9, according to which disputes 
concerning the liability of a worker, an employer or an organisation for damages 
caused by an industrial action, pending or carried out, are governed by the law of 
the country where the action is to be, or has been, taken (lex loci acti)
787
. Recital 
                                                          
786
  Ibidem, para. 26. 
787
  F. MOSCONI, C. CAMPIGLIO, Diritto internazionale privato e processuale, Volume I, cit., pp. 
456-457; Z. CRESPI REGHIZZI, Regolamento (CE) n. 864/2007, in F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (a 
cura di), Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione europea, cit., pp. 586-601, spec. p. 596-
597; F. MARONGIU BONAIUTI, Le obbligazioni non contrattuali nel diritto internazionale pri-
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No. 27 thereof clarifies that as the concept of industrial action, such as a strike ac-
tion or lock-out, is governed by each Member State’s internal rules, the Regula-
tion assumes «as a general principle that the law of the country where the indus-
trial action was taken should apply, with the aim of protecting the rights and obli-
gations of workers and employers». In addition, Recital No. 28 states that «the 
special rule on industrial action in Article 9 is without prejudice to the conditions 
relating to the exercise of such action in accordance with national law and without 
prejudice to the legal status of trade unions or of the representative organisations 
of workers as provided for in the law of the Member States». 
This explanation has given rise to doubts due to its reference to national defi-
nitions. It is deemed to be a derogation of the general principle of uniform inter-
pretation, which requires an autonomous characterisation of the concept
788
. Thus, 
the notion of industrial action shall be determined according to the lex causae 
identified through the application of Article 9, or to the lex fori
789
. By contrast, it 
shall be given an autonomous definition, thus meaning all actions that are, in ac-
cordance with EU law, included under collective bargaining and collective ac-
tion
790
. 
Article 9 contains a special rule for damages for the specific case of an indus-
trial action that is different from the general rule on obligations arising from tort 
set forth in Article 4 of the Rome II Regulation, which refers to the law of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
vato, cit., spec. p. 139 ff.; G. PALAO MORENO, The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obli-
gations, in Yearbook of Private International law, 2007, Vol. 9, pp. 115-126, spec. p. 122 ff. 
The inclusion of a specific article on industrial action was suggested by the European Parlia-
ment legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”), 
P6_TA(2005)0284. 
788
  G. PALAO MORENO, The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, cit., p. 118. 
789
  Z. CRESPI REGHIZZI, Regolamento (CE) n. 864/2007, cit., p. 596. 
790
  P. FRANZINA, Il regolamento n. 864/2007/CE sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni extra-
contrattuali («Roma II»), in Le nuove leggi civili commentate, 2008, No. 5, pp. 971-1044, 
spec. p. 1016 ff. 
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country where the harm occurs
791
. The conflict of laws rule in Article 9 applies 
only to non-contractual liability, that is to say non-contractual obligations deriving 
from industrial actions. It follows that it does not cover the consequences for indi-
vidual employment contracts, which are governed by Article 8 of the Rome I 
Regulation. Prerequisites for the exercise of industrial actions and the legal status 
of trade unions or similar organisations are excluded
792
. The legitimacy of the 
strike needs to be assessed under the law of the place where it takes place; indeed, 
strikes are so closely related to the public policy order of the place of the action 
that no other legal system could apply
793
. It has been argued that the territoriality 
of industrial actions is also revealed through the application of overriding manda-
tory provisions, which include the rules on socio-political assets
794
.  
The conflict of law rule applies not only to workers’ industrial actions but also 
to employers’ actions. It does not make a distinction based on favor lavoratoris795. 
It also applies without prejudice to the application of the law of the country where 
the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have their 
habitual residence at the time when the damage occurs. However, in practice, this 
rarely occurs.  
Article 9 applies without prejudice to Article 4, paragraph 2, which deems the 
law of the common habitual residence to be applicable
796
. Overall, the adequacy 
of Article 9 to offer a proper solution for the determination of the applicable law, 
                                                          
791
  See, in general, F. DORSSEMONT, A.A.H. VAN HOEK, Collective action in Labour Conflicts 
under the Rome II Regulation, in European Labour Law Journal, 2011, Vol. 2, No. 1 and No. 
2, pp. 48-118; P. FRANZINA, Il regolamento n. 864/2007/CE, cit., p. 1018 ff. 
792
  Z. CRESPI REGHIZZI, Regolamento (CE) n. 864/2007, cit., p. 597; G. PALAO MORENO, The 
Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, cit., p. 118. 
793
  M. FRANZEN, Conflicts of Laws in Employment Contracts and Industrial Relations, in R. 
BLANPAIN (editor), Comparative Labour law and Industrial Relations in Industrialized Mar-
ket Economies, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2014, pp. 245-267, spec. p. 
265. 
794
  F. MARONGIU BONAIUTI, Le obbligazioni non contrattuali nel diritto internazionale privato, 
cit., p. 141. 
795
  Ibidem, p. 142; G. PALAO MORENO, The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, 
cit., p. 117. 
796
  G. PALAO MORENO, The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, cit., p. 121. 
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and thus whether it will prove to benefit workers, has been argued, because said 
Article refers to one place and does not offer flexibility
797
. 
As an outcome of cross-border industrial actions, different laws may apply as 
to the legitimacy, exercise, contractual consequences and non-contractual obliga-
tions. It appears nonetheless that the connecting criterion of the place where the 
industrial action occurs or has occurred may also be used for the determination of 
jurisdiction. In this way, the courts of that place will apply their own law. This is 
also true when posted workers are involved, as the State of origin is not “directly 
connected” with the relevant situation. 
                                                          
797
  Ibidem, p. 122. 
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5.4. Recognition and enforcement of collective judgments. 
Recognition and enforcement of judgments in Europe are governed by the 
Brussels I Recast Regulation that provides for the mutual recognition of judg-
ments and the abolition of the exequatur procedure
798
. Specific rules concerning 
collective redress procedures are not included. The question is thus whether under 
the existing rules collective judgments may circulate amongst the EU Member 
States.  
According to the Explanatory Statement accompanying the Proposal for the 
recast of the Brussels I Regulation
799
, the Commission acknowledged that within 
the preliminary public consultation specific concerns were expressed with respect 
to the abolition of exequatur, not only in defamation cases but also in collective 
redress proceedings
800
. It then clarified that the Proposal abolishes the exequatur 
procedure for all judgments covered by the Regulation with the exception of 
judgments in defamation and compensatory collective redress cases
801
. In particu-
lar, the exequatur procedure is maintained for judgments issued in collective 
«proceedings brought by a group of claimants, a representative entity or a body 
acting in the public interest and which concern the compensation of harm caused 
by unlawful business practices to a multitude of claimants»
802
. Having ascertained 
the differences among Member States as to the collective mechanisms established 
in various areas with diverse requirements, the Commission asserted that «the re-
quired level of trust cannot be presumed at this stage»
803
. Such arguments were 
                                                          
798
  F. MOSCONI, C. CAMPIGLIO, Diritto internazionale privato e processuale, Volume I, cit., p. 
290 ff.; R. MAŃKO, Europeanisation of civil procedure, cit., p. 3 ff.; A. MALATESTA, Rego-
lamento (CE) n. 44/2001, cit., p. 532 ff.; A. MALATESTA, Regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012, in 
F. POCAR, M.C. BARUFFI (a cura di), Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione europea, 
cit., p. 539 ff. 
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  Proposal for a Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters (recast), COM(2010)748 final of 14 December 2010, cit. 
800
  Ibidem, para. 2. 
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  Ibidem, para. 3.1. 
802
  Ibidem, para. 3.1.1. 
803
  Ibidem, where it recalled the initiative on a European approach to collective redress to identi-
fy which forms of collective redress could fit into the EU legal system and into the legal or-
ders of the EU Member States. 
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included in the proposed Recital No. 23, according to which the current procedure 
for recognition and enforcement shall continue to apply to defamation and com-
pensation obtained in collective proceedings. The Commission further stated that 
«the provisions abolishing intermediate enforcement measures should be extended 
to judgments ordering compensation in collective proceedings in the event of 
adoption of measures for the harmonisation or approximation of the procedural 
rules applicable to such proceedings». Nonetheless, even in the absence of such 
harmonisation or approximation measures, the Commission could propose the 
abolition of intermediate measures for collective damages proceedings
804
. In the 
respective proposed Article 37, the exequatur procedure was retained for proceed-
ings concerning the compensation of harm caused by unlawful business practices 
to a multitude of injured parties and which are brought by a state body, non-profit 
entity or a group of more than twelve claimants.  
It appears that the collective redress procedure was only referred to actions 
brought by a group of more than twelve people and only related to unlawful busi-
ness practices. However, the abovementioned arguments of the Commission are 
generic and not convincing. The qualification of a collective action is a matter for 
national legislations, which have not yet been harmonised. Thus, the divergences 
between the existing systems for national collective redress are not limited to pro-
ceedings related to unfair commercial practices. For the purpose of legal certainty, 
the European Parliament did note that it would be better to have no exemptions
805
. 
With regard to workers and employers, the Proposal recognised the right to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements and, in cases of conflicts of inter-
ests, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action, as 
referred to in Article 28 of the Charter, which can also be promoted by their re-
spective organisations
806
. Respectively, the proposed Recital No. 27 and Article 
85 prescribed respect for fundamental rights, including the right to engage in col-
                                                          
804
  Ibidem, Recital No. 23. 
805
  Report of 15 October 2012 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (recast), A7-0320/2012, Committee on Legal Affairs, Rapporteur: Tade-
usz Zwiefka. 
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  Proposal for a Regulation, COM(2010)748 final, cit., para. 3.4. 
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lective action to protect their interests, in particular the right or freedom to strike 
or to take other actions, in accordance with Union law and national law and prac-
tices
807
. 
Nevertheless, the proposed provisions were not included in the final version 
of the Brussels I bis Regulation. As no restriction on the types of judgments fall-
ing within its scope of application was established, the existing rules on the 
recognition, enforceability and enforcement apply to judgments issued in collec-
tive proceedings in one EU State to be recognised and enforced in another EU 
State
808
. As to the recognition of foreign judgments issued in a third State, nation-
al rules of private international law shall apply.  
The Brussels I Recast Regulation relies on the mutual recognition of deci-
sions; indeed, no special procedure is required according to its Article 36 and in 
compliance with the conditions set forth in Article 37
809
. As an innovative feature 
in comparison with former Regulation No. 44/2001, under Article 39, no declara-
tion of enforceability is needed for judgments that are enforceable in the issuing 
Member State, which will thus be enforceable in other Member States
810
. Article 
40 specifies that such a judgment carries with it, by operation of law, the power to 
proceed to any protective measures which exist under the law of the Member 
State addressed. However, the procedure for the enforcement of judgments given 
in another Member State is still governed by the law of the requested Member 
State, and judgments shall be subject to the conditions provided for national 
judgments pursuant to Articles 41 and 42. The request for enforcement must be 
accompanied by the certificate issued pursuant to Article 53 and the specific doc-
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  The so-called Monti clause: see supra in Chapter 2, para. 2.4. 
808
  M. HELLNER, Private International Law and Collective Redress – The case of Antitrust dam-
age claims, in A. NUYTS, N.E. HATZIMIHAIL (eds.), Cross-Border Class Action. The Europe-
an Way, cit., pp. 223-239, spec. p. 238; S. BARIATTI, Recognition and enforcement in the EU 
of judicial decisions rendered upon class actions: the case of U.S. and Dutch judgments and 
settlements, in F. POCAR., I. VIARENGO, F.C. VILLATA (edited by), Recasting Brussels I, Pa-
dova, CEDAM, 2012, pp. 319-339, spec. p. 327. 
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  See P. FRANZINA, X.E. KRAMER, J. FITCHER, The Recognition and Enforcement of Member 
States Judgments, in A. DICKINSON, E. LEIN (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast, cit., pp. 
373-519, spec. p. 377 ff.  
810
  In this regard see also Recital No. 26 of Brussels I Recast Regulation. 
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uments listed in Article 43. The grounds for the refusal of recognition or enforce-
ment are established in Article 45. They include (a) non-compliance with the pub-
lic policy of the requested Member State; (b) lack of service with the document in 
the case of proceedings in default of appearance that did not allow a defence; (c) 
irreconcilability with a judgment given between the same parties in the Member 
State addressed; (d) irreconcilability with an earlier judgment issued in another 
Member State or in a third State involving the same cause of action and between 
the same parties; (e) conflicts with the rules of jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 or 
5 of Chapter II, where the weaker party was the defendant; or Section 6 of Chap-
ter II on exclusive jurisdiction. In these last situations, the court to which the ap-
plication was submitted shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the court 
of origin based its jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction of the court of origin may not 
be reviewed. Moreover, the public policy exception may not be applied to the 
rules relating to jurisdiction. 
For the purposes of the present analysis, on the one hand, it must be noted that 
no rule regards collective redress procedures and, on the other hand, it is signifi-
cant and a valuable improvement that Article 45 enhances the protection of weak-
er parties by prescribing that a violation of jurisdictional grounds may only be an 
obstacle to recognition if a weaker party was a defendant in the dispute. To ad-
dress the circulation of judgments issued in collective proceedings, some general 
remarks may first be made, independently of the relevant policy area. 
The automatic recognition of judgments entails the mutual acceptance of their 
effects, which are granted in the State of origin, in a different legal order. The ef-
fects may be recognised by assimilation of the effects granted to a national judg-
ment, or the original effects may be extended into the requested State
811
. In prac-
tice, the two theories do not cause different consequences, because, in any case, 
effects that are not contemplated in one legal order may not be recognised.  
                                                          
811
  F. MOSCONI, C. CAMPIGLIO, Diritto internazionale privato e processuale, Volume I, cit., p. 
294; S.M. CARBONE, C.E. TUO, Il nuovo spazio giudiziario europeo in materia civile e com-
merciale, cit., p. 324 ff.; P. WAUTELET, Article 36, in U. MAGNUS, P. MANKOWSKI (edited 
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Under the public policy exception, Member States may invoke respect for the 
procedural requirements to constitute a collective redress (whether it is an opt-in 
or opt-out system becomes a relevant issue), in addition to the respect for proce-
dural rights, which include the right to defence, access to justice, fair trial, as well 
as to the preclusive effect of the judgment in the case of an opt-out procedure. It 
has been argued that in relation to collective redress, the concept of public policy 
is more closely related to its procedural content, and the control of the substantive 
public policy is not at stake
812
.  
As stated by the Court of Justice, the notion of public policy as a ground for 
the refusal to recognise and enforce judgments must be interpreted exceptionally 
and narrowly
813
. Indeed, it is aimed at limiting the entry of foreign legal values 
that are contrary to the public policy of the Member State requested to enforce a 
decision
814
. In relation to the Brussels Convention, the Court had already clarified 
that the courts of the State remain free to determine, according to their own con-
ceptions, what public policy requires, and thus it is not for the Court to define the 
content of the public policy of a State. It is nonetheless required to review the lim-
its within which the courts of a State may have recourse to that concept for the 
purpose of refusing the recognition of a judgment emanating from a court in an-
other State
815
. Judges may verify the effects of the foreign decision in their legal 
order, but not the decision itself. 
The Court explained that recourse to a public policy clause can be envisaged 
only where the recognition or enforcement of a judgment delivered in another 
State would be at variance, to an unacceptable degree, with the legal order of the 
State in which enforcement is sought inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental prin-
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  L. CARBALLO PIÑEIRO, Acciones colectivas transfronterizas, cit., p. 605 ff. 
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  See Report by Mr P. Jenard on the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, in OJ C 59 of 5 March 1979, pp. 
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161-183, spec. pp. 168-169. 
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  Court of Justice, judgment of 28 March 2000, Case C-7/98, Dieter Krombach v André Bam-
berski, EU:C:2000:164, paras. 22-23. 
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ciple
816
. In order for the prohibition of any review of the foreign judgment as to its 
substance to be observed, the infringement would have to constitute a manifest 
breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in 
which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within 
that legal order
817
.  
As far as collective proceedings are concerned, the different conditions re-
quired by national civil procedural laws may be invoked as grounds for refusal 
under the public policy exception provided that they are imposed to safeguard 
fundamental rights and values
818
. For instance, it may be apparent when the right 
to a defence is involved.  
In the Gambazzi case of 2009
819
, the Court held that the exercise of the right 
of defence «occupies a prominent position in the organisation and conduct of a 
fair trial and is one of the fundamental rights deriving from the constitutional tra-
ditions common to the Member States and from the international treaties for the 
protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of 
which they are signatories, among which the European Convention for the Protec-
                                                          
816
  The concept of public policy includes fundamental principles of the forum, including funda-
mental rights’ protection: see P. PIRODDI, Armonia delle decisioni, riconoscimento reciproco 
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July 2015, Case C-681/13, Diageo Brands BV v Simiramida-04 EOOD, EU:C:2015:471. 
819
  Court of Justice, judgment of 2 April 2009, Gambazzi, cit. The case concerned a defendant, 
who entered appearance but who was excluded from the proceedings by order on the ground 
that he had not complied with the obligations imposed by an order made earlier in the same 
proceedings. Thus, the appealed judgment was issued as he was in default of appearance. 
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tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is of particular importance»
820
. 
This right may also be subject to restrictions provided that they are aimed at pur-
suing objectives of public interest and are proportionate
821
. The respect for fun-
damental procedural rights as enshrined in the ECHR is thus a requirement for the 
recognition of judgments across the European Union
822
. National values and prin-
ciples raised in opposition to the recognition of a judgment must nonetheless be in 
compliance with European principles
823
. Policy objections must meet the strict EU 
standards and must not undermine the fundamental principles of mutual trust and 
free movement of judgments. In preventing national values from being invoked 
when recognition and enforcement are sought, the public policy clause was 
deemed to be a harmonising provision
824
. The provision on the right to defence 
under Article 45, paragraph 1, letter b is supplemented and widened by the con-
cept of public policy under letter a thereof
825
.  
In light of the above, in the context of an opt-out mechanism, it has been not-
ed that the right to defence and procedural guarantees may be violated inasmuch 
as absent members were not notified or served, and could not opt-out from the ac-
tion
826
. These concerns led the Commission to exclude the (US) opt-out model, as 
explained in its 2013 initiatives
827
, and to maintain the exequatur procedure, as 
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  Ibidem, para. 29.  
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Class Action. The European Way, cit., pp. 85-110, spec. p. 101. 
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stated in the 2010 Proposal for the recast of the Brussels I Regulation
828
. Indeed, 
questions regarding the publicity of the proceedings and the methods for opting-
out may arise in relation to the right to defence, as well as within the concept of 
public policy
829
. 
With respect to the default of appearance (letter b)
830
, in the Trade Agency Ltd 
judgment of 2012
831
, the Court stated that opposition may be based on the ground 
of the default of appearance when, in light of all the relevant circumstances, the 
judgment is a manifest and disproportionate breach of the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial referred to in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter on ac-
count of the impossibility of bringing an appropriate and effective appeal against 
it
832
. Closely related to the right to defence, this also concerns the procedural pro-
tection of the defendant. In the context of collective procedures, this may be the 
case where persons are not formally parties to the proceedings, but may nonethe-
less be bound by the final judgment in accordance with the law of the State of 
origin. The requested courts shall address those procedural requirements
833
.  
The effectiveness of judgments is a matter for the lex fori which is called up-
on to rule about the extent to which the decision marks the other claims as res ju-
                                                                                                                                                               
and Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
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  Ibidem, para. 62. 
833
  D. FAIRGRIEVE, The impact of the Brussels I enforcement and recognition rules on collective 
actions, cit., p. 187. 
247 
 
dicata and thus for instance whether a decision rendered as a result of a repre-
sentative action is binding upon the other claimants
834
.  
As to the irreconcilability of judgments given between the same parties in the 
requested Member State (letter c) and with an earlier judgment given in another 
Member State or in a third State involving the same cause of action and between 
the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions neces-
sary for its recognition in the Member State addressed (letter d)
835
, the Court af-
firmed that this occurs when two decisions «entail legal consequences that are 
mutually exclusive»
836
. This provision may be applicable to collective judgments. 
Critical issues are faced in cases in which the members involved in two different 
proceedings are not identical. In the absence of any case law on this point, it 
would be possible for a binding judgment issued in a collective proceedings to be 
opposed in the State of enforcement. Cases involving an opt-out procedure would 
be more complex: incompatibility may be registered because some of the mem-
bers were not parties to the proceedings in the State where the irreconcilable 
judgment was issued
837
.  
A limit on the review of jurisdiction (letter e) is imposed upon the judge 
seised with a request for non-recognition or enforcement, who shall be bound by 
the findings of fact on which the court of origin based its jurisdiction (Article 45, 
paragraph 2) and shall not assess the jurisdiction of the judge a quo, even on the 
basis of public policy grounds (paragraph 3)
838
. Exceptions are provided for ex-
clusive and protective jurisdiction. In light of these conditions, it seems that a col-
lective judgment may not be opposed on the basis of jurisdictional issues. This is 
                                                          
834
  P. MANKOWSKI, P. NIELSEN, Introduction to Articles 17-19, cit., p. 451. 
835
  F. MOSCONI, C. CAMPIGLIO, Diritto internazionale privato e processuale, Volume I, cit., p. 
317 ff.; D. FAIRGRIEVE, The impact of the Brussels I enforcement and recognition rules on 
collective actions, cit., pp. 187-188. 
836
  Court of Justice, judgment of 4 February 1988, Case 145/86, Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann 
v Adelheid Krieg, EU:C:1988:61, para. 22. 
837
  See B. HESS, Cross-border Collective Litigation and the Regulation Brussels I, in IPRax 
Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts, 2010, No. 2, pp. 116-121. 
838
  F. MOSCONI, C. CAMPIGLIO, Diritto internazionale privato e processuale, Volume I, cit., p. 
320 ff. and 336 ff. 
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true even when workers are involved, because they (may) represent the plaintiff 
party to the proceedings. Indeed, generally, the weaker party would never be the 
defendant, or at least in the extreme scenario in which the employer sues a group 
of workers to claim their contractual or non-contractual liability, such as damages 
arising out of industrial actions. 
Questions of recognition and enforcement have also been referred to collec-
tive settlements, whose nature is essentially contractual except for their judicial 
approval (by an EU court), which may then circulate under the Brussels regime
839
. 
In conclusion, the effectiveness of collective judgments rendered in one State 
may be hampered on the grounds listed in the Brussels I Recast Regulation, main-
ly on the basis of the public policy exception and other procedural safeguards due 
to the different approaches to collective redress of the national systems
840
. Issues 
that may be more crucial arise with respect to foreign collective judgments, nota-
bly US class action decisions
841
, which are not discussed herein.  
                                                          
839
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5.5. Concluding considerations. 
In the context of the enforcement of rights, when the right to collective action, 
jointly with the right to an effective remedy, shall be ensured as imposed in the 
EU legislation concerning workers and posted workers, national laws are called 
upon to grant protection for both substantive and procedural rights. Facilitating 
access to justice in cross-border litigation is indeed one of the main objectives of 
the realisation of a European judicial area. When, in specific fields, no common 
rules as to the procedural means are provided for at the European level, the do-
mestic provisions apply. To coordinate the Member States’ legal orders, uniform 
EU conflict of jurisdictions and conflict of laws rules are adopted.  
In relation to the peculiar means for collective redress, which is a viable rem-
edy that contributes to procedural economy and efficiency, and may be resorted to 
in various policy areas, difficulties arise in the existing legal framework within the 
judicial civil cooperation. Although the European institutions have considered this 
issue incidentally, and is under legislative developments, the inadequacy of the 
Brussels and Rome systems has been pointed out. The main question may be 
summarised as follows: will it suffice to interpret the existing private international 
law provisions, or should new special jurisdictional and legislative rules be in-
cluded?  
As discussed, the extension of the jurisdictional rules would controvert the 
Brussels system. Nor does considering all the EU instruments based on a system-
atic approach to find appropriate solutions appear to be useful, as they are differ-
ent in terms of their functions and aims. Therefore, coordination between the rele-
vant Regulations could not support the resolution of transnational implications 
when dealing with collective redress. It is nevertheless advisable that the coinci-
dence between forum and ius is to be achieved through the establishment of simi-
lar connecting factors. The adequate allocation of jurisdictional and legislative 
functions will accordingly facilitate the circulation of judgments. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Cross-border collective redress in the employment context has proven to be a de-
bated issue from different perspectives. Considerations have been pointed out 
starting with the case law of the Court of Justice, which offered some interpreta-
tions as to the recognition of the fundamental social right to take collective action, 
moving to the legal framework related to labour mobility, where workers’ rights 
must be protected and the phenomenon of transnational posting must be carefully 
regulated, to the role of civil procedure in providing for effective judicial remedies 
in close relationship with private international law rules. In view of (advisable) fu-
ture legislative developments on an EU regime on collective redress, some rec-
ommendations are submitted. 
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6.1. Summarising conclusions. 
Cross-border collective redress in the employment context assessed pursuant 
to a comprehensive approach highlights the peculiarities related to the different 
perspectives analysed so far.  
The need for the regulation, coordination and effective protection of social 
rights seems to be a key concept for the elaboration of a European framework on 
this procedural means. A legislative response to the critical balance between mar-
ket integration and social rights, notably the right to collective action (provided by 
Article 28 of the Charter), which was struck by the Court of Justice in the Viking 
and Laval judgments, is requested. The protection of workers’ rights and the en-
joyment of the freedoms of movement are instrumental in achieving the estab-
lishment of a common and internal market. The existing EU rules do not fully sat-
isfy these needs, and the priorities in sensitive matters, such as labour policies, are 
compared with the interests of the Member States in safeguarding their own pecu-
liarities and identity.  
Notwithstanding the recognition of the right to collective action in the general 
category of the fundamental social rights, this does not imply with certainty that 
there are specific provisions in the EU legal order; however, it necessarily indi-
cates that the EU ascribes it some importance. Recognising the fundamental social 
rights as part of the EU general principles means that, under the hierarchical 
equivalence, they may be balanced with other principles enshrined in the Treaties, 
such as the economic freedoms. As stated by the Court of Justice, the protection 
of workers may be a justifiable restriction, when lawful and proportionate, on 
these freedoms.  
The protection of the social rights was undermined in times of economic cri-
sis, when austerity measures were adopted. In this situation, the question regarded 
the compliance of such measures with the Charter, even if they did not fall direct-
ly within the scope of EU law. On the one hand, the Court declared its lack of ju-
risdiction; on the other, the Member States are however obliged to observe EU 
principles and objectives while acting under matters falling under EU law, such as 
economic and monetary policy.  
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From a substantive perspective, relevance shall be given to the rights against 
the economic principles and governance. This leads to the question of how such 
rights are effectively protected and enforced across the Member States. The EU 
legislative acts on workers’ protection provide for mechanisms of public enforce-
ment; however, private means are left to national discretion, except for the har-
monising rules imposing the obligation to ensure effective remedies.  
In this context, due to the increasing labour mobility, diverse factors give rise 
to difficulties in addressing safeguards for workers in transnational employment 
relationships. Particularly, the category of posted workers is covered by specific 
legislation (Directive 96/71 and Directive 2014/67) converging issues related to 
market freedoms, namely the free provision of services, with minimum work 
terms and conditions, defence of rights, procedures for control and private interna-
tional law aspects. The 2016 proposal for the amendment of the Posting of Work-
ers Directive is under legislative process; this has proven to be a crucial topic be-
cause the respect for the subsidiarity principle was first claimed in it. Later, 
amendments were proposed by the EU legislator that affect some aspects related 
to the minimum requirements, as well as, among other issues, the (eventually wel-
come) reference to the right to collective action. 
As to the effective judicial remedies available to individuals to seek the pro-
tection of their rights, the Member States enjoy procedural autonomy, and only 
rarely does the EU attempt to interfere with national competences. Judicial sys-
tems may nonetheless be coordinated or harmonised at the European level with a 
view to facilitating access to justice and ensuring sound administration of justice, 
economy and efficiency in proceedings. The European Union has the power to 
promote judicial cooperation and to harmonise procedural systems when this is 
aimed at better solving European situations. With regard to collective procedures, 
there is no uniform approach, nor are there any EU-tailored provisions.  
The latest legislative developments submitted by the European Commission, 
which are aimed at the convergence of national collective redress remedies 
through the establishment of common principles, are of a non-binding nature, but 
they may nevertheless serve as a starting point. They create a horizontal approach 
in dealing with collective redress, mainly referring to consumer protection and 
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victims of damages for the violation of antitrust law or environmental law. The 
employment context is not mentioned, although it is also not (explicitly) excluded.  
Looking at the existing scenario, issues related to the competent authority, the 
determination of the applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of col-
lective decisions may arise. Taking into account the relevant EU regulations, there 
are indeed a few rules on multiple litigation, but they do not specifically address 
collective redress. The rules on conflict of jurisdictions and of laws need to be 
adapted to the new rights deriving from the exercise of the freedom of movement 
that are recognised within the EU legal order. Labour law and the protection of 
workers’ rights are just an example of this modern approach. If the internal market 
is a continuous process towards the implementation of the objectives of the Un-
ion, why should the private international law rules remain unchanged, especially 
when they are aimed at protecting the weaker parties?  
From an interpretative point of view, the current private international law 
provisions may not be extended to cover situations other than those falling within 
their scope of application. This is particularly true when collective claims are in-
stituted in matters governed by protective rules. On the one hand, arguments 
against the weak nature of the actor may be put forward; on the other, the aims 
and functionality of the systems regarding the jurisdiction and applicable law may 
be hampered. Whether coincidence between forum and ius should be established 
in achieving the best solution to handle cross-border litigation is questioned. From 
the analysis of the case law and the EU institutions’ observations in light of the 
entry into force of the Brussels I Recast Regulation, coordination among private 
international law instruments must at least be assured. The need to set up a specif-
ic ground for jurisdiction over industrial actions has also been proposed: this does 
not find a proper place in the Brussels system, whereas it does in the Rome sys-
tem. Further issues arise in situations involving posted workers, which enjoy an 
alternative ground for jurisdiction and a specific conflict of laws rule. The estab-
lishment of uniform rules on collective procedures may then facilitate the circula-
tion of judgments based on the principle of mutual recognition and enforcement. 
To conclude, a more systematic approach is needed, including better coordi-
nation of the EU instruments at the horizontal level. Thus, an EU action on cross-
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border collective redress in the specific sector of employment appears necessary, 
as this would be in line with former law-making developments implemented by 
the EU with regard to the protection of other weak parties. 
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6.2. Some recommendations.  
In light of the foregoing considerations, some recommendations for adjust-
ments of the existing legislative framework related to employment matters (work-
ers and posted workers) are submitted. Such recommendations take into account 
the case law of the Court of Justice analysed so far, in which relevance has been 
given to the factual circumstances of the cases, which may indeed contribute in 
the determination of proper rules for the resolution of conflicts of jurisdictions or 
of applicable laws. 
As to the need of protecting the fundamental social rights, from a substantive 
point of view, a provision on the right to take collective action referring to both 
judicial and extrajudicial means shall be included in all relevant acts in line with 
the so-called Monti clause and as recently suggested by the Council with refer-
ence to the 2016 proposal for the amendment of Directive 96/71. However, a Re-
cital may not suffice, because it does not have legally binding effects like an arti-
cle. Therefore, with a view to concretely imposing the Member States to safe-
guard the social right in question, a provision is required in which the collective 
dimension related to the exercise of social rights and to the (judicial and extraju-
dicial) remedies for their protection and enforcement is specified. The aim is to 
guarantee both the recognition of social rights and the access to justice, regardless 
of the procedural form and of the judicial or administrative nature of the proceed-
ings. These suggestions could be considered within the legislative framework on 
workers, and especially on posted workers. 
From a procedural perspective, the adoption of common principles and com-
mon minimum standards applicable to collective redress procedures may contrib-
ute to the alignment of national civil procedural laws. This is hopefully the aim of 
the current initiatives of the Commission, which were initiated in 2013. Focusing 
on the private enforcement means would support the improvement of the existing 
EU legislation. 
Accordingly, private international law instruments should be adapted to the 
exigencies raised by collective redress systems in transnational litigation, without 
hampering their functionality. It is therefore advisable to identify a ground for ju-
risdiction that is suitable to deal with the collective dimension, as well as the pro-
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tection of the weaker party, even if that party is a collective claimant. These two 
elements may indeed be combined. Maintaining that the coincidence between fo-
rum and ius leads to the best solution (from the perspectives of the claimant, the 
defendant and the judge), identical connecting factors may be established. The so-
lutions set forth in conflict of jurisdictions or of laws rules should in any case pur-
sue the objective of protecting the weaker party to the employment relationship.  
As to collective redress concerning employment contracts and related matters, 
in the absence of a choice of court or law agreement, the jurisdictional and legisla-
tive competence may be based on the place of the employer’s establishment, 
which, from a factual assessment of the circumstances and considering that all 
plaintiff members have a link with it, is deemed to be the closest place to the em-
ployment relationship and is in line with the criterion of the place from which the 
worker receives daily instructions. This last factor was suggested by the European 
Parliament in its 2013 Resolution on the Recast Regulation, with regard to indi-
vidual disputes. In that document, it also addressed the situation regarding indus-
trial action issues and proposed that the place where the industrial action is to be 
or has been taken should be considered. Such a criterion is indeed in line with the 
conflict of laws rule provided by the Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations, and thus it should be included among the grounds for 
jurisdiction.  
In cases involving posted workers, when acting collectively against the (post-
ing or hosting) employer, the place where the workers are or were posted may be 
relevant when the disputes relate to the employment terms and conditions that 
must be respected in the host State during the posting. For any other disputes re-
lated to the employment relationship, the habitual place of work of the employees, 
or the place where the posting undertaking is established, i.e. the home country, 
shall be considered as a connecting factor. 
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